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1.1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1960 the medical care expenditures have more than doubled worldwide as a 
share of GDP (Kotlikoff and Hagist, 2005; Cutler, 2002). OECD countries have experi-
enced an average annual increase in per capita health care costs of 3.5 percent during 
the period 1990-2001, outpacing the average annual economic growth during the 
same period by about 50 percent.1 The major driving forces behind the continuing 
rise in health care costs are medical technology,2 health care services price-infl ation,3
and the aging of the population.4 Policymakers have expressed the view that contin-
ued increases in health care spending may be “unsustainable”, particularly in light of 
government budget defi cits.5
For decades, governments have been seeking suitable solutions to fi nance the ris-
ing health care costs, given the increasingly constrained collective resources. Suitable 
refers to the maintenance of affordable and universal access to basic health care 
services, the containment of aggregate spending and the improvement of technical, 
allocative and dynamic effi ciency of health care delivery (Schut, 1995). In the attempt 
to fi nd a balance between affordability and effi ciency goals, a great variety of mixes 
of different sources of health care fi nancing have emerged across countries combin-
ing out-of-pocket spending, supplementary health insurance, and collective funding 
(tax-based fi nancing or social health insurance).
Throughout this thesis, the term affordability indicates the extent to which a so-
cially acceptable level of insurance coverage is affordable for everybody.6 Depending 
on the context, the terms cross-subsidisation or solidarity may be used instead of 
affordability. By effi ciency, we refer to dynamic effi ciency, which is defi ned as quality-
improving and cost-reducing innovations in the organisation and delivery of care 
(van Barneveld et al., 2001; Schut, 1995).
1. See www.oecd.org – Health Data 2002 - and www.oecdobserver.org – graph “Healthy Growth”, 
accessed on March 2, 2006.
2. Newhouse (1992) roughly estimates that about half – and perhaps even more – of the 50-year 
(from 1940 to 1990) increase in medical care expenditure in the US is attributable to technological 
change (including new types of physical capital and new diagnostic and therapeutic procedure). See 
also Baker et al. (2003).
3. Smith et al., (2006).
4. See Population ageing and health care expenditure – www.ageing.ox.ac.uk, accessed February 11, 
2006.
5. Aaron (2003).
6. Our defi nition of affordability is partly based on the ‘normative defi nition’ proposed by Bundorf 
and Pauly, (2006).
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1.1.1. Many defi nitions of health care fi nancing schemes
The diversity of fi nancing arrangements in different countries is refl ected in the great 
variety of defi nitions adopted in the literature and by governments to describe the 
various sources of health care funding (Foubister et al., 2006; Colombo and Tapay, 
2004; Mossialos and Thomson, 2004; Mossialos and Thomson, 2002). Traditionally, 
health care fi nancing schemes are classifi ed along two dimensions: “public” and 
“private”. Yet the meanings attributed to public or private fi nancing schemes are not 
uniformly defi ned. There are several ways to distinguish between public and private 
health care fi nancing schemes. These distinctions can be based on factors such as 
the degree of cross-subsidisation inherent in the scheme, the intensity of regulation, 
the ownership and management of the scheme, the level of compulsion in participa-
tion, the extent to which an insurance entity actually bears fi nancial risks, and the 
sources of funding (OECD, 2004; Mossialos and Thomson, 2002). Due to the use of 
different distinguishing factors, the boundaries between private and public health 
care fi nancing schemes appear quite blurred.
Dror (2000) noticed that there has been a convergence between public and pri-
vate health care fi nancing arrangements in terms of the degree of cross-subsidisa-
tion and intensity of regulation. For instance, several countries (including Australia, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States) reduced cross-
subsidies and increased cost-sharing in public fi nancing schemes and, conversely, 
introduced regulations to enhance the degree of cross-subsidisation in private insur-
ance arrangements.
The distinction between public and private fi nancing schemes based on the (pub-
lic or private) nature of insurers is also problematic. Social security schemes can be 
administered and managed by private institutions, such as mutual companies in Bel-
gium or private insurers in the Netherlands. On the other hand, government-owned 
insurers can also provide private insurance. VHI Healthcare (formerly the Voluntary 
Health Insurance Board) is a state-backed entity providing private voluntary insur-
ance in Ireland. Medibank Private is the largest non-profi t state-backed fund provid-
ing private voluntary insurance in Australia. In some cases, the same insurance entity 
may offer different types of cover (eg. in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland).
In some countries (eg. the Netherlands and Switzerland), individuals are required 
to purchase mandatory health insurance from private competing risk-bearing insur-
ers. Nevertheless, this insurance is regulated in a manner similar to public schemes 
in other OECD countries, since the benefi ts package is standardised, premiums are 
community-rated, and enrolment is open (Colombo, 2001; van de Ven et al., 2006). 
In most OECD countries, supplementary insurance is purchased on a voluntary basis 
from private for-profi t companies, while coverage for basic services is mandatory 
for at least some groups in the population. However, there are also cases in which 
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the law mandates participation to private supplementary health insurance (eg. Bel-
gium and Germany). In addition, there are cases of public basic health care fi nancing 
schemes for which participation is voluntary (eg. Germany).
1.1.2. Classifying health care fi nancing schemes
A classifi cation of health care fi nancing schemes based on the dichotomy public-pri-
vate can not provide a clear and uniform defi nition of health care fi nancing schemes. 
Therefore, a uniform and coherent conceptual framework that clearly distinguishes 
between different health care fi nancing schemes is needed in order to analyse the 
features and the interactions between different fi nancing schemes.
We envisage two essential dimensions for defi ning different health care fi nancing 
arrangements: 1) the type of services and 2) the type of coverage they provide. By 
services we mean health care goods and services,7 and by coverage we refer to the 
level of compensation of the costs of a set of predefi ned health care services. Cover-
age may be either in-kind or in-cash.
In this thesis, we distinguish between basic and supplementary services, and be-
tween mandatory and voluntary coverage. Historically in most countries the crucial 
element of distinction between basic and supplementary services has been cross-
subsidisation. Therefore, basic services are defi ned as the set of health care services 
for which the government enforces a system of mandatory cross-subsidies from low- 
to high- risk groups or from high- to low- income groups. Supplementary services
are defi ned as the set of health services that do not fulfi l the conditions for being 
considered as basic. We defi ne mandatory coverage if the government imposes on 
consumers a legal obligation to obtain coverage. By contrast, we refer to voluntary 
coverage when people are free to decide which services to cover. Restrictions on 
choice of coverage as a result of employment-based group contracts do not fall under 
the scope of our defi nition of mandatory coverage, since these restrictions are not 
the result of government regulation. Then, the term basic coverage (BC) refers to 
schemes that provide access to (the coverage of) basic health care services within 
a certain society, and supplementary coverage (SC) to schemes providing access to 
(the coverage of) supplementary services, which are by defi nition excluded from BC. 
Mandatory coverage (MC) refers to schemes that provide mandatory coverage for 
either basic or supplementary services. In case these services are basic we refer to 
mandatory basic coverage (MBC), if they are supplementary we refer to mandatory 
supplementary coverage (MSC). In case there is no legal obligation set by the govern-
7. In the insurance literature the term benefi ts is widely adopted to refer to health care services and 
goods. Throughout this thesis the term benefi ts is sometimes used, particularly when referring to 
services provided by insurance schemes or contracts.
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ment limiting consumers’ choice of coverage, we are in presence of voluntary cover-
age (VC), which may provide coverage for either basic (VBC) or supplementary (VSC) 
services (see Figure 1). Apart from countries where the distinction between MBC and 
VBC or between MSC and VSC is necessary, we use BC and SC to refer to MBC and 
to VSC schemes, respectively. If the basic or the supplementary coverage (BC or SC) 
are offered by an insurer, we also adopt the terms basic health insurance (BI) and 
supplementary health insurance (SI) schemes.
According to our classifi cation, National Health Service (NHS) and social health 
insurance schemes can be categorised as schemes providing mandatory basic health 
care coverage (MBC), given that the coverage is mandatory and the system of cross-
subsidies fi nances directly basic services’ provision or the coverage for these services. 
In National Health Insurance (NHI) or Service (NHS) countries, such as Australia, 
Canada, France, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom, every resident is to some ex-
tent mandated by the law to contribute to health care fi nancing (eg. via taxes) and 
is entitled to access a uniformly predefi ned set of services from specifi c providers. In 
Figure 1. Classifying health care fi nancing schemes
Figure 1. Classifying health care financing schemes 
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social health insurance countries such as Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, the government has introduced a legal mandate for the majority 
of the population to purchase coverage for a uniform set of basic (ie. subsidised) 
entitlements from competing health insurers or sickness funds.
Examples of voluntary basic coverage (VBC) can be found in several countries. In 
general, VBC pursues one or more of the following three different functions:
a) It duplicates the fi nancial coverage for services already fully covered by MBC, but 
with increased choice over providers and reduced waiting times; or
b) It provides a substitute for individuals not eligible for MBC;
c) It complements the coverage of services for which individuals are not or only 
partly covered (ie. co-payments) by MBC.
Duplicate VBC is typical of countries with so-called Beveridge-style tax-funded health 
care systems (ie. National Health Service (NHS)), eg. Australia, Ireland, Mediterranean 
countries, New Zealand, Nordic countries, United Kingdom. In these countries VBC 
provides insured access to care that duplicates many of the basic services provided 
by the NHS, to which VBC’s subscribers retain full access. The key VBC’s attractions in 
these countries are faster access to basic services, a more comfortable care environ-
ment, a wider choice of providers and better (perceived) quality of care. Among this 
group, Australia and Ireland are the most signifi cant cases of duplicate VBC. They 
both have a large population segment (over 40 percent) with VBC and a similar share 
of total health expenditures (over 7 percent). In both countries the government has 
introduced several institutional (ie. a risk-equalisation scheme) and regulatory (ie. 
community-rating) arrangements to guarantee the fi nancial access of high-risk in-
dividuals to VBC. In Ireland, VBC also provides substitutive coverage for services (eg. 
GP) for which certain groups (eg. high-income people) are not covered by MBC. VBC 
is present also in Germany for about 10 percent of the population (ie. high-income 
groups) who are not eligible for MBC. In France, 90 percent of the population buys 
subsidised-VBC to insure for services (eg. hospital care, prescription drugs) not fully 
covered (eg. co-payments) by the MBC scheme. Although in most countries the vol-
untary coverage of services (eg. medical devices) that are completely excluded from 
MBC is not subsidised, in some countries (eg. Australia, France and Ireland) individu-
als may benefi t from cross-subsidies (VBC).
For goods or services completely excluded from collective fi nancing, individuals 
are allowed to purchase VSC in all OECD countries. However, in Belgium and Germany, 
the governments have enforced the mandate for sickness funds’ enrolees to purchase 
coverage for some services that are excluded from the basic benefi ts package. More 
specifi cally, in Belgium the law prescribes that all insured are obliged to enrol with 
the same insurer for both basic and (some) supplementary services. In Germany, BC 
providers may choose whether or not to provide coverage for (some) supplementary 
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services, and all of them do so. If BC providers choose to provide coverage for (some) 
legally determined supplementary services, they must offer it to all their BC enrolees, 
who must buy it unless they change BC provider.
1.1.3. Trends
Over the past decades two trends can be observed in most OECD countries. On the 
one hand, policymakers focused on achieving universal access to health care services 
by establishing and gradually expanding mandatory coverage for a uniformly pre-
defi ned set of services to the entire population (Cutler, 2002; Hurst, 1990). On the 
other hand, along with the gradual expansion of mandatory coverage, health care re-
forms in most OECD countries aimed at containing the collective fi nancing of health 
care by increasing the share of individual fi nancial responsibility and participation to 
the fi nancing of health care spending (Colombo and Tapay, 2004; Cutler, 2002). Shift-
ing (parts of) the costs of health care away from collective to individual responsibility 
led to an increase in the demand for voluntary and supplementary health insurance, 
and thereby to a proliferation of several intertwined health care fi nancing schemes. 
In particular, most OECD countries have limited the comprehensiveness of schemes 
providing universal mandatory basic health care coverage by allowing individu-
als to increasingly rely on voluntary basic or supplementary health care fi nancing 
schemes.
In most of the following OECD countries, voluntary basic or supplementary health 
care fi nancing schemes have been playing an important role in the last decades:
– Australia (Colombo and Tapay, 2003; Bloom, 2000);
– Belgium (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2003);
– Canada (Finkelstein, 2002; Flood and Archibald, 2001);
– France (Buchmueller and Couffi nhal, 2004);
– Germany (Wasem et al., 2004);
– Ireland (Nolan, 2006);
– Israel (Brammli-Greenberg and Gross, 2003);
– the Netherlands (Schut et al., 2004);
– Switzerland (Beck et al., 2003; Colombo, 2001);
– the United States (Docteur et al., 2003; Eppig and Chulis, 1997).
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the role of supplementary health care fi nancing in 
terms of share of total health care fi nancing or in terms of percentage of insured has 
increased in several OECD countries (see Table 1). In terms of share of MBC-spending, 
SC-expenditures increased in Canada (from 11 to 16 percent), Germany (from 2 to 
3 percent), Israel (from 3 to 5 percent) and the Netherlands (from 5 to 7 percent), 
General Introduction 21
TA
B
LE
 1.
 T
re
nd
s 
in
di
ca
ti
ng
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 ro
le
 o
f V
BC
 &
 S
C 
a
Au
st
ra
lia
Be
lg
iu
m
Ca
na
da
Fr
an
ce
Ge
rm
an
y
Ire
la
nd
Is
ra
el
Th
e 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Ex
p 
SC
/E
xp
 M
BC
 %
Or Ex
p 
VB
C/
Ex
p 
BC
 %
19
85
: 1
3.
2%
- 19
91
: 2
4%
19
93
: 2
4.
3 
%
19
97
: 2
5%
19
99
: 2
1%
20
00
: 1
8%
20
01
: 1
8.
2%
- -
2%
- 19
90
: 1
1%
- - - - 20
00
: 1
6.
1%
- - -
- 19
90
: 1
4.
4%
- - - - 20
00
: 1
6.
8%
- - -
- - - - 19
97
: 2
.1
%
- - - 20
03
: 2
.2
 %
20
05
: 3
%
- 19
90
: 1
2.
6%
19
91
: 1
4.
5%
19
93
: 1
8.
3%
19
97
: 1
6.
1%
- 20
00
: 1
8%
20
01
: 1
4.
1%
- -
- - - - - 19
99
: 3
.3
%
20
00
: 4
.1
%
- 20
03
: 5
.3
%
-
- - - - 19
97
: 5
.4
%
- 20
00
: 6
.3
%
- 20
03
: 6
.5
%
-
- - - - 19
96
/7
: 3
7%
- 20
00
: 2
8%
- 20
03
: 2
3%
-
- 19
90
: 8
.6
%
b
- - - - 20
00
: 7
.9
%
- - -
Sh
ar
e 
of
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
bu
yi
ng
 V
BC
/S
C
- - 19
87
: 4
7.
2%
19
93
: 3
9.
9%
19
97
: 3
1.
3 
%
19
99
: 3
0.
1%
20
00
: 4
2.
1%
20
01
: 4
4.
9%
- -
95
%
65
%
92
%
- - - 19
93
: 8
%
 c
- - - - 20
03
: 1
1%
 c
-
19
57
: 1
5%
19
80
: 2
6%
19
87
: 3
0%
19
93
: 3
5%
- 19
99
: 4
2%
- - 20
03
: 4
7%
20
06
: 5
0%
 d
- - - - - 19
99
: 4
5.
8%
20
00
: 5
6.
0%
- 20
03
: 6
6.
0%
-
- - - - 19
97
: 9
4.
5%
- 20
00
: 9
2.
9%
- 20
03
: 9
2.
1%
-
- - - - 19
97
: 6
2%
- - - 20
03
: 7
1%
-
- - - - 19
97
: 6
0%
 e
19
99
: 5
9%
20
00
: 5
7.
4%
20
01
: 6
0%
- -
Re
le
va
nc
e 
of
 V
BC
/
SC
 in
 h
ea
lth
ca
re
 
fi n
an
ci
ng
Mo
de
ra
te
Lo
w
Mo
de
ra
te
Hi
gh
Lo
w
Mo
de
ra
te
Mo
de
ra
te
Mo
de
ra
te
Hi
gh
Mo
de
ra
te
a  T
he
 r
ef
er
en
ce
s 
of
 a
ll 
th
e 
da
ta
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 in
 t
he
 t
ab
le
s 
ar
e 
lis
te
d 
pe
r 
co
un
tr
y 
in
 t
he
 a
bo
ve
 t
ex
t.
b  T
he
se
 fi 
gu
re
s 
re
fe
r 
to
 t
ot
al
 p
ub
lic
 a
nd
 p
ri
va
te
 s
pe
nd
in
g.
c  T
he
se
 fi 
gu
re
s 
re
fe
r 
on
ly
 t
o 
VS
C-
en
ro
le
es
, 
si
nc
e 
10
0%
 M
BC
-e
nr
ol
ee
s 
ha
s 
M
SC
.
d  4
3.
0%
 a
re
 n
on
-m
ed
ic
al
 c
ar
d 
ho
ld
er
s.
e  T
he
se
 fi 
gu
re
s 
re
fe
r 
to
 t
he
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
be
ne
fi c
ia
rie
s 
bu
yi
ng
 S
up
pl
em
en
ta
l I
ns
ur
an
ce
.
Ch
ap
te
r 
1
22
mainly because of government policies that focused on reducing collective health 
care fi nancing and increasing coverage of services previously paid for out-of-pocket. 
While representing only a small share of total health care fi nancing, on average SC 
covers 60 percent or more of the population in OECD countries. The share of individu-
als purchasing VSC has increased particularly in Germany (from 8 to 11 percent), Israel 
(from 46 to 66 percent) and Switzerland (from 62 to 71 percent) and it is steadily high 
in Canada (65 percent) and the Netherlands (92 percent).
Table 1 shows also that other countries (eg. Australia, France and Ireland,) in the 
attempt of containing collective fi nancing relied on VBC rather than on SC. The share 
of VBC-expenditures as a percentage of MBC-spending has been fl uctuating (eg. 
Australia and Ireland) and, in some cases, has increased over time (eg. France). The 
percentage of the population buying VBC has increased in Australia (from 40 to 45 
percent) and Ireland (from 35 to 50 percent) and is remarkably high in France (92 per-
cent). The fl uctuations in the shares of both VBC and SC in some countries are mainly 
related to the introduction of universal mandatory basic health care coverage (such 
as Medicare in Australia (1983) and social health insurance in Switzerland (1996)).
1.1.4. Implications for effi ciency and affordability
In this thesis, we focus mainly on the design of the different health care fi nancing 
schemes and on the consequences for effi ciency and affordability of shifting (parts 
of) the costs of health care from mandatory basic health care fi nancing schemes 
(hereafter simply basic health insurance, ie. BI) to supplementary health care fi nanc-
ing schemes (ie. SI).
The trend towards an increasing role of supplementary health insurance may 
cause concern. Most countries encourage competition in supplementary health in-
surance markets as a means of increasing fl exibility, effi ciency and enhancing con-
sumer choice. The absence of detailed government regulations in competitive mar-
kets for supplementary health insurance may enhance cost-effective substitution 
of care (technical effi ciency), provision of ‘tailor-made’ care to consumers (allocative 
effi ciency) and quality-improving and cost-reducing innovations in the organisation 
and delivery of care (dynamic effi ciency). On the other hand, a continuous decrease 
of collective spending accompanied by an increasing reliance on competitive and 
unregulated markets for supplementary health insurance is likely to prompt an in-
creasing confl ict with society’s goal of affordable access to coverage (van de Ven et 
al., 2003; van de Ven et al., 2000). Besides, reducing collective fi nancing may also 
result in a welfare loss to society if individuals’ (altruistic) preferences cannot be met 
(Schut, 1995).
In an unregulated competitive market for health insurance, the premium per 
contract will be based on expected costs (equivalence principle). For individual insur-
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ance, this implies that premiums would be differentiated according to risk factors 
such as age, gender, health status, etc. (ie. risk-rating). For example, the premium of 
an old or chronically ill person would be much higher than the premium of a young 
or healthy person. Furthermore, insurers might refuse to cover high-risk individuals 
for whom an appropriate premium cannot be calculated and/or they might exclude 
pre-existing medical conditions from coverage (ie. risk-selection).
In some countries (ie. Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland) 
SI covers services excluded from a legally determined basic package of services of-
fered by competing insurers or sickness funds. If supplementary insurance is com-
bined with basic insurance or is offered by the same entities or their affi liates, it may 
be used as a tool for risk-selection in a competitive BI market. In sum, the expansion 
of supplementary health insurance may have serious consequences for both the ef-
fi ciency and affordability of basic health care services.
1.2. AIM AND CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY
In this thesis, we propose a typology of health care fi nancing schemes that is based 
on the dimensions of basic/supplementary (services) and mandatory/voluntary (cov-
erage). The proposed classifi cation serves to analyse the design of different funding 
schemes and the interactions between basic and supplementary health care fi nanc-
ing schemes. As far as we know, an in-depth analysis of the implications of an in-
creasing share of supplementary health care fi nancing on affordability and effi ciency 
has not yet been performed.
Given this background this manuscript focuses on the design of basic and supplemen-
tary health care fi nancing schemes. The main purpose of this study is to investigate 
the consequences of an increasing share of supplementary health care fi nancing on 
effi ciency and affordability of basic services.
The main contributions of this study are the development of a theoretical framework 
for the analysis of the design of health care fi nancing schemes, and an empirical and 
institutional analysis of the interactions between basic and supplementary sources 
of fi nancing. This study provides a better understanding of the strength and weak-
nesses of the fi nancial and organisational structures of different countries’ health 
care fi nancing schemes. In particular, it focuses on countries with a competitive mar-
ket for mandatory basic health insurance and on competitive markets for supplemen-
tary health insurance regardless of whether coverage is mandatory or voluntary.
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1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the proposed classifi cation of health care fi nancing schemes, this study 
focuses on the design of basic and supplementary health care fi nancing schemes 
and, in particular, on the implications of an increasing reliance on supplementary 
health care fi nancing schemes on the effi ciency and affordability of basic health care 
services.
Chapter two provides a theoretical framework that investigates the economic ra-
tionales for the design of health care fi nancing schemes. We distinguish between the 
arguments for governments to implement a system of mandatory cross-subsidies 
that aims at achieving an affordable access to care for vulnerable groups (ie. low-
income or high-risk people); and the arguments to enforce mandatory coverage for 
a predefi ned set of health care services. Based on this distinction, we investigate 
whether and to what extent the introduction of universal mandatory coverage for 
a uniform set of services is necessary and proportionate to achieve an affordable 
access to care for vulnerable groups. We also consider the economic rationales for 
alternative strategies. In particular, the following research question is addressed:
1. What can be the economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of 
mandatory cross-subsidies and to implement a legal mandate to obtain cover-
age for a set of predefi ned services?
In the third chapter, we apply the conceptual analysis developed in chapter 2 to the 
following OECD countries: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. The focus of this chapter is to dis-
cern whether the actual design of different countries’ health care fi nancing schemes 
is consistent with the economic rationales for mandatory cross-subsidies and for 
mandatory coverage. Specifi cally the following question is addressed:
2. Is the design of health care fi nancing schemes in the selected countries in con-
formity with the economic rationales for organising a system of mandatory 
cross-subsidies, and for imposing mandatory coverage?
Chapter four investigates the potential for risk-rating in supplementary health insur-
ance markets. An empirical analysis is developed to determine the reduction of cross-
subsidies caused by the transfer of benefi ts from mandatory basic health insurance 
with community-rated premiums to voluntary supplementary health insurance with 
risk-rated premiums. The central questions of this chapter are the following:
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3. Why and to what extent do insurers risk-rate premiums in supplementary health 
insurance markets?
4. What is the potential for risk-rating caused by transferring services from basic to 
supplementary health insurance?
In chapter fi ve, we evaluate the prospects for solidarity (ie. affordability) in com-
petitive markets for both basic and supplementary health insurance and discuss the 
relevance and potential effects for national policies of supranational regulations. In 
particular, this chapter proposes an economic analysis of the several intervention 
strategies that can be adopted by governments to regulate competition in health 
insurance markets with the aim of achieving solidarity. The analysis relates to both 
basic and supplementary health insurance markets. The purpose is to determine the 
fi rst-best regulatory intervention strategy to achieve solidarity in competitive health 
insurance markets, from a theoretical perspective. Furthermore, the chapter evalu-
ates the potential impact of supranational law (ie. European Community (EC) law) on 
national regulations sustaining solidarity in competitive basic and supplementary 
health insurance markets. Specifi cally the following questions are addressed:
5. What is the best strategy that governments can adopt to achieve an “acceptable 
level of solidarity” in competitive health insurance markets from an economic 
perspective?
6. Do the different intervention strategies conform to the EC legal framework?
In the sixth chapter, the focus is on how the design and operation of supplementary 
health insurance markets can affect the behaviour of insurers offering basic health 
insurance. In particular, an international comparison is made with the aim of assess-
ing whether supplementary health insurance is likely to be used as a tool for risk-
selection in the following fi ve countries with competitive markets for basic health 
insurance: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The questions 
guiding this chapter are:
7. What are the conditions under which supplementary health insurance can be 
used as a selection device in competitive markets for mandatory basic health 
insurance?
8. To what extent are these conditions fulfi lled in the competitive mandatory basic 
health insurance markets of the fi ve countries considered?
Finally the main fi ndings are summarised in Chapter seven.
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For the convenience of the reader the following remark is made. Because (versions 
of) the chapters have been submitted, accepted or published as independent articles 
in scholarly journals,8 they can be read independently.
8. Versions of chapter 2, 3 and 4 have been submitted for publication to international (health) eco-
nomics journals. Chapters 5 and 6 have been published in Health Economics Policy and Law (Paolucci 
et al., 2006-2007).
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2.
Economic rationales for the design of 
health care fi nancing schemes
summary  In this chapter we investigate the economic rationales for the 
design of health care fi nancing schemes. We make an explicit distinction 
between the arguments for governments to implement a system of mandatory 
cross-subsidies to achieve affordability in the fi nancial access to basic services 
for high-risk or low-income individuals, and the arguments to mandate the 
coverage for predefi ned health care services.
We argue that the most important economic arguments to enforce a system 
of cross-subsidies are related to: the presence of externalities in health care 
services consumption; the individuals’ risk of becoming bad risks; and the moral 
hazard effects induced by cross-subsidisation.
The rationale for mandatory coverage is based on considerations of free riding 
behaviour, individuals’ lack of foresight and too high transaction costs of 
alternative ways to organise cross-subsidies.
Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of health 
care fi nancing arrangements. We argue that imposing a universal mandate 
to obtain uniform coverage for predefi ned services is not a necessary and 
proportionate measure to increase the affordability of health care for 
vulnerable groups. To achieve affordability it is suffi cient if governments 
impose mandatory cross-subsidies. By allowing variations over income groups 
in the composition of the mandatory benefi ts packages and/or on the level of 
deductibles moral hazard can be reduced as compared to a universal mandate 
for a uniform coverage.
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2.1. INTRODUCTION
In most countries governments decide about the introduction of mandatory cover-
age and mandatory cross-subsidies on the basis of a number of underlying argu-
ments. These arguments can be manifold eg. ethical, historical (ie. path dependency), 
political (ie. pressure groups), economic etc. In this chapter, the focus is on the set of 
economic rationales for the design of health care fi nancing schemes. For this pur-
pose, a general framework is developed that analyses the main economic rationales 
underlying the political choice of enforcing a system of mandatory cross-subsidies 
and introducing a mandatory coverage provision. In particular, the following ques-
tion is addressed:
• What can be the economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of 
mandatory cross-subsidies and to implement a legal mandate to purchase cover-
age for a set of predefi ned services?
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next sections, we make a distinction be-
tween a system of mandatory cross-subsidies (section 2.2.) imposed to achieve afford-
ability in the fi nancial access to basic services, and mandatory coverage (section 2.3.) 
introduced to guarantee that certain groups of individuals are covered and protected 
against the fi nancial risk of needing certain medical services. This distinction is based 
on the divergence between the arguments for the enforcement of a system of man-
datory cross-subsidies and the arguments to mandate the coverage for predefi ned 
health care services. The main implications for the design of health care fi nancing 
schemes are summarised (section 2.4.).
2.2. MANDATORY CROSS-SUBSIDIES
Although universal mandatory coverage for a uniform set of services may guarantee 
an affordable access to care, it may not be a necessary and proportionate tool from 
an economic perspective. In order to achieve an affordable access to basic health 
care services for vulnerable groups (eg. low-income or high-risks individuals), it is 
suffi cient for governments to introduce a system of cross-subsidies, in which low-risk 
and/or high-income individuals contribute to the fi nancing of health care services 
needed by high-risk and/or low-income individuals.1 Although in most societies indi-
1. In this thesis, cross-subsidisation may apply to both services and insurance coverage. There are 
several intervention strategies to increase the fi nancial accessibility to care or to health insurance. 
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viduals appear to be willing to support such a system of cross-subsidies, government 
intervention may be required in order to assure its existence and functioning. Theo-
retically, government intervention would not be necessary if the individuals’ willing-
ness to cross-subsidise overwhelms the incentives for free riding. In particular, if the 
contributions are not given voluntarily (eg. by external donors) governments may 
have to impose a system of mandatory income- or risk- related cross-subsidies.2 The 
broader the minimum set of health services considered as basic,3 the higher are the 
mandatory cross-subsidies’ contributions.
In the following subsections, we discern the main economic arguments related to 
the enforcement of a system of mandatory cross-subsidies that aims at achieving 
affordable fi nancial access to health care services for the high-risk and/or the low-
income groups. In particular, we distinguish and discuss the following economic ar-
guments: the presence of externalities in the demand for some health care services 
(section 2.2.1.), the individual’s risk of becoming a high-risk (section 2.2.2.), and the 
moral hazard effect induced by cross-subsidisation (section 2.2.3.).
2.2.1. Externalities
For some goods and services, including many forms of medical treatment, consum-
ers may be willing to pay for the consumption by others. A reason for this is that 
the consumption of health care services produces external effects. Externalities arise 
when a consumption (production) activity of one set of individuals affects the utility 
functions of other individuals, while this effect is not included in the individuals’ 
utility functions (Rosen, 2005). Externalities can be both positive and negative. Posi-
tive (negative) externalities occur when actions of one set of individuals make other 
individuals better (worse) off, yet the fi rst set neither bear the costs nor receive the 
benefi ts of doing so (Gruber, 2005). The external effects generated by an individual’s 
(non-) consumption of health care services’ are mainly the consequence of two types 
of interpersonal preferences: altruistic and egoistic preferences. The literature tracks 
down a third type of interpersonal preferences so-called paternalistic preferences 
(van Doorslaer and Schut, 1999; Culyer and Simpson, 1980). Since the only difference 
between paternalistic and altruistic preferences is in the extent and the focus of an 
individual’s concern about others, we simply distinguish between two types of altru-
istic preferences. We refer to type-1 altruistic preferences if an individual’s concern is 
For a more in depth analysis of two of the strategies (ie. explicit premium-subsidies and implicit 
premium-subsidies) we refer to chapter 5 in this thesis.
2. Empirical evidence concerning the importance of the free rider problem in public good provision 
is not conclusive (see Brunner, 1998; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997).
3. Basic services are the totality of cross-subsidised services.
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about others’ general wellbeing and to type-2 altruistic preferences if an individual 
concerns specifi cally about others’ health status.4
2.2.1.1. Altruistic preferences5
A fi rst important consumption externality in health care is the presence of type-1 
altruistic preferences that is an individual’s concern about the wellbeing of others. 
Thus, an individual’s concern about others’ well being generates an altruistic exter-
nality that calls for subsidisation. Type-1 altruistic preferences may undertake a very 
general form of interpersonal dependencies. For instance, the interpersonal utility 
function for individual B may look like the following:
 UB= UB (HB, UA[HA (MA), CA], CB)
The utility of B is in this case a direct function of the utility of individual A and 
therefore of A’s health status (HA) and non-medical consumption (CA). An important 
implication of this model is that B respects the preferences of A. For example, if A 
prefers other goods (CA) over health or health care, than B may also be willing to pay 
for A’s consumption of these other goods (CA). Therefore, A freely chooses, based on 
his/her own preferences, whether to consume medical care (MA) or other goods (CA). 
A fi nancial transfer of income (lump sum) from B to A would appear to be the sim-
plest transaction in order to increase A’s utility.6 Alternatively, an individual’s concern 
about others may not be focused on others’ general wellbeing but specifi cally on their 
health status (type-2 altruistic preferences). In other words, an individual may prefer 
to contribute to improvements in others’ health status rather than others’ general 
welfare (Reinhardt, 1998; Arrow, 1963). In this case, type-2 altruistic preferences may 
be expressed by the following interpersonal utility function for individual B:
 UB= UB (HB, HA(MA), CB)
4. The social concern for the distribution of the use of health care services may be based on viewing 
medical care as involving good-specifi c altruism (Diamond, 1992) or commodity-egalitarism (Evans, 
1978).
5. In this chapter, we do not deal with the question: what determines altruism? This question has 
given rise to an entire fi eld of study of social capital, the value of altruistic and communal behaviour 
in society. A central fi nding of this fi eld is that individuals are likely to be more altruistic when they 
are more “trusting” others. Anderson et al. (2003) found that most of the attitudinal and behavioural 
measures of trust were positively correlated with high contributions to merit or public goods.
6. The problem with this “lump-sum solution” is the virtual impossibility of establishing lump-sum 
taxes and subsidies that do not affect incentives of either the payer of the tax or the recipient of the 
subsidy (Graaff, 1971; Nath, 1969; Samuelson, 1947).
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The utility of B is a direct function of A’s health status (HA), therefore B’s willing-
ness to subsidise limits itself to A’s medical consumption, in so far that it positively 
contributes to A’s health status. Possible interpersonal transactions, which could in-
crease the utilities of both individuals, would have to be income- or risk- related sub-
sidies earmarked to the consumption of specifi c services that positively contribute 
to health. Most people seem to be unwilling to deny effective care to other members 
of society.7 Presumably, an individual’s concern toward others’ health status does not 
only depend on the effectiveness of treatments, but also on the costs and the sever-
ity of the illness. For instance, in case of lifesaving interventions individuals may be 
willing to cross-subsidise the fi nancial access of high-risk or low-income individuals 
to services or treatments, even if they are not particularly cost-effective. Thus, altru-
istic preferences may be stronger for some health care services than for others.
Given the presence of altruistic preferences, an individual’s utility of supporting a 
system of cross-subsidies may depend on the following factors: the cost-effectiveness 
of services, the initial health status of the benefi ciary, the expected cost of services 
per consumer, and the consumers’ responsibility for the incidence of the disease. 
Each of these factors will be discussed below.
Cost-effectiveness of services
Cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA) are usually indicated as the primary tools policy-
makers adopt in deciding whether to include (or exclude) a service in the basket 
(Drummond et al., 1997).8 The results of a CEA are summarised by the cost-effective-
ness (CE) ratio.9 The CE ratio compares the incremental cost of an intervention with 
7. Van den Berg et al. (1986) found evidence of the presence of strong altruistic preferences for 
medical care consumption in the Netherlands. From data of the 1985 Health Interview Survey by the 
Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) they conclude that 78 percent of the representative 
sample population fully disagreed with the statement that ‘people with a less favourable health 
status should pay more for health care than people in good health’ (9 percent partially agreed, only 3 
percent fully agreed and 10 percent had no opinion).
8. An extensive literature review about CEA methodology may be found elsewhere (Hauck et al., 
2003). Key problems include choice of a summary measure to capture other benefi ts important to pa-
tients and the public; non-comparability of the values elicited with different health state value elici-
tation instruments; generalisability of studies beyond the study setting or country; choice of target 
population receiving the intervention; accounting for uncertainty in measuring costs and outcomes; 
inability to account for the opportunity costs of the cost-increasing element of new interventions; 
and the requirement to consider portfolios of programmes, rather than individual technologies.
9. Let the subscripts 1 and 0 denote the intervention under study and the alternative to which it is 
compared, respectively. If C1 and C0 are the net present values of costs that result when the interven-
tion and alternatives are used, and E1 and E0 their respective health outcomes, the incremental CE 
ratio is simply: CE ratio = (C1 - C0)/(E1 - E0). This ratio, which is a cost per unit incremental health effect, 
is often used as a measure of value.
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the incremental health improvement attributable to the intervention. The health 
improvements of using the intervention are typically measured in quality-adjusted 
life-years (QALYs) gained. Therefore, the CE ratio is usually expressed as a cost per 
QALY gained.10 The intervention with the relatively lower CE ratio is considered the 
most cost-effective. In other words, CE ratios indicate which health care services will 
provide health improvements most effi ciently (ie. at a lower cost) (Garber, 2000).
The information provided by CE ratios may affect an individual’s utility of con-
tributing to a system of cross-subsidies, since they allow comparisons among dif-
ferent services in terms of costs and effects (ie. measured in QALYs). Economically 
rational individuals with altruistic preferences maximise their utility by maximising 
the effect of cross-subsidies on others’ health status. In particular, the effect of cross-
subsidisation on others’ health status increases the lower the CE ratio of the treat-
ment. The lower the CE ratios of services are, the more effective cross-subsidisation 
on others’ health status is, and thereby the more the altruistic preferences of rational 
individuals are satisfi ed. All in all, the lower the CE ratio of an intervention for a speci-
fi ed diagnosis, the higher an individual’s utility of contributing to a system of cross-
subsidies that guarantees the fi nancial access to the intervention by others.
Initial health status of the benefi ciary
Cost-effectiveness information is not the only grounds on which individuals’ altru-
istic preferences are based, and thereby for governments to decide whether a cer-
tain service should be cross-subsidised. For instance, in the case of lung- or heart-
transplants, a relatively high cost-effectiveness ratio does not appear to constitute 
a suffi cient motivation to exclude these services from cross-subsidisation in most 
countries. A parallel argument can be made for Viagra, which is not included in the 
basic basket of most countries despite its low cost-effectiveness ratio.
Apparently, when it comes to assess whether and to what extent specifi c health 
care services generate altruistic externalities, other factors, besides cost-effective-
ness, such as the individuals’ initial health status have to be considered.11 Our propo-
sition is that an increase in an individual’s utility produced by an improvement of a 
10. In many respects QALYs are analogous to life expectancy, but include interventions that improve 
quality of life even when they do not affect survival. Each year that an individual lives longer contrib-
utes an additional year to the life expectancy calculation. The amount that each additional year of 
life adds to QALYs, in contrast, is a preference weight or utility that takes a value between 0 (death) 
and 1 (best health imaginable).
11. Although related to the argument of individuals’ initial health status, the concepts of severity of 
illness (Nord et al., 1999), fair inning (Williams, 1997) and proportional shortfall (Stolk, 2004; Johan-
nesson, 2001) will not be discussed, since they do not explicitly refer to the variation in an individual’s 
utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies generated by an improvement in others’ health sta-
tus or quality of life.
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given size in others’ health status is likely to be greater the lower the patient’s initial 
health status.
From the “law of diminishing marginal return” it follows that an improvement on 
an individual’s “own” health status increases his or her “own” utility more the lower 
his “own” health status. This is also likely to hold for the marginal utility of “other’s” 
health. The assumption of decreasing marginal utility of “other’s” health implies that 
for equal improvements on A’s health status (HA1- HA0= H’A1- H’A0), the difference in 
B’s utility decreases the higher is A’s initial health status (U’B1- U’B0 < UB1- UB0). More 
precisely:
 δ UB (HA) / δ HA < 0
Therefore, the plausible assumption of decreasing marginal utility of “other’s” health 
implies that an individual’s marginal utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies 
that guarantees the fi nancial access to specifi c services is greater the lower others’ 
initial health status. Everything equal, the poorer the initial health status (measured 
in QALYs) of a patient, the more the effect of cross-subsidies satisfi es an individual’s 
altruistic preferences.
In current CEA, health improvements (ie. gains in QALYs) produced by consump-
tion of health care services are weighted equally regardless the initial health status 
of patients. Thus, only the number of QALYs gained determines priority, while in a 
decision-making process of a rational altruistic individual QALYs that are gained by 
people with a lower initial health status may be given more weight. For instance, 
patients eligible for a lung transplant normally are in such poor health states (in 
Figure 2, closer to 0 on the X axis, ie. HA0), which altruistic individuals may fi nd it ac-
ceptable to cross-subsidise the high cost per QALY in order to provide patients with a 
‘last resort medicine’. This phenomenon may be especially pronounced for lifesaving 
interventions. In contrast, erectile dysfunction is generally considered not to be life-
threatening. Since it generally occurs to people with good health status (in Figure 
2, H’A0, ie. high initial health status), the QALY gains produced by Viagra, which is a 
cost-effective treatment, would receive a relatively low weight.12 In deciding whether 
(and for which diagnoses) the fi nancial access to a service should be cross-subsidised, 
weights that consider the cost-effectiveness of services and the initial health status 
of patients could be used to refl ect the individuals’ altruistic preferences.
12. Note that in specifi c patient groups such as patients with erectile dysfunction due to spinal cord 
injuries, this argument does not hold, since these patients’ initial health status is low. Therefore, a 
rational altruistic individual may be willing to cross-subsidise the low cost per QALY of Viagra to 
patients with a diagnosed erectile dysfunction due to spinal cord injuries.
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The expected cost of services per consumer
A rational and altruistic individual’s utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies 
may also be affected by the expected costs of health care services faced by others. 
All other things equal, the lower the expected cost of services per consumer the 
weaker the effect of cross-subsidies is likely to be in satisfying individuals’ altruistic 
preferences. In general, a system of cross-subsidies particularly satisfi es altruistic 
preferences, and thereby produces a welfare gain, if it increases fi nancial access to 
otherwise unaffordable care (Nyman, 2003). Whether and to what extent health 
care is unaffordable may vary across individuals, and it depends in particular on their 
available income (or total wealth). For instance, if services involve low utilisation rate 
and are relatively cheap (ie. Paracetamol), an individual may not be willing to cross-
subsidise people who need them, given that these services may be easily accessed 
without constituting an excessive fi nancial burden on each consumer. Nevertheless, 
there always are individual consumers for whom even low prices or volumes are hard 
to afford, and the absence of subsidies may cause differences in health care use. 
These differences may generate altruistic externalities for some health care services 
used by some individuals, and thus call for subsidies.
Ceteris paribus, the higher the expected price and volume of medical care per 
consumer, the greater an individual’s utility of contributing to a system of cross-
subsidies, and thereby the stronger governments’ arguments to enforce it.
Figure 2. Decreasing marginal utility of other’s health
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Consumer’s responsibility for the incidence of the disease
Another factor that may infl uence an individual’s willingness to support a system 
of cross-subsidies can be derived from a consumer’s responsibility in originating the 
condition for which services are demanded. Consider the case of health care expendi-
tures that are clearly caused by the individuals’ behaviour, such as smoking or skiing 
accidents. All in all, the greater a consumer’s responsibility in originating a condition 
is, the less would the use of services satisfy altruistic preferences, and thereby the 
lower an individual’s utility to support cross-subsidisation for the consumption of 
the services. In practice, however, it may be diffi cult to establish a clear connection 
between someone’s responsibility and health care consumption. And, even if so, it 
may be practically unfeasible to set-up a system of cross-subsidies that corrects for 
it.
2.2.1.2. Egoistic preferences
Externalities generated by the individual’s (non-) consumption of health care ser-
vices may also be the consequence of egoistic preferences. For instance, individual B 
may be concerned about the use of medical care by individual A simply for egoistic 
reasons in the case of communicable diseases. The interpersonal utility function for 
B looks like the following:
 UB= UB (HB [MB, HA (MA)], CB)
The medical consumption of A (MA), for example in the form of vaccination, reduces 
the chances that A gets a communicable disease and improves, in that way, the health 
of A (HA). However, because of the existence of a chance that B will also be infected 
by A (external effect), this has an infl uence on the (expected) health of B (HB), and 
thereby on B’s utility UB. In general, immunisation for communicable diseases yields a 
positive utility for all non-immunised individuals.13 This externality limits itself to the 
use of the few health care services for which there is a divergence between collective 
and individual benefi ts or costs of consumption (Schut, 1995; Schut and Lapre’, 1988). 
If the full cost of immunisation is borne by each consumer then the risk of under-
consumption is likely to occur, that is individuals may purchase less of these services 
than the socially optimal level.14 In fact, rational consumers would purchase goods 
13. Similarly, effective preventive care may generate positive externalities. The consumption of effec-
tive preventive care may constitute a net gain for society as a whole, since it may reduce the chance 
of using more costly curative services in the future. This holds true if society pays for the future costs 
of curative services.
14. The demand for preventive care is likely to be less than socially optimal because of the fact that 
moral hazard results in a substitution away from preventive care toward curative care (Pauly, 1974). 
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until the ratio of the marginal utility of each to its price is equal across all goods. 
Therefore, when there is a positive consumption externality, the collective marginal 
utility is greater than that of the individual, so that (some) consumers, acting on their 
own and relying on their own resources, will not buy a large enough quantity of such 
goods (Rice, 2003). The risk of underconsumption is higher for low-income individu-
als, because high-income people have higher opportunity costs of sickness (higher 
time price) and lower marginal utility of money. In the case of a positive externality, 
a straightforward way to overcome underconsumption is to introduce subsidies.15 If 
a large number of people benefi ts from the subsidies, as it appears to be the case 
for immunisations, it is very likely that most individuals would also be willing to 
participate in a system of cross-subsidies.
Another consumption externality in health care is the presence of individuals’ con-
cern about their own treatment opportunities relative to others. Therefore, individu-
als’ utility depends not so much on what care they have access to in absolute terms 
but relative to others (Rice, 2003). Most plausible, perhaps, would be that people 
want those who have less access than they have to have more (altruistic preferences) 
and, at the same time, want to have as much access to services as those who have 
more (concern about status or rank). Although economists usually assume that util-
ity is a function of an individual’s endowment, independent of his relative position, 
the importance of relative standing, or positional externalities, has a long history in 
economic theoretical (Galbraith, 1958; Duesenberry, 1949; Veblen, 1899) and empiri-
cal analysis (Easterlin, 1995; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1993; Kapteyn and Wansbeek, 
1985; Duncan, 1976). Positional externalities occur when “one person’s action alters 
an important frame of reference for others’ ” (Frank, 1991). People care about their 
relative position in society for many reasons. One of these reasons might be that 
people feel envy when others have things that they themselves do not possess. Envy 
may change individuals’ utility functions and its presence raises important policy 
questions (Choi, 1993; Elster, 1991; Bannerjee, 1990; Frank, 1985).16 For example, the 
The gains from preventive care are uncertain and occur in the future, while the costs (in terms of 
money and time) have to be made in advance. By contrast, curative care often offers a short-term and 
more certain gain. Therefore, the stronger the individual’s asymmetry with respect to uncertainty 
surrounding gains and losses, the less likely the person will demand preventive care (Fuchs, 1982).
15. For instance, governments may enforce a system of earmarked income-related (from high to low 
income groups) cross-subsidies, or subsidise the provision of immunisations, even providing them 
free of charge.
16. The term ‘positional’ has not been applied uniformly in the literature. For instance, positional 
goods were initially defi ned by Hirsch (1976) as those that are in fi xed supply or subject to conges-
tion with increased use. Solnick et al. (1998) attempt to identify what things create positional exter-
nalities and when people may fi nd themselves on a positional treadmill. In other words, they try to 
answer the question: to what extent are positional externalities imposed when I have eg. cosmetic 
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use of cosmetic treatments such as facelift by some individuals may result in a re-
duction of the utility for the others since their look may be no longer as appealing. 
Then society’s marginal utility from the consumption of cosmetic treatments will 
be lower than the individual marginal utility of the facelift users. Society’s marginal 
utility may be realigned with the marginal utility of individuals consuming cosmetic 
services either by introducing cross-subsidies or taxation. A system of cross-subsidies 
may be introduced with the purpose of increasing the fi nancial accessibility to cos-
metic care for those individuals who are willing but not able to pay for it. Moreover, 
the concern for great relative physical attractiveness can lead everyone to expand 
resources simply to remain in the same relative position (Wolf, 1991). On the other 
hand, cross-subsidising cosmetic surgery (or similar services) lowers the costs borne 
by individuals, and thereby it may increase the quantity of services consumed (ie. 
moral hazard) and the deadweight loss. In order to increase social welfare and cor-
rect for this moral hazard, governments could introduce taxation on the consump-
tion of these services or leave these benefi ts out of the basic basket (Frank, 1999). So, 
to the extent that positional externalities are present in the consumption of health 
care services the introduction of cross-subsidisation leads to a trade-off between the 
satisfaction of this type of egoistic preferences, on the one hand, and moral hazard, 
on the other hand.
2.2.2. The fi nancial risk of becoming a high-risk
The individuals’ risk of incurring high medical costs for future health problems may 
constitute a second main argument for governments to establish a system of cross-
subsidies. In particular, the occurrence of catastrophic risks or chronic illnesses, such 
as AIDS, cancer, senile dementia, heart disease, or organ failure may cause dramatic 
increases in health expenditures, which are likely to be unbearable by most individu-
als. The problem faced by consumers, in particular low-income individuals, is that of 
obtaining lifetime insurance for this type of risks/illnesses (Cochrane, 1995; Pauly, 
1992; Diamond, 1992; Newhouse, 1984). From a dynamic perspective, there is a miss-
ing market problem. If contracts covered the whole lifecycle, the individual probabil-
ity of being sick in each period would be low, and premiums per-period would be low 
as well. However, insurance contracts are not signed once and for all, and individuals 
are exposed to the risk of incurring in events that increase their future expected ex-
penditures. In this case, when the contract is renewed, insurers will adjust premiums 
to the new risk category, and access to coverage may become problematic. This hap-
pens because in real-world markets insurance against the fi nancial risk of becoming 
surgery? They found that positional concerns are extremely important for physical attractiveness 
and stronger for goods than for bads.
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a high-risk is incomplete. Therefore, individuals lose welfare ex ante, since they want 
insurance against the risk of falling into a worse risk class but they cannot obtain it. 
More precisely, the welfare loss derives from a missing market for insurance against 
the chance of being discovered to be high-risk. This problem has been termed the 
problem of renewable insurance or the problem of inter-temporal insurance (Cutler 
and Zeckhauser, 2000).
In order to correct for this market failure, government intervention may be re-
quired.17 In particular, by establishing a system of cross-subsidies that increases 
the fi nancial access for high-risk and/or low-income groups to health care services, 
governments guarantee that risk-averse consumers are insured against long-term 
health risks (ie. dramatic and unforeseen future changes in health status).18 In this 
sense a cross-subsidy system also provides insurance against the fi nancial risk of 
becoming a high-risk in the future (van de Ven et al., 2000).
2.2.3. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard may arise along several dimensions.19 In general, moral hazard prob-
lems refer to adverse behaviours encouraged by the guarantee of fi nancial protec-
tion (ie. subsidies) against losses caused by the occurrence of adverse events (Gruber, 
2005). Since subsidies may reduce the marginal cost of health care services borne 
by the individual, they may result in excessive consumption of these services (‘con-
sumer-initiated moral hazard’).20 Providers may also be inclined to induce additional 
demand for services for which they know that the costs are covered by subsidies 
(‘supplier-induced moral hazard’).
The problem of moral hazard or subsidies-induced overconsumption is not uni-
form across health care services. In particular, the extent to which cross-subsidies 
17. In theory, markets might develop to deal with the problem posed by lifetime insurance. For a 
careful review of the main reasons suggesting that market solutions (eg. long-term insurance, time-
consistent insurance contracts) may be poor vehicles for insuring long-term health risks, we refer to 
Cutler et al., 2000.
18. After all, the traditional function of insurance is to protect against an adverse event that has not 
yet occurred (Arrow, 1963).
19. Moral hazard problems are particularly relevant to the health care sector as contrasted with 
other sectors, because they emerge from the unequal distribution of information between the par-
ties involved. Insurers and governments have highly imperfect information about the appropriate-
ness of medical diagnoses and treatments. Hence, it is very diffi cult for them to value the damage 
caused by a disease and to appraise the costs of treatment. Moreover, they cannot judge whether or 
not subscribers have taken action to prevent diseases from occurring, which make it hard to relate 
premiums and subsidies to subscribers’ preventive activities (Schut, 1995).
20. Moreover, individuals may reduce preventive activities to protect health status if they are (to 
some extent) fi nancially protected against adverse events.
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induce moral hazard depends on the service’s demand price-elasticity and on the in-
teractions between subsidised and non-subsidised services. The higher is a service’s 
demand price-elasticity the greater is the subsidies-induced overconsumption. For 
instance, the moral hazard effect of cross-subsidising lung-transplants may be much 
smaller than that of cross-subsidising Viagra, because the demand price-elasticity of 
lung-transplants is likely to be smaller than Viagra’s. Ceteris paribus, the smaller the 
moral hazard effect of cross-subsidising a specifi c service, the stronger may be the 
governments’ arguments to enforce a system of cross-subsidies that guarantees the 
fi nancial access to that service.
An important interaction between subsidised and non-subsidised services may 
occur if cheap substitutes (ie. OTC drugs) of subsidised services are not cross-subsi-
dised. Depending on the type of service, the choice of not subsidising relatively cheap 
substitutes may induce a substitution effect towards the remaining more expensive 
subsidised services. If the total cost (including the cross-subsidy) of services would 
exceed the cost of these substitutes, this substitution effect may imply a welfare 
loss for society. On the other hand, subsidising cheaper substitutes, which may be 
accessed by most individuals without excessive fi nancial burden, may increase moral 
hazard. So, the substitution effect induced by a system of cross-subsidisation leads to 
a trade-off between cost-effective substitution and moral hazard.
All in all, cross-subsidisation may induce moral hazard problems, which consist of 
excessive, and thereby suboptimal, consumption of subsidised services. Moral hazard 
may also lead to health care cost infl ation.21 So, to the extent that a system of cross-
subsidies increases the incentives for excessive consumption of health care services, 
there is a trade-off between access to care and moral hazard. Therefore, when decid-
ing whether to cross-subsidise specifi c services policymakers have to be aware of the 
fi nancial consequences of subsidies-induced overconsumption.
2.2.4. Summary
The following summary Table 2a presents an overview in which each economic argu-
ment is related to its positive or negative effect on the decision to organise cross-
subsidies between risk/income groups.
21. In particular, subsidies-induced overconsumption by increasing the costs of a specifi c service 
may negatively affect the cost-effectiveness ratio of that service. In many countries (eg. France, The 
Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, etc.), policy-makers have in some circumstances taken into 
account the ex-post cost-effectiveness ratio in deciding whether or not to subsidise a service. For 
instance, cost-effective treatments with a high ex-post cost-effective ratio (eg. selective serotonin 
reuptake (SSRIs), sildenafi l (Viagra) ect.) were (partially) removed from the basic basket. On the other 
end, treatments not considered cost-effective ex-ante (eg. ultra-orphan drugs) were subsidised be-
cause of their low ex-post impact on the budget available for cross-subsidies (Hughes et al., 2005; 
Kooijman, 2003; Harris et al., 2001).
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2.3. MANDATORY COVERAGE
Coverage, that provides fi nancial access to predefi ned health care services, may be 
particularly benefi cial for those at the lower end of the income distribution (Nyman, 
2003). However, it is those at the lower end of the income distribution who are most 
likely not to take out coverage voluntarily (Feldstein, 1999). Governments may stimu-
late the voluntary purchase of coverage by subsidising it. In addition or in alternative, 
governments may impose on consumers a legal obligation to obtain coverage. In sec-
tion 2.3.1., the following economic rationales for governments to enforce mandatory 
coverage are discussed: free riding (section 2.3.1.1.), lack of foresight (section 2.3.1.2.) 
and transaction costs of organising otherwise a system of cross-subsidies (section 
2.3.1.3.).22 In section 2.3.2., we propose two alternatives for the fi ne-tuning of manda-
tory coverage.
22. In the literature, adverse selection is often advocated as another argument for governments 
to introduce mandatory coverage (Nyman, 2003). The government can avoid the adverse selection 
induced welfare loss from inadequate protection by making coverage compulsory. In the presence of 
mandatory coverage low-risk individuals are prevented from opting out of a pooling equilibrium. But 
compulsion may generate other welfare losses, ie. moral hazard. Alternative and less invasive mea-
sures can deal with adverse selection while maintaining adequate risk protection for all risk groups. 
The central idea is to require insurers to offer adequate coverage to all applicants, irrespective of risk, 
while keeping premiums affordable by means of some system to redistribute purchasing power for 
medical care (Schut, 1995). For instance, governments may introduce a system of (risk-related) cross-
Table 2a. Economic arguments for mandatory cross-subsidies
Effect on the decision to organise
cross-subsidies between risk/income groups
Economic Arguments
Altruistic 
Externalities
CE ratio -
Initial Health Status of benefi ciaries -
Expected cost per consumer +
Consumers’ responsibility for the incidence of 
the disease
-
Egoistic
Externalities
Positive +
Negative -
Individual risk of 
becoming a bad risk
+
Moral Hazard Demand price-elasticity -
Cheap substitutes +
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2.3.1. Economic rationales for mandatory coverage
2.3.1.1. Free riding
The fi rst alleged argument to enforce mandatory coverage is free riding. People may 
have incentives to hide their true preferences for some goods or services (eg. public 
or merit goods) and let other people pay while enjoying the benefi ts themselves. This 
phenomenon is known as free riding and its presence may lead to ineffi cient alloca-
tions of resources.In general, any investment in goods or services that has a personal 
cost but a common benefi t may provide incentives for individuals to underinvest, or 
to invest less than is socially optimal (free rider problem) (Gruber, 2005).23
In the context of health care fi nancing, free riders are individuals who purposely 
do not purchase coverage for their own health care entitlements because they expect 
not to be denied access to medical treatments in case of need or others in society are 
willing to pay for them if they really need health care. Empirical studies show that 
the presence of last resort safety nets, such as charity, reduces the demand for cover-
age, because they remove the health and the fi nancial consequences (ie. disutility) of 
being uncovered (Johnson and Crystal, 2000; Dubay et al., 1997; Holahan, 1997; Cutler 
and Gruber, 1996; Thomas, 1994).
An individual’s incentives and opportunities to free ride may change in relation 
to the type of health care services and across different income groups. In general, 
an economically rational individual has incentives to abuse others’ altruistic prefer-
ences if the average expected costs of different health care services exceed his or 
her own available income. Without a mandatory coverage provision, the risk that an 
individual does not cover for certain services and prefers to free ride is greater the 
higher the average expected costs of care are. In addition, incentives to free ride are 
smaller the higher an individual’s available income, because the higher the income 
the lower the marginal utility of money (Nyman, 2003). Hence, low-income individu-
als could purposely not cover for health care services because others in society are 
willing to pay for them if they really need health care. For high-income people this 
argument is less relevant because they can (and therefore will have to) pay most 
health care services themselves.
For services or treatments with very high average expected costs (eg. liver failure 
requiring a liver transplant or routine dialysis, diabetes, asthma, or other chronic 
diseases that would require periodic physician visits and regular use of pharma-
subsidies fi nanced via mandatory solidarity contributions that may increase the affordability and 
sustainability of coverage for high risks.
23. See Rosen (2005) for a comprehensive analysis of the consequences for effi ciency of free riding, 
and for a review of the literature that investigates the empirical relevance of the free rider problem.
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ceuticals etc.) mandatory coverage may be necessary to prevent free riding even for 
high-income groups, excluding those individuals belonging to the high end of that 
distribution. For those at the very low end of the income distribution, the coverage of 
(most) health care services, including those with a low average expected cost, would 
represent a relatively high fi nancial burden, and thereby increase the incentives and 
the opportunities for free riding. Therefore, for low-income groups a mandatory cov-
erage provision for a broad set of services may be necessary to prevent free riding 
and thereby increase welfare. For middle/high income groups mandatory coverage 
may be limited to services with high average expected costs.
Ceteris paribus, the effectiveness of a mandatory coverage provision to prevent 
individuals from free riding, and thereby to increase welfare, diminishes as the aver-
age expected costs of care decrease and increases as an individual’s available income 
decreases.
2.3.1.2. Lack of foresight
Governments may also enforce mandatory coverage in the presence of individuals’ 
myopic behaviour (ie. lack of foresight), implying that individuals do not appropri-
ately cover themselves against health risks. In other words, individuals may fail to 
maximise their (life-time) utility (Rosen, 2005). For instance, this may mean that con-
sumers feel healthy and underestimate health risks, ie. young and healthy individu-
als do not always know what is in their best interest. Individuals’ lack of foresight 
may have serious consequences for individuals and society. In fact, the immediate 
fi nancial advantage of not paying for coverage may lead to high future expenses, 
which may be nearly or totally impossible to afford by individuals. In order to pre-
vent individuals from becoming uninsurable and having unaffordable high health 
expenditures, government intervention may be required in the form of mandatory 
coverage.
Individuals’ lack of foresight is not homogeneous across income groups and types 
of health risks. Firstly, different income groups may have heterogeneous preferences 
towards health care coverage, since the marginal value of money is different across 
income groups. An important difference between different income groups is that 
particularly for those at the low end of the distribution the voluntary purchase of 
coverage represents a loss of income that would otherwise be used to purchase ne-
cessities, like shelter, food and clothing. Thus, at the low end of the income distribu-
tion, the utility cost of purchasing coverage is greater vis à vis the value of the other 
goods and services forgone, compared to those at the high range of the distribution. 
Forgoing these necessities could have consequences for health similar to those of 
forgoing medical care when ill (Nyman, 2003). Another important difference across 
income groups is that on average high-income individuals are better educated than 
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low-income people and may afford high health care costs. Therefore, the lack of fore-
sight argument for governments to introduce mandatory coverage is less relevant 
(although not irrelevant for catastrophic health risks) for high-income than for low-
income groups.
Secondly, myopic behaviour is not uniform across different types of health risks. 
Individuals’ forecasting ability may be weaker for health risks that may occur in a ‘far 
future’ than for health risks that may occur ‘at any time’. In addition, individuals may 
not correctly appreciate how much certain health care services may contribute to 
their own health or for the health status of their dependents in the future. We refer, 
for example, to psycho-geriatric care, to long-term psychiatric care, to the use of den-
tal care by children, to the contraceptive pill for girls under 18 years old, to obstetric 
care, to long-term nursing home care and to care for persons addicted to alcohol and 
drugs (van de Ven, 1995). A theoretical explanation to this phenomenon is that indi-
viduals’ aversion towards risk is not symmetric, since they appear to prefer certain to 
uncertain gains but prefer uncertain to certain losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Therefore, the stronger the individual’s asymmetry with respect to uncertainty, the 
less likely the person will voluntarily demand for insurance coverage. Moreover, the 
more catastrophic health risks are, the greater the impact of an individual’s lack of 
foresight may be on future health care expenditures, and thereby the stronger the 
rationale for governments to introduce a mandatory coverage provision. For other 
types of health risks, variations in an individual’s available income may affect his or 
her willingness to voluntary demand for coverage. Low-income people are more ex-
posed to the fi nancial consequences of short-sightedness than high-income groups, 
due to a relatively lower ability to pay. A mandatory coverage provision for a broad set 
of services, including those with low future costs, may be necessary for low-income 
groups to prevent (the consequences of) myopic behaviour and thereby increase 
welfare. Extending the mandatory coverage provision for non-catastrophic risks to 
high-income groups may not be necessary to prevent that high-income groups be-
have myopically.
Ceteris paribus, the more serious health risks are, the greater the impact of indi-
viduals’ lack of foresight may be on health expenditures, and thereby the stronger 
the rationale for governments to introduce a mandatory coverage provision.
2.3.1.3. Transaction costs of organising otherwise a system of cross-subsidies
A third economic rationale to introduce mandatory coverage can be the transaction 
costs of organising otherwise a system of mandatory cross-subsidies. If without 
universal mandatory coverage these costs are much higher than with universal man-
datory coverage, governments may make the coverage for cross-subsidised services 
mandatory for everyone (ie. including high-income people). On the other hand, uni-
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versal mandatory coverage may induce moral hazard and increase total health care 
costs, and thereby constitute a welfare loss for society as a whole. So to the extent 
that the organisation of an alternative system of cross-subsidies generates high 
transaction costs, Society may face a trade-off between moral hazard and transac-
tion costs of organising cross-subsidies.
2.3.1.4. Summary
Tables 2b summarises the main economic arguments for governments to introduce 
mandatory coverage and their positive or negative impact on the choice to enforce a 
mandatory coverage provision.
Table 2b. Economic arguments for mandatory coverage
Effect on the decision to enforce mandatory coverage
Economic Arguments
Free Riding Income -
Cost of illness +
Lack of Foresight Income -
Cost of illness +
Transaction costs of 
alternative ways to organise 
cross-subsidies
+
The introduction of mandatory coverage may be an effective welfare increasing 
provision so far as it prevents free riding and myopic behaviour. However, these 
economic arguments are not equally relevant for different groups of individuals and 
for different types of services or health risks. Therefore, the introduction of universal
mandatory coverage for a uniform comprehensive package of services (eg. including 
the coverage of services with low average expected costs) may be unnecessary to 
prevent free riding and lack of foresight. Universal mandatory coverage for a uniform
set of services may also be disproportionate because it may reduce the responsive-
ness to consumers’ preferences, induce moral hazard and increase total health care 
costs, and thereby constitute a welfare loss for society.
2.3.2. Fine-tuning mandatory coverage
In order to avoid the welfare decreasing consequences of moral hazard, mandatory 
coverage could be fi ne-tuned according to the individuals’ available income and the 
type of service. An important precondition for fi ne-tuning mandatory coverage to 
different income groups is to maintain the desired level of cross-subsidies between 
Ch
ap
te
r 
2
46
risk groups. Therefore, the fi ne-tuning of mandatory coverage should be accompa-
nied with a (not too costly) system of cross-subsidies between risk groups.
The fi ne-tuning of mandatory coverage for different income groups may occur in 
two ways: by transferring in toto certain services from mandatory to voluntary cover-
age; or by increasing the extent of cost sharing (eg. deductibles). Hence, consumers 
may opt-out from mandatory coverage and voluntarily pay out-of-pocket (or seek for 
coverage) for certain services; or they may opt for a deductible, which means that 
they can choose to pay the costs up to a certain amount themselves. In both cases 
they receive a premium rebate.
High-income groups may be allowed to opt-out from mandatory coverage for a 
wider range of services (eg. GP, prescription drugs etc.) or to take a higher deduct-
ible than low-income groups, for which a mandatory coverage provision is necessary 
also for services with low average expected costs and for non-catastrophic health 
risks. Therefore, fi ne-tuning mandatory coverage according to the individuals’ avail-
able income and to the type of service effectively prevents free riding and myopic 
behaviour, and it also reduces moral hazard and thereby increases welfare compared 
to universal mandatory health insurance for a uniform set of services, provided that 
organising cross-subsidies is not too costly.
The drawback of fi ne-tuning mandatory coverage is that it may imply high trans-
action costs. In particular, the more mandatory coverage is fi ne-tuned to the individu-
als’ available income the higher are the consumers’ search costs and the transaction 
costs of fi ne-tuning involved in the defi nition of the several mandatory packages of 
services, in adjusting the packages to variations in individuals’ incomes (eg. due to 
changes in employment status, promotion etc.) or to health care services’ techno-
logical innovations.
So, the fi ne-tuning of mandatory coverage by type of service and income groups 
confronts governments with a trade-off between moral hazard, on the one hand, 
and the transaction costs of fi ne-tuning coverage and organising cross–subsidies, on 
the other hand. In the next subsections we discuss two types of schemes that aim 
at smoothing this trade-off by limiting the extent to which mandatory coverage can 
be fi ne-tuned: the two-option scheme (section 2.3.2.1.) and the single-option scheme 
with income-related deductibles (section 2.3.2.2.). Both schemes may be relevant for 
both NHS-countries and for countries with a competitive (social) health insurance 
market.
2.3.2.1. High and low option schemes
Governments may make a clear distinction between two schemes, a low-option 
scheme for the high-income groups and a high-option scheme for the low-income 
groups, rather than having a large variety of mandatory packages of services fi ne-
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tuned according to the individuals’ income.24 The low-option scheme primarily in-
cludes health care services with high expected costs for which mandatory coverage 
is necessary also for high-income groups (eg. to prevent myopic behaviour). The high-
option scheme envisages a mandatory coverage provision for a comprehensive pack-
age of services (eg. including low-cost care) for low-income groups. By choosing the 
low-option scheme (high-income) individuals may reduce the mandatory package 
and benefi t from a reduction of the mandatory contribution (ie. premium rebate). 
In order to guarantee an affordable access to the (broader) high-option scheme for 
high-risk or low-income individuals, the premium rebate should not affect the viabil-
ity of the system of mandatory cross-subsidies.25 In case of an unregulated competi-
tive health insurance market the premium reduction should be risk-rated. In other 
words, the premium rebate for the low-option scheme is higher for the high-risk 
individuals than for the low-risk individuals. If the difference in contribution per risk 
group between the two schemes would refl ect the difference in expected costs of 
the two schemes per risk group, then cross-subsidies are maintained. Moreover, if the 
premium rebate does not affect the system of cross-subsidies, the fi nancial access to 
the high-option scheme for the high-risk or low-income people is subsidised by the 
low-risk or high-income individuals. In addition to the high-option there might be all 
kind of voluntary supplementary health insurance, ie. not-subsidised.
Compared with allowing consumers to choose from several levels of mandatory 
coverage, the distinction between a high-option and a low-option scheme is more 
effective in containing the consumers’ search costs and the transaction costs of fi ne-
tuning mandatory coverage. On the other hand, it is less responsive to consumers’ 
preferences (ie. consumers’ choice of coverage is limited to two schemes) and also 
less effective in reducing moral hazard (but more effective than universal mandatory 
coverage).
2.3.2.2. Single-option scheme with income-related deductibles
An alternative to the two-option scheme is to have mandatory coverage for a uni-
form package of services with the option for consumers to choose an income-related 
24. Contours of the Basic Health Care Benefi t Package, Publication no. 2003/021; downloadable from: 
http://www.gezondheidsraad.nl/.
25. Although in theory the arguments for mandatory coverage differ from the arguments for manda-
tory cross-subsidies, in most countries the package of cross-subsidised services coincides with, or 
contains, the package of services for which a mandatory coverage provision is enforced. For example, 
there are packages of cross-subsidised services for which there is no mandate to purchase coverage 
(eg. GP care for the high-income people in Ireland) but not vice versa. This is true for health care 
but not for other types of insurance (eg. car). In car insurance often the purchase of insurance is 
compulsory but not subsidised. Therefore, we plausibly assume that high-option plans coincide with 
the package of cross-subsidised services.
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deductible with a premium rebate. On average, the higher the income the higher the 
maximum deductible level. The no-deductible scheme can then be considered as the 
high-option scheme and the high-deductible scheme as the low-option scheme. By 
taking a deductible, high-income individuals may reduce the mandatory package. 
The costs on which the mandatory cross-subsidies can be based on are the costs of 
the no-deductible scheme (ie. high-option scheme). The premium reduction in case 
consumers choose to take a deductible could be unregulated and it would most likely 
be risk-rated in a competitive market, ie. a low premium reduction for low-risks and a 
high premium reduction for high-risk individuals. If the premium reduction is equal 
to the expected out of pocket expenditures (ie. it does not reduce the cross-subsidies) 
solidarity is maintained.
The single-option scheme with voluntary income-related deductibles effectively 
prevents free riding and myopic behaviour; it avoids the transaction costs of fi ne-
tuning mandatory coverage by type of service and income group and it enhances 
the responsiveness to consumers’ preferences and it reduces moral hazard and total 
health care expenditures compared to universal mandatory health insurance for a 
uniform package of services.
2.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter investigates the economic rationales for the design of health care fi -
nancing arrangements. It proposes a categorisation of fi nancing schemes based on a 
distinction between mandatory cross-subsidies and mandatory coverage. The most 
important economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of mandatory 
cross-subsidies that guarantees the fi nancial access to a predefi ned set of basic ser-
vices to high-risk or low-income individuals are related to: the presence of externali-
ties in health care services consumption; the individuals’ risk of becoming bad risks; 
and the moral hazard effects induced by cross-subsidisation. Conversely, the ratio-
nales for mandatory coverage are based on considerations of free riding behaviour, 
individuals’ lack of foresight and too high transaction costs of alternative ways to 
organise cross-subsidies.
From our analysis we also conclude that the introduction of universal mandatory 
coverage for a uniform set of services is unnecessary to prevent free riding and myo-
pic behaviour and also disproportionate because it induces moral hazard. In line with 
the objective of preventing free riding and myopic behaviour, mandatory coverage 
could be fi ne-tuned according to the individuals’ available income. In particular, the 
choice between enforcing universal mandatory coverage for a uniform package of 
basic services and fi ne-tuning mandatory coverage confronts governments with a 
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trade-off between moral hazard, on the one hand, and the transaction costs of fi ne-
tuning and of organising otherwise a system of mandatory cross-subsidies, on the 
other hand.
To smooth this trade-off, the following two types of schemes can be considered as 
pragmatic alternatives: the two-option scheme and the single-option scheme with 
voluntary income-related deductibles.
Although they both represent potentially attractive alternatives to universal man-
datory coverage, the single-option scheme with income-related deductibles is prefer-
able on several grounds. Firstly, the distinction between two packages (ie. two-option 
scheme) may result practically unfeasible, because it may generate diffi culties in the 
identifi cation of the criteria to fi nd the services that clearly make the difference be-
tween the two packages. Secondly, under the two-option scheme the transaction 
costs of fi ne-tuning are likely to be higher compared to the single-option scheme 
with income-related deductibles. Thirdly, the single-option scheme with voluntary 
income-related deductibles provides a wider choice than the two-option scheme, 
and thereby it increases the responsiveness to consumers’ preferences.
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3.
The design of health care fi nancing 
schemes in different countries
summary  In this chapter, the conceptual analysis developed in the previous 
chapter is applied to the following countries: Australia, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. 
In particular, we discuss the conformity of the actual design of these OECD 
countries’ health care fi nancing schemes with the economic arguments for 
mandatory cross-subsidies and for mandatory coverage. We observe that 
several countries (eg. Australia, Belgium, France and Israel) opted for the 
introduction of universal mandatory coverage for a comprehensive and 
uniform package of services. As discussed in chapter 2, this measure is not per 
se necessary and proportionate to achieve an affordable access to (the coverage 
of) health care services for vulnerable groups. Alternatively, governments 
could rely either on the two-option scheme or the single-option scheme with 
voluntary income-related deductibles. Although the latter scheme is likely to 
be preferable from an economic perspective, it is not implemented in any of 
the considered countries. Only the Netherlands and Switzerland come close 
to this scheme given that they have implemented a single-option scheme 
with traditional deductibles (fi xed amounts) for curative health care services. 
However, the fi xed deductible levels may be too high for low-income people 
and too low for high-income individuals. In addition, long-term care services 
are covered by a universal single-option scheme with mandatory income-
related copayments in the Netherlands (AWBZ). As far as the two-option 
scheme is concerned, it is implemented in Germany and Ireland. Nevertheless, 
the high-option scheme for low-income people seems to be too broad in 
Germany and too small in Ireland.
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3.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the conceptual analysis developed in chapter 2 is applied to the fol-
lowing OECD countries: Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, The Neth-
erlands, Switzerland and the United States.
There are several important differences in the way different countries design and 
structure their health care fi nancing schemes. For instance, there are differences in 
the regulation of fi nancial access (eg. yes/no mandatory cross-subsidies for specifi c 
services); in the institutional setting (eg. yes/no competition); in the types of carriers 
(yes/no commercial insurers); in the type of coverage (voluntary or mandatory); and 
in the set of entitlements (ie. services, choice of providers, quality of care and waiting 
time) provided. In particular, the political decisions about whether to introduce man-
datory cross-subsidies and whether to enforce mandatory coverage are not uniform 
across services and population groups in different countries. Many different expla-
nations can be offered for the diversity in the design of different countries health 
care fi nancing schemes (eg. path dependency, pressure groups etc.). In this chapter, 
however, we focus on whether the actual design of health care fi nancing schemes of 
the selected countries is coherent with the economic rationales for mandatory cross-
subsidies and mandatory coverage. In particular, we address the following research 
question:
• Is the design of health care fi nancing schemes in the selected countries in con-
formity with the economic rationales for organising a system of mandatory 
cross-subsidies, and for imposing mandatory coverage?
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we investigate whether and to what extent 
the design of health care fi nancing schemes in the different OECD countries is or-
ganised in line with the economic arguments for introducing a system of mandatory 
cross-subsidies (section 3.2.). Then, we analyse the conformity of different countries’ 
health fi nancing schemes with the economic arguments for enforcing a mandatory 
coverage provision (section 3.3.). In section 3.4., we conclude by summarising our 
fi ndings and by discussing the main policy implications.
3.2. MANDATORY CROSS-SUBSIDIES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
Mandatory cross-subsidies are present in all the countries considered. The main pur-
pose of cross-subsidies is to achieve affordable access to health care services or to 
health insurance.
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In general, countries with a so-called social health insurance scheme (eg. Belgium, 
Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland) implement mandatory cross-
subsidies with the aim to increase the affordability of insurance coverage for most 
health care services. Mandatory cross-subsidies for the purchase of insurance cover-
age can be of two types:
• Explicit cross-subsidies, eg. risk-equalisation schemes;
• Implicit cross-subsidies, eg. premium rate restrictions like community-rating, 
income-related contributions.
In Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the government has 
introduced a combination of explicit (risk-equalisation) and implicit (community-rat-
ing and/or income-related contributions) cross-subsidies for the coverage of a broad 
set of services ranging from long-term care and hospital care to ambulatory care and 
rehabilitative physiotherapy. In Germany, these subsidies do not automatically apply 
for the upper 10 percent high-income groups unless they decide to opt-in. In Belgium 
and Germany mandatory cross-subsidies apply to dental care. In Belgium there are 
no cross-subsidies for home care (see Table 3a).
In so-called National Health Insurance or National Health Service systems (NHS) 
(eg. Australia, France and Ireland), mandatory cross-subsidies are usually raised via 
income-related contributions or taxation to fi nance the provision of most health 
care services.
In Australia, every citizen is entitled to access a broad package of services fi nanced 
by the tax-based NHS scheme (ie. Medicare), ranging from public health care, long-
term care (apart from home care), and hospital care to ambulatory care and pre-
scription drugs. In Ireland, apart from long-term care and hospital care, the access to 
other subsidised NHS-services differs across income groups. The NHS provides access 
to services such as ambulatory care, prescription drugs, medical devices and dental 
care only for the low-income and high-risk groups (ie. medical card holders). In these 
two countries individuals may buy voluntary health insurance for the coverage of 
services (partly) uncovered by the NHS, but also for services for which they retain full 
access under the NHS (duplicate coverage). Interestingly, voluntary health insurance 
is subsidised in both countries via a combination of explicit (risk-equalisation) and 
implicit (community-rating) cross-subsidies.
In France the National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme (Sécurité Sociale) is fi nanced 
by taxation and income-related contributions and it provides coverage for a broad 
benefi ts package (see Table 3a). For services (eg. dental care, medical devices, spa) 
that are only partly covered (copayments) by or completely excluded from the NHI, 
individuals may purchase voluntary insurance, which is fully subsidised only for the 
unemployed and the low-income groups.
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Apart from the United States, the access to public health services, such as the vac-
cination of communicable diseases, is subsidised in all other countries mainly via 
taxation. The primary economic argument for the introduction of subsidies for the 
immunisation of transmissible illnesses is the presence of positive externalities in 
the demand for this type of services. In particular, the fact that vaccines yield a direct 
positive externality to all individuals, including the non-immunised people, may in-
crease the risk of underconsumption particularly among the low-income groups. An 
effective way to prevent underconsumption is to subsidise vaccines, as most countries 
do. Similarly, other types of preventive care that effectively reduce the probability of 
using expensive (subsidised) curative care in the future may yield positive externali-
ties. Although this provides an economic justifi cation for subsidisation, apart from 
vaccinations not many countries actually subsidise the access to effective preventive 
care, eg. interventions lowering systolic blood pressure and thereby preventing the 
occurrence of cardiovascular-diseases (Murray et al., 2003).
The access to (the coverage of) long-term care services (eg. home care, nursing 
home care, dialysis care, palliative care, psychiatric care etc.) is subsidised in almost 
all the countries considered. An economic argument for implementing a system of 
cross-subsidies may be the presence of altruistic externalities in the consumption 
of long-term care. In order to assess the extent to which the presence of altruistic 
preferences justifi es a system of cross-subsidies several factors have to be taken 
into account, such as the cost-effectiveness of long-term care, the individuals’ initial 
health status, the expected cost of long-term care services per consumer and the 
consumer’s responsibility for the incidence of the illness (see chapter 2). Long-term 
care may require the use of expensive machineries (eg. dialysis care), drugs (eg. in-
sulin for diabetic patients), or personnel (eg. skilled-nursing) or it may yield limited 
QALY gains because it is needed by aged people (eg. home care) or terminal patients 
(eg. palliative care). Although long-term care may not be cost-effective, the introduc-
tion of a system of cross-subsidies may be economically justifi ed for those services 
(eg. home care and nursing home care) for which the average initial health status of 
the consumers is poor (eg. old people), the expected costs per consumer is very high 
and the consumer’s behaviour is not likely to be related with the incidence of the 
illness. Another economic argument for the introduction of cross-subsidies for costly 
long-term care is the fi nancial risk of becoming a high-risk in the future. A system of 
cross-subsidies that guarantees affordable access to (the coverage of) long-term care 
services can in fact be seen as an insurance against health risks with catastrophic 
fi nancial consequences. According to the arguments of altruistic externalities and 
the absence of adequate private insurance for the fi nancial risk of becoming a bad 
risk, mandatory cross-subsidisation of long-term care (coverage) such as home care, 
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nursing home care, psychiatric care etc. may be required to assure affordable access 
to these services to everyone.
The design of most countries’ fi nancing schemes appears to be consistent with 
the economic rationales for cross-subsidising long-term care services apart from 
Australia (ie. home care), Belgium (ie. home care) and the United States (ie. home 
care and psychiatric care for individuals aged 65 or older).
Almost all the countries considered have implemented a system of mandatory 
cross-subsidies with the aim of achieving affordable access to (the coverage of) hos-
pital care, prescription drugs and ambulatory care (ie. GP and specialist) for everyone. 
In general, for most hospital care and prescription drugs the introduction of a system 
of cross-subsidies appears to be consistent with the economic rationale provided by 
altruistic externalities and the fi nancial risk of becoming a high-risk. Most hospital 
care and prescription drugs appear to be relatively cost-effective, assuming the ap-
propriateness of the diagnosis. Considering that the costs per consumer for most 
hospital care and prescription drugs are relatively high, cross-subsidies may improve 
the affordability of these benefi ts for everyone. In addition, cross-subsidies may act 
as an insurance against the risk of needing expensive hospital services or drugs in the 
future. An argument for not cross-subsidising hospital care and prescription drugs 
may be subsidies-induced overconsumption (ie. moral hazard). As estimated by van 
Vliet (2004) for the Dutch private health insurance market the price-elasticities of 
hospital care (-0.04) and prescription drugs (-0.08) are quite small in absolute terms 
and much smaller than for other services such as GP care (-0.4), non-rehabilitative 
physiotherapy (-0.3), specialist care (-0.12) and other care (e. dental care, medical de-
vices etc.) (-0.21).1 The lower price-sensitivity of specialist care, prescription drugs and 
hospital care may be in part due to a lower impact of price-variations for higher need 
of health care. The still rather high elasticity for non-rehabilitative physiotherapy 
may be explained by the often doubtful necessity and effectiveness of such care. 
In principle, supplier- or consumer-induced moral hazard is less likely to occur for 
services with low price-elasticities than for services with high price-elasticities. Nev-
ertheless, the results of the RAND experiment show that even for services with a low 
price-elasticity (eg. hospital care and prescription drugs) high levels of coinsurance 
result in substantial reduction of moral hazard.2 An argument against subsidisation 
1. These studies are consistent with the literature (Newhouse, 1993). It has to be acknowledged 
that the overall price-elasticity, which equals -0.14 for the six types of care in van Vliet (2004), is 
in the middle of the range reported by the RAND study. This indicates that according to the RAND 
experiment individuals are on average more sensitive to price-variations for the different types of 
care than the Dutch privately insured.
2. However, the RAND study used high copayments rates that seem unthinkable in the context of 
most countries considered here.
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may be that individuals’ lifestyles (eg. high-fat diet, smoking, drinking, unsafe sex 
etc.) can be responsible for the incidence of some illnesses (eg. heart diseases, lung 
cancer, HIV etc.) that require certain hospital care or prescription drugs (for example 
acute surgery such as heart or lung transplant, chemotherapy, antiretroviral drugs 
etc.). Given that the relationship between behavioural factors and incidence of cer-
tain conditions is often controversial, cross-subsidies for hospital care, prescription 
drugs and specialist visits may be justifi ed on the basis of the other determinants 
of altruistic externalities (in particular cost-effectiveness and costs of services per 
consumer) and the fi nancial risk of becoming a bad risk; or on non-economic (eg. 
ethical) arguments.
The rank order of price-elasticities presented above indicates that patients are 
particularly sensitive to GP care price-variations. Therefore, cross-subsidies are likely 
to induce moral hazard for GP care, ie. a reduction in the out-of-pocket payments 
by consumers for (the coverage of) GP visits may result in an increased number of 
consultations. On the other hand, if GP care is not subsidised, supplier-induced moral 
hazard towards more expensive (substitutive) hospital care may occur. In addition, 
the cost-effectiveness of ambulatory care may be relatively high particularly if GPs 
function as gatekeepers. Considering that the costs per consumer of GP are relatively 
low and do not constitute a fi nancial burden for most individuals, cross-subsidisation 
for GP care can be justifi ed especially for low-income and high-risk people.
Ireland and the United States are the only two countries in which the access to GP 
care is subsidised only for low-income and high-risk groups. Interestingly, in Ireland 
individuals may purchase cross-subsidised voluntary health insurance for the cover-
age of GP care. Therefore, the reduction of moral hazard that (potentially) results from 
limiting cross-subsidisation in the access to GP care may be offset by the welfare loss 
of increased moral hazard of cross-subsidising the voluntary coverage of GP care. In 
Ireland, prescription drugs are subsidised only for 30 percent of the population (ie. 
low-income and high-risk groups). In the United States, these services are subsidised 
only for Medicare benefi ciaries (see Table 3a). The limited extent of mandatory cross-
subsidies for prescription drugs in these countries may threaten the affordability of 
these services for low-income or high-risk individuals whose income (age) is slightly 
above (below) the subsidy threshold.
The only type of physiotherapy that is subsidised in all countries apart from the 
United States is rehabilitative care (eg. musculoskeletal, cardiothoracic and neuro-
logical). In terms of the economic rationales for mandatory cross-subsidies, the fact 
that rehabilitative physiotherapy is the sole type of physical therapy to be subsi-
dised in most countries is probably due to its relatively high cost-effectiveness, its 
high costs per consumer and the poor individuals’ initial health status on average. 
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Moreover, given that the probability of subsidies-induced moral hazard for rehabili-
tative physiotherapy is lower than for other types of physiotherapy (eg. therapeutic 
massage), the introduction of a mandatory cross-subsidies system for rehabilitative 
physiotherapy is sound from an economic perspective.
For benefi ts such as dental care, medical devices, spa, hospital amenities and alter-
native care most countries do not organise mandatory cross-subsidies. In Australia 
and Ireland people may benefi t from subsidies for these benefi ts if they purchase 
voluntary health insurance. In France only low-income people are subsidised for ser-
vices such as dental care, medical devices and spa. In Belgium and Germany dental 
care is subsidised for everyone excluding the self-employed and high-income people. 
The main economic argument for not subsidising these services is subsidies-induced 
overconsumption. The relatively high price-elasticity of services such as dental care, 
medical devices, alternative care, etc. (ie. “other care” in van Vliet, 2004) suggests 
that cross-subsidies may induce moral hazard for these types of care. The absence 
of cross-subsidisation for these services may be also justifi ed by the often unproven 
necessity and effectiveness of some of these services (for example alternative care 
or spa).
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3.3. MANDATORY COVERAGE IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
Although universal mandatory coverage for a uniform set of services is very popular 
in OECD countries, it is not per se optimal from an economic perspective (as discussed 
in chapter 2). In particular, apart from the coverage of care with high average ex-
pected costs per capita, a universal mandate may be unnecessary to prevent free rid-
ing and myopic behaviour or may be disproportionate because it may induce moral 
hazard and an increase in health care expenditures. For services with high average 
expected costs such as hospital care, long-term care, expensive prescription drugs 
and rehabilitative physiotherapy, mandatory coverage may be necessary also for 
high-income or low-risk people particularly to prevent myopic behaviour. Moreover, 
mandatory coverage may be proportionate because for these services moral hazard 
is not very likely to occur. For other services such as ambulatory care and medical 
devices, physiotherapy, dental care, spa, alternative care and hospital upgrades, 
mandatory coverage may be restricted to low-income or high-risk groups. In fact the 
incentives to free ride and to behave myopically are stronger for low-income or high-
risk than for high-income or low-risk individuals, given that for these services the 
average expected cost per individual is relatively low. Moreover, universal mandatory 
coverage is likely to induce moral hazard for these services.
In most countries with a National Health Insurance (NHI) or Service (NHS) system, 
coverage is mandatory for everyone and uniform for a comprehensive package of 
services including long-term care, ambulatory and hospital care and prescription 
drugs (see Table 3b). In France universal mandatory coverage extends to all types of 
physiotherapy. Although free riding and lack of foresight are effectively prevented 
by universal mandatory coverage, the generosity of the mandatory package of ser-
vices is likely to induce moral hazard (particularly for GP visits and non-rehabilitative 
physiotherapy). Apart from long-term care, all services in the mandatory package are 
subject to fi xed copayments schemes. In order to limit the exposure to out-of-pocket 
payments, individuals may purchase voluntary insurance to cover for the copayments 
and for services not included in the mandatory benefi ts package (eg. dental care etc.) 
(see Table 3b). For the purchase of voluntary insurance the unemployed and the low-
income individuals are fully subsidised by the Couverture Maladie Universelle (CMU) 
(ie. general taxation). Although copayments may be an effective tool to reduce moral 
hazard, allowing individuals to purchase voluntary coverage (fully subsidised for 
low-income groups) may offset the effectiveness of these copayments in mitigating 
moral hazard and lead to excessive demand of care and thereby to an increase in 
health care costs.
In Ireland, apart from long-term care and hospital care, the coverage of other ser-
vices (eg. ambulatory care, prescription drugs, physiotherapy and dental care) is man-
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datory only for medical card holders (ie. low-income or high-risk people). In principle 
the option of a broader mandatory package of services for low-income groups than 
for high-income groups is consistent with the objective of preventing free riding and 
myopic behaviour (as discussed in chapter 2). In Ireland individuals may purchase 
voluntary health insurance for most health care services and benefi t from cross-
subsidies (such as community-rating and risk-equalisation). Although cross-subsidi-
sation may increase the affordability of coverage, it may not appropriately address 
the problems of free riding and myopic behaviour inherent to the voluntary coverage 
of high-cost services (eg. prescription drugs, rehabilitative physiotherapy) for indi-
viduals who are not eligible for medical cards (ie. 70 percent of the Irish population). 
Therefore, for high-cost care mandatory coverage should be extended to everyone. 
Moreover the combination of explicit (risk-equalisation) and implicit (community-
rating) cross-subsidiation in the Irish voluntary health insurance market is likely to 
create incentives for risk-selection, especially considering the rather poor quality of 
the risk-equalisation scheme.
In Australia there is no mandatory coverage for home care and rehabilitative 
physiotherapy. Although the voluntary coverage for these services is subsidised, sub-
sidisation may not be suffi cient to offset the incentives for free riding and lack of 
foresight particularly for low-income and high-risk individuals. To prevent free riding 
and myopic behaviour in the decision to buy voluntary coverage for high-cost care 
(eg. home care) the introduction of a mandatory coverage provision may be neces-
sary especially for low-income people (see chapter 2).
In some countries such as Belgium, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the 
government has introduced a legal mandate for all inhabitants to purchase cover-
age from competing health insurers or sickness funds for a uniform set of services, 
comprising ambulatory and hospital care, prescription drugs and rehabilitative phys-
iotherapy. In Belgium and Switzerland the mandatory package of services offered by 
sickness funds includes also long-term care services. In Israel and the Netherlands, 
the coverage for long-term care is mandatory and uniform for everyone but provided 
by regional or nation-wide monopolistic insurers (van de Ven et al., 2007).
The Netherlands and Switzerland are the only two attempts towards the single-
option scheme with voluntary income-related deductibles. After the enforcement of 
the New Insurance Act (2006), the Netherlands switched from a German-like two-
option scheme to a Swiss-like universal single-option scheme with voluntary fi xed-
deductibles in exchange for a premium rebate, but only for curative health care ser-
vices.3 In principle, the fi ne-tuning of mandatory coverage via voluntary deductibles 
3. For long-term care (eg. nursing home care), the Netherlands implemented a universal single-
option scheme (ie. AWBZ) with mandatory income-related copayments.
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is effective in preventing free riding and lack of foresight. Nevertheless, given that in 
both countries voluntary deductibles are not income-related, the maximum fi xed-
deductible may be too low for the high-income and too high for the low-income 
people. A single-option scheme with voluntary income-related deductibles for both 
curative and long-term health care services would therefore be more responsive to 
consumers’ preferences, and reduce moral hazard and total health care costs com-
pared to universal mandatory coverage.
Germany is the only Bismarkian-country with a two-option scheme. In fact, the 
mandate to purchase coverage from competing insurers is universal only for long-
term care and restricted to low- and middle- income groups for a broad range of ser-
vices including palliative care and spa (see Table 3b). The German two-option scheme 
effectively prevents free riding and lack of foresight; increases the responsiveness 
to consumers’ preferences and it reduces moral hazard compared to universal man-
datory health insurance for a uniform set of basic services; and it does not affect 
the affordability of health care coverage for low-income and high-risk groups given 
that they are cross-subsidised by the high-income (apart from the top 10 percent 
high-income groups) and low-risk groups (ie. income-related contributions and risk-
related subsidies).
In other countries such as the United States, mandatory coverage for most services 
is quite fragmented across income and risk groups. For instance, mandatory coverage 
for long-term care, rehabilitative physiotherapy and prescription drugs applies only 
to certain income groups and differs by State (ie. Medicaid benefi ciaries). Therefore, 
high-risk individuals (ie. people above 65 years eligible for Medicare), who are not 
eligible for Medicaid, have to rely on voluntary coverage for these services if they can 
afford it. Since the likelihood that low-risk individuals would buy voluntary coverage 
for long-term care and prescription drugs in a competitive insurance market is low, 
an adverse selection spiral is likely to occur (Desmon et al., 2006; Ettner, 1997; Wolfe 
and Goddeeris, 1991). For these services, policymakers are considering introducing 
a universal mandatory coverage provision for a uniform package of services (Stein-
brook, 2006).
3.4. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter discusses the conformity of the actual design of nine OECD countries’ 
health care fi nancing schemes with the economic arguments for mandatory cross-
subsidies and for mandatory coverage.
Many countries (eg. Australia, Belgium, France and Isreal) opted for the introduc-
tion of universal mandatory coverage for a comprehensive and uniform package 
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of services. As discussed in chapter 2, this measure is not per se necessary and pro-
portionate to achieve affordable access to (the coverage of) health care services for 
vulnerable groups. In conformity with the economic rationales, mandatory coverage 
could be fi ne-tuned according to the individuals’ available income. Governments 
may consider the following alternatives to universal mandatory coverage: the two-
option scheme and the single-option scheme with voluntary income-related deduct-
ibles. Although the latter scheme may be preferable from an economic perspective, 
it is not implemented in any of the considered countries. Only the Netherlands and 
Switzerland come close to this type of scheme given that they have implemented a 
single-option scheme with traditional deductibles (fi xed amounts), and with income-
related copayments for long-term care in the Netherlands. As far as the two-option 
scheme is concerned, it is implemented in Germany and Ireland. The high-option 
scheme (ie. for low-income people) appears to be too broad in the Germany and too 
small in Ireland. In Germany, it includes services like spa for which the arguments 
for mandatory coverage are particularly weak (eg. moral hazard). Moreover, for ser-
vices such as ambulatory care the percentage of individuals who may opt-out from 
the high-option scheme is only 10 percent (ie. the highest income groups). Given 
the relatively low costs of GP care and its relatively high price-elasticity, the govern-
ment may consider to lower the income threshold or to introduce income-related 
copayments/deductibles for ambulatory care as for hospital care, prescription drugs 
and rehabilitative physiotherapy. In Ireland, the mandatory coverage provision for 
ambulatory care and prescription drugs applies only to 30 percent of the population. 
Considering that the price-elasticity of prescription drugs is relatively low and their 
costs high, the mandatory coverage provision for expensive drugs could be extended 
to everyone.
Apart from Australia and Belgium, in all other countries the coverage or the access 
to long-term care is subsidised and mandatory for everyone. In Australia the only 
way for individuals to benefi t from cross-subsidisation for home care is to purchase 
voluntary health insurance. In the Australian voluntary health insurance market 
there is a combination of explicit (risk-equalisation) and implicit (community-rating, 
30 percent premium rebate and lifetime cover) cross-subsidies. Although the mar-
ket is extensively regulated and subsidised, the combination of explicit and implicit 
cross-subsidies does not seem to have tackled appropriately the adverse selection 
problems (Butler, 2007; Connelly et al., 2006). In the long-run the combination of a 
poor quality risk-equalisation scheme (ie. two age-bands) with community-rating is 
likely to create incentives for risk-selection in the Australia voluntary health insur-
ance market (van de Ven et al., 2000). In Australia alternative care and home care 
are considered equally with respect to cross-subsidies, ie. individuals who want to 
benefi t from subsidisation for the coverage of these services have to buy voluntary 
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insurance. Given that the effectiveness of alternative care is not scientifi cally proven, 
its costs relatively low and subsidies-induced moral hazard high compared to home 
care services, the economic rationale for mandatory cross-subsidies is stronger for 
home care than for alternative care.
Home care in Belgium is excluded from the system of mandatory cross-subsidies 
although coverage is mandatory for everyone. In presence of mandatory coverage for 
home care, the absence of cross-subsidies may be related to the fact that the level 
of price-competition in the Belgian health insurance market is moderately low. In 
fact, a mandatory coverage provision may be suffi cient to guarantee subsidisation 
for home care between low-risk (ie. young) and high-risk (ie. old) individuals if the 
level of price-competition in the insurance market is low. Although organising cross-
subsidies implicitly via a mandate to purchase coverage might be effective in the 
short term, it may not be a stable solution, particularly in the context of an ageing 
society (ie. the percentage of old people increasing faster then birth-rates). If the 
level of price-competition increases in the market, the premium for home care for 
low-risk (ie. young) individuals would approach zero and insurers would no longer be 
able to implicitly subsidise high-risk (ie. old) people. An effective long-term solution 
might be to introduce explicit risk-adjusted subsidies for home care in Belgium.
Interestingly in these countries the fi nancial access to ambulatory care is subsi-
dised for those people for who home care is not subsidised. Given that the costs 
per consumer of ambulatory care are lower than home care, the introduction of a 
system of cross-subsidies for home care is likely to satisfy altruistic preferences more 
effectively than for ambulatory care.
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4.
The potential for risk-rating in competitive 
markets for supplementary health 
insurance: an empirical analysis
summary  Many countries are considering the option of reducing the 
share of mandatory basic health insurance (BI) and to increasingly rely on 
voluntary supplementary health insurance (SI) schemes to cover health care 
expenditures. In theory, competitive markets for SI tend to risk-rated premiums. 
After discussing the determinants of risk-rating in competitive SI markets, we 
estimate the potential for risk-rating due to the transfer of benefi ts from BI to 
SI coverage. For this purpose, we simulate several scenarios in which benefi ts 
covered by BI are transferred to competitive markets for SI. We use a dataset 
from one of the largest insurers in the Netherlands, to calculate the potential 
premium range for SI resulting from this transfer. Our fi ndings show that, by 
adding risk-factors, the minimum SI premium decreases while the maximum 
increases. Moreover, we observe that risk-rating primarily affects the maximum 
premium. The magnitude of the premium range is especially substantial for 
benefi ts such as medical devices and drugs. For these services the potential 
consequences of risk-rating in terms of access to affordable insurance 
coverage may be considered not “socially acceptable”, since they result in high 
SI-premiums for certain risk/income groups. Therefore, when transferring 
benefi ts from BI to SI policy makers should be aware of the implications for the 
affordability of insurance coverage.
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4.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, we argued that most OECD countries implement manda-
tory cross-subsidisation either implicitly (eg. through community-rating) or explicitly 
(eg. through risk-adjusted premium subsidies and/or taxation) with the purpose of 
providing (the coverage for) a wide range of benefi ts to most individuals at an af-
fordable price (ie. solidarity). For instance, countries with a National Health Service 
(NHS) system fi nance health care mainly via taxation and open access to health care 
facilities to all nationals (Colombo and Tapay, 2004). Countries with a competitive 
market for mandatory basic health insurance (BI) adopt a risk-equalisation scheme 
with premium rate restrictions (eg. community-rating) and open enrolment (van de 
Ven et al., 2003).
Conversely, in most voluntary supplementary health insurance (SI) markets these 
institutional and regulatory arrangements are formally absent. In the long run, the 
absence of these legal constraints may induce insurers to risk-rate premiums and 
thereby increase their competitiveness and profi ts in competitive SI markets. In this 
chapter, we address the following questions:
• Why and to what extent do insurers risk-rate premiums in SI markets?
• What is the potential for risk-rating caused by transferring benefi ts from BI to SI 
coverage?
In order to answer these questions, we provide an empirical illustration of the transi-
tion from community-rated to risk-rated premiums in SI markets. We hypothesise 
that this transition would naturally occur in competitive SI markets without pre-
mium rate restrictions.
This chapter is organised as follows. First we discuss the equivalence principle and 
the rationale for risk-rating in competitive SI markets. Then the methodology and the 
data used in the econometric analysis are briefl y described. In particular, we simulate 
several scenarios in which benefi ts covered by BI (community-rating) are transferred 
to SI (risk-rating). And we calculate the potential premium range resulting from this 
transfer in order to quantify the potential gains of risk-rating for insurers relative to 
community-rating. Finally, we discuss the conclusions and the policy implications.
4.2. THE SOLIDARITY AND EQUIVALENCE PRINCIPLES
A major problem of competitive markets for SI, although they may stimulate insurers 
to be more effi cient and more responsive to consumer preferences, is the “apparent 
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incompatibility” between the solidarity and equivalence principles. The solidarity 
principle implies that low-risk or high-income individuals subsidise high-risk or low-
income individuals with the aim of achieving an affordable access to health insur-
ance coverage. The equivalence principle refers to the fact that, without external 
interventions, a competitive health insurance market may tend to risk-adjusted pre-
miums. It might be argued that solidarity could be achieved by a system of implicit 
cross-subsidies where insurers would accept predictable losses on the contracts of 
high-risk individuals and compensate these losses with predictable profi ts made on 
the contracts of low-risk individuals. However, implicit cross-subsidisation cannot be 
fi nancially sustainable in a competitive insurance market (van de Ven et al., 2000). 
Since competition minimises the predictable profi ts per contract, insurers have to 
break even on each contract and therefore apply the equivalence principle, either 
by adjusting the premium to the consumer’s risk (premium differentiation) or by 
adjusting the accepted risks to the premiums (risk-selection). While for automobile, 
burglary and fi re insurance these consequences appear to be “socially acceptable”, 
for health insurance this may not be the case (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2004).
For instance, consider the case of unregulated competitive health insurance mar-
kets dominated by insurers that community-rate their premiums (eg. private health 
insurance in the Netherlands before 2006). In this context, those insurers that in-
troduce risk-rating (with easily available risk factors such as age and gender)1 would 
immediately gain a competitive advantage vis à vis insurers that adopt community-
rated premiums. The competitive advantage of risk-rating insurers consists of their 
increased attractiveness for low-risks. In fact, low-risks would crowd the cheaper 
risk-rating insurers. As a result, in the absence of compensation schemes for high-risk 
individuals community-rating insurers would be forced either to follow risk-rating 
insurers or to increase their community-rated premiums. In the latter case, they most 
likely will be faced with an adverse selection spiral, which will force them to exit the 
market.
1. Throughout this chapter, we consider gender as a potential risk factor given that insurers may 
use it to risk-rate premiums in several countries’ private voluntary health insurance markets. In ac-
cordance with EC-law, the Council Directive 2004/113/EC of December 2004, adopted to implement 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods 
and services (Article 13 of the EC-Treaty), establishes that Member States may decide “to permit 
proportionate differences in individuals’ premiums and benefi ts where the use of sex is a determin-
ing factor in the assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data”, 
which must be regularly updated and made public (Article 5(2), Directive 2004/113/EC). An example 
of gender-based premium differentiation outside the EU is South Africa (Armstrong et al., 2004). In 
any case, forbidding the use of gender as a risk factor would not affect signifi cantly the premium 
range relative to the other risk factors, ie. age and health status.
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In this chapter, we mainly focus on risk-rating and, in particular, on its determi-
nants and its effects on the affordability of insurance coverage.
4.3. THE DETERMINANTS OF THE LEVEL OF RISK-RATING
In this section we discuss a conceptual framework in order to discern the determi-
nants of the insurers’ incentives for risk-rating in competitive SI markets. Insurers’ 
choice regarding whether and to what extent to adopt risk-rated premiums in these 
markets is infl uenced by several factors, which may be distinguished in two main 
categories: 1) exogenous factors, that cannot be infl uenced by insurers’ actions such 
as the level of competition, the consumers’ willingness to switch and the regula-
tory framework; and 2) endogenous factors, that can (to some extent) be affected by 
insurers’ behaviour such as transaction costs of risk-rating, self-regulation and the 
choice of risk-adjusters in SI markets.
4.3.1. Level of competition
The degree of competition and contestability in SI markets is a crucial element in order 
to assess whether there are incentives for risk-rating. The most common indicators 
used to measure the degree of competition and contestability in the marketplace are 
the price-sensitivity, the market share of the (potential) insurers,2 and the consumers’ 
switching rate. In general, highly competitive and contestable markets increase the 
incentives for insurers to risk-rate premiums. If insurers (partially or completely) bear 
the fi nancial risk, the greater the degree of competition in the market the less likely 
it is for insurers to survive without risk-rating premiums. In fact, insurers choosing 
not to compete with risk-rated premiums may lose market share to insurers who 
actually risk-rate, and thereby worsen the average risk profi le of the individuals in 
their pool. This may lead to excessive and unsustainable expected costs mainly due 
to the low-risk individuals’ crowding-out effect, and thereby it may force insurers to 
exit the market.
2. If available, the preferable indicator of fi rms’ market power is the relevant price-sensitivity, since 
it directly provides information about the shift in the (incumbent or new entrant) fi rms’ market 
shares due to price-variations. Market shares as such are more crude proxies of fi rms’ market power 
(often adopted by Antitrust Authorities as indirect indicators, when data on price-sensitivities lacks). 
They can be measured at the level of the individual fi rms on the “relevant market” in order to es-
tablish the market dominance of each fi rm. Alternatively, concentration ratio’s (CR8, CR4 and the 
Hirschman-Herfi ndahl index) report the aggregated market share of the largest fi rms in the market. 
If market shares are not decisive, the competitive advantage of the dominant fi rm should be taken 
into account including entry barriers. Entry barriers are particularly important to determine the de-
gree of contestability of the market.
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4.3.2. Consumers’ willingness to switch
Whether risk-rating in SI markets is effective for insurers to increase their market 
share and/or profi ts depends also on the consumers’ willingness to switch SI-provid-
er. In fact, by offering lower premiums insurers would gain market share if and only 
if consumers were suffi ciently sensitive to the price-variation (price-sensitivity) and 
willing to switch. Some empirical studies (Strombom et al., 2002; Buchmueller and 
Feldstein, 1997) indicate substantial variation in price-sensitivity related to expected 
health care costs. For instance younger, healthier individuals are between two and 
four times more price-sensitive than individuals who are older and who have been 
recently hospitalised or diagnosed with cancer. Moreover, premium sensitivity is 
signifi cantly higher for new enrolees (eg. probably younger), suggesting that habit 
reduces price-sensitivity. The consumers’ willingness to switch SI-carrier depend on 
other factors, which determine the magnitude of the price-sensitivity, such as habit, 
convenience and the strength of the link between SI and BI providers.3 These factors 
should also be taken into account when considering the potential increase in the per-
centage of low-risk individuals in the insurers’ portfolios due to a premium decrease. 
For instance, if the link between SI and BI carriers is strong, low switching rates in BI 
markets may lead to low switching rates in SI markets. This is due to the role of SI in 
health care fi nancing which is relatively less important than BI’s and to the fact that 
a strong link between BI and SI providers may strengthen the consumers’ preferences 
for one stop shopping (ie. joint purchase of BI and SI). In some countries (eg. The 
Netherlands), low switching rates in BI markets may well explain low switching rates 
and, in turn, the prevalence of community-rated premiums in SI markets.4
4.3.3. Regulatory framework
The level of risk-rating also depends on the regulatory framework. Many countries 
adopt premium rate restrictions such as community-rating, a ban on certain rating 
factors, or rate-banding (by class), with the scope of reducing the adverse effects of 
risk-rating (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000).
Despite the legal obligation of insurers to adopt, for example community-rated 
premiums within their pool, risk-rating among insurers may still occur indirectly. 
To the extent that some insurers are successful in attracting the low-risk persons, 
these selection activities (eg. product differentiation) result in market segmentation, 
such that the low-risk individuals pay a low premium and the high-risk individuals 
3. See chapter 6 for more details on the strength of the links between SI and BI carriers.
4. Switching rates in the Dutch BI market increased by 18 percent after the introduction of the new 
Dutch national health insurance scheme in January 2006. In the coming years, this may lead to an 
increase in the SI’s switching rates, given that BI and SI are linked (see chapter 6).
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pay a very high premium - if they are able and willing to do so. That is, market seg-
mentation leads to premium differentiation among insurers (not within the same 
insurer). An example of market segmentation caused by legally mandatory open en-
rolment and community-rating per insurer, is South Africa’s private health insurance 
market. Given that age profi les differ considerably among insurers, the maximum 
community-rated age-related per capita expected costs per insurer are four times 
the minimum (Armstrong et al., 2004). In sum, premium rate restrictions (and open 
enrolment) create incentives for selection, which may threaten access to affordable 
health insurance coverage.
4.3.4. Transaction costs
In a competitive market for SI, transaction costs may inhibit risk-bearing insurers 
from adjusting their premiums to an individual’s expected costs (Newhouse, 1996). 
Transaction costs refer for example to the overall administrative and marketing ex-
penses incurred by SI providers, or they may simply refer to the costs involved in the 
risk-rating process, such as the elaboration, distribution, collection and processing 
of health questionnaires. Questionnaires are useful tools for gaining specifi c and 
detailed information on individuals’ health status, which is an accurate predictor of 
individuals’ expected costs (van de Ven et al., 2004). The widespread utilisation of 
health questionnaires suggest that in unregulated competitive SI markets the level 
of transaction costs does not preclude insurers from using questionnaires to risk-rate 
premiums (or to risk-select).
4.3.5. Self-regulation
Another reason for insurers not to risk-rate premiums in the short-term and to main-
tain premiums at an acceptable level for Society (ie. community-rated premiums) 
may be to avoid government intervention in SI markets. In response to insurers’ risk-
rating, governments may decide to introduce regulatory constraints on premium set-
ting in SI markets or to transfer benefi ts from SI to BI coverage. In order to avoid gov-
ernment intervention, insurers may prefer to self-regulate in the short-term, ie. not 
to engage in price-competition. Nevertheless, in the medium/long term incentives to 
undercut (raise) the premiums of low-risk (high-risk) individuals may increase, given 
the potential profi ts (losses) insurers may make by attracting them.
4.3.6. Choice of risk-adjusters
Insurers’ decision concerning whether to implement risk-rated premiums in SI mar-
kets depends considerably on the choice of risk-adjusters that effectively represent 
good predictors of individuals’ future health care expenditures. There are a number 
of factors that infl uence the choice of risk-adjusters.
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First, an essential pre-condition to risk-rating is that the relevant information 
about individuals’ risk profi les can be collected routinely at reasonable costs. The 
data necessary to construct risk-adjusters usually can be obtained by requiring appli-
cants to fi ll in health questionnaires. Contrary to regulated BI markets where the law 
usually forbids or imposes severe restrictions to the use of health questionnaires, in 
most countries’ SI markets insurers are relatively free in adopting them (as discussed 
in chapter 6).5 Insurers may use this information to predict new applicants’ and exist-
ing enrolees’ future health expenditures.6
A second element is the stability of a potential risk factor. Insurers may tend to 
give priority to the use of risk factors that are stable in time. Using very volatile 
risk-adjusters may cause dramatic and unstable differences in the premiums, which 
may be very diffi cult for consumers to accept.7 For instance, the use of 1-year DCGs 
(ie. Diagnostic Cost Groups) as a risk factor results in premiums which depend on 
whether one has been hospitalised in the previous year. Therefore, the premium in 
period t would increase dramatically in case of hospitalisation in period t-1. Whereas, 
at t+1 the premium would decrease to the t-1 level assuming that no hospitalisation 
occurred in period t. The use of 3-year or 5-year DCGs mitigates the volatility of this 
health status indicator and increases the predictability of the models (Lamers and 
van Vliet, 1996). Nevertheless, the use of this adjuster may be very costly since it may 
require frequent repetitions of the risk classifi cation process. All in all, the use of risk-
adjusters that refl ect chronic conditions (such as PCGs, Pharmaceuticals Cost Groups) 
may be preferable for insurers given that their effect on the premium variation is in 
principle less volatile, at least in the short-term.
A third important factor is the profi tability of (further) risk-rating. In order to 
establish whether or not a risk-adjuster produces fi nancial gains, rational insurers 
consider two elements: 1) the specifi c risk-adjuster’s contribution to the variation in 
the premium range; 2) the variation in the percentages of individuals (frequency) in 
5. The choice of risk-adjusters is considered as an endogenous determinant of the level of risk-rat-
ing, since health questionnaires are designed by the insurers. Consequently, insurers may infl uence, 
at least to a certain extent, the quality of the questions proposed and thereby the quality, in terms of 
predictive power, of the resulting risk-adjusters.
6. Under the regulatory constraints currently present in the Dutch (and most other countries’) SI 
market, most information about relevant risk-factors may be collected by insurers via health ques-
tionnaires. The fact that most risk-factors are observable decreases the possibility (and the conse-
quences) of adverse selection, which in fact appears not to be an issue at least in the Netherlands 
given that 90% of the population holds SI.
7. In unregulated competitive insurance markets the use of health status indicators as risk-adjust-
ers by insurers is very likely to happen in the long run. Nonetheless, large and sudden fl uctuations in 
the premiums may be diffi cult to accept for enrolees if these variations are due to a change in health 
status.
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each risk group produced by the introduction of new risk-adjusters. The more sub-
stantial the risk-adjuster’s contribution to the variation of the premium range and to 
the variation in the percentage of individuals’ identifi ed in each risk cell, the greater 
would be the effect of risk-rating on insurers’ potential profi ts.
Frequent and large variations in the premiums and in the cells’ composition may 
also cause problems in terms of insurers’ reputation vis à vis consumers, competitors 
and governments. Therefore, insurers have to weigh the profi tability of risk-adjusters 
with a fourth factor that is the returns/losses of risk-rating in terms of reputation. 
Particularly for countries with a competitive BI market where a wide variety of ben-
efi ts are provided by sickness funds or mutualités, solidarity in terms of affordability 
and accessibility of insurance coverage is a very sensitive issue. Moreover, not-for 
profi t entities operating in the BI market are often linked to SI providers, which in-
creases the (potential) spillover effects in terms of reputation. BI providers linked to 
a SI provider may deteriorate their reputation vis à vis the government, consumers 
and other insurers, which may lead to important losses both in terms of volumes 
and fi nances. On the other hand, BI/SI providers may exploit risk-rating in SI markets 
also as a tool for risk-selection in the BI market (with community-rated premiums) 
(see chapter 6). Whether the losses in terms of reputation for BI providers due to 
risk-rating by the linked SI entities outweigh the profi ts produced by both risk-rating 
(in the SI market) and by induced risk-selection (in the BI market) is crucial to predict 
insurers’ behaviour. So to the extent that risk-adjusters can be collected at a reason-
able cost, insurers (BI and SI providers) face a trade-off between the profi tability of 
risk-rating and its potential losses in terms of reputation.
4.4. METHODS
Consistent with the observed trend that benefi ts of the mandatory basic health in-
surance (BI) are transferred to voluntary supplementary health insurance (SI),8 we 
simulate a scenario in which certain benefi ts, covered by BI, are transferred to SI cov-
erage. Since in BI markets premiums are community-rated by legislation, the transfer 
of benefi ts to an unregulated competitive SI market may lead insurers to risk-rate 
premiums. In order to calculate the expected risk-rated premiums, we apply ordinary 
least squares (OLS) to individual’s annual health care expenditures (Y) relative to dif-
ferent benefi ts packages:
8. Since January 2004, BI in the Netherlands no longer covers for the costs of physiotherapists 
and dentists for adults; of the fi rst in-vitro fertilisation treatments (IVF); of the contraceptive pill 
for women older than 21 years; and of taxi transport of sick people to the doctor. Psychotherapy was 
limited to 30 treatments (Van Kolfschooten, 2003).
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Y= β X + ε.
Where Y can be:
1. Y1 = the total health care expenditures of the “2002 SI benefi ts package”;
2. Y2 = the total expenditures (=SI+BI expenditures) for dental care;
3. Y3 = the total expenditures (=SI+BI expenditures) for paramedic care;
4. Y4 = the total expenditures (=SI+BI expenditures) for medical devices;
5. Y5 = the total expenditures (=SI+BI expenditures) for pharmaceuticals;
6. Y6 = the total expenditures for the “complete SI benefi ts package” (=Y2+Y3+Y4+Y5).
The expected premiums can be calculated for all subgroups that follow from the 
different risk factors (X) included in the estimated regression equation above.
In the simulations, we calculate the community-rated premium (average premi-
um), and the maximum and the minimum expected premium [E(Y)=βˆX] that insurers 
would obtain by adjusting the benefi ts’ costs to different risk factors (Xs) such as 
age, gender, diagnostic cost groups (DCGs) and pharmaceutical cost groups (PCGs) 
for each of the benefi ts (packages). The obtained premium range, that is the absolute 
difference between the maximum and the minimum risk-based premiums, is con-
fronted with the community-rated premium. This allows us to quantify the potential 
gains of risk-rating and discuss the potential implications for solidarity. The main 
reason for applying OLS instead of two-part models to compare, for each benefi ts 
package, the premium range with the community-rated premium across different 
models is that it corresponds to a realistic simulation of health insurers’ practice. 
To all dependent variables we apply a simple demographic model (Model 1) charac-
terised by 16 age*gender dummies (independent variables), a demographic model 
plus a dummy for DCGs (Model 2), a demographic model plus a dummy for PCGs 
(Model 3) and a demographic model plus two dummies for DCGs and PCGs (Model 
4). We consider different models with the purpose of evaluating whether the gradual 
introduction of risk factors affects the premium range, and thereby the affordability 
of health insurance coverage. The community-rated premium, the minimum and the 
maximum expected premiums are the result of a multiple regression analysis, not of 
cell-based averages.
We considered these benefi ts since in several countries policy-makers have already 
excluded (some of) them from the basic package covered by mandatory health insur-
ance. This is particularly the case for dental and paramedic care and medical devices, 
whereas pharmaceuticals are (still) covered by BI in most countries. Since prescrip-
tion drugs are partly covered by Medigap (the Medicare supplemental insurance) in 
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the US (Uccello and Bertko, 2003; Laschober et al., 2003),9 we decided to include them 
in the analysis to show the potential implications of risk-rating.
4.5. DATA
The empirical analysis in this study is based on a dataset issued by one of the largest 
insurers in the Netherlands (AGIS), concerning about 1.5 million Dutch insured. We 
concentrate our analysis on a sub-sample of about 0.5 million individuals holding 
identical coverage for both BI and SI. Table 4a presents the dependent and indepen-
dent variables along with means and standard deviations used in our regressions.
The dataset contains demographic information on the enrolled members, such 
as sex, date of birth, zip code, and eligibility. For each enrolee the dataset comprises 
administrative information on hospitalisations, prescription drugs’ consumption and 
health care expenditures. The annual per person health care expenditures include 
the costs (2002) paramedic care, dental care, medical devices, pharmaceuticals and 
other care (ie. inpatient and outpatient specialist care, general practitioner (GP) care, 
ambulatory care etc.). All cost data refer to actual charges.
For each hospital admission in 2001, the diagnosis is known in the form of the 
relevant code from the International Classifi cation of Diseases, ninth edition, Clini-
cal Modifi cation (ICD-9-CM). According to these diagnoses, individuals are classifi ed 
in a Diagnostic Cost Group (DCG) on an annual basis, which are based on inpatient 
hospital information for certain chronic diseases. Patients were assigned, analogous 
to the DCG model by Pope et al. (2000), to a DCG according to inpatient diagnostic 
information. Thus, based on clinical similarities and the amount of hospitalisations, 
the ICD-9-CM codes (about 15.000) were clustered in 172 groups of diagnosis (DxG) 
as specifi ed in Pope et al. (1999). In order to adjust the model to the Dutch Healthcare 
System a team of medical experts reviewed the diagnosis groups and excluded 105 of 
the 172 groups. About 25 percent of the people that were hospitalised are assigned to 
a DCG. Pharmacy Cost Groups (PCGs) are based on outpatient pharmacy information 
for certain chronic diseases. Patients were assigned to a PCG, when more than 180 
daily drug dosages (DDD) were prescribed for one year. Only about 12 percent of the 
prescribed drugs are used for the PCGs. Patients are assigned only to 1 PCG or 1 DCG, 
ie. the most expensive. DCGs and PCGs may not be the sole information insurers 
9. No Medigap policies sold after January 1, 2006 include drug coverage. People can only buy pre-
scription drug coverage through the new Medicare Part D prescription drug plans. If people did not 
join a drug plan during the initial enrolment period (November 15, 2005 and May 15, 2006), they can 
join during the annual enrolment period between November 15th and December 31st of each year, 
and they will have to pay a penalty (see www.calmedicare.org/drugs/mpdc/guide/medigap.html).
Ch
ap
te
r 
4
80
actually use in risk-rating premiums, they may for instance use DBCs (ie. Diagnose 
Behandeling Combinatie which means Diagnosis Treatment Combination) instead of 
DCGs or other variables such as region of residence, ethnicity etc.
4.6. RESULTS
4.6.1. The potential gains of risk-rating in competitive supplementary health 
insurance markets
This section presents the estimations results’ providing an indication of the poten-
tial gains of risk-rating for insurers in SI markets. In general, we found that for most 
Table 4a. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean* Standard Deviation (SD)*
Cost in year 2002 (in €)*
2002 SI BP a 75 248
Dental (SI+BI) 83 188
Paramedic (SI+BI) 70 226
Medical devices (SI+BI) 76 468
Pharmaceuticals (SI+BI) 309 972
Other care (SI+BI) 284 1073
SI BP b 538 1248
Independent variables
Age (years) 40 23
Female (%) 56 0.5
In a PCG group year 2001 (%) 8.5 0.3
In a DCG group year 2001 (%) 2 0.5
Number of individuals 545366
* All the cost variables, including the means and the standard deviations, reported in this table represent the 
sum of BI and SI health care expenditures per SI benefi t or benefi ts package in year 2002, ie. SI BP.
a The “2002 SI Benefi ts Package (2002 SI BP)” includes dental care (36 per cent of the total dental 
care expenditures), paramedic care (10 per cent), medical devices needed for disability (5 per cent), 
pharmaceuticals (4 per cent), home care for pregnant and elderly people (10 per cent), alternative care (100 
per cent), and cross-boarder care obtained for temporary stay (max 60-90 days) (100 per cent). We did not 
consider home, alternative and cross-boarder care in our estimations given that they are not frequently used 
on average.
b In the “complete SI Benefi ts Package (SI BP)” we included the total expenditures (BI+SI) of dental care, 
paramedic care, medical devices and pharmaceuticals.
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benefi ts (packages) the implementation of a “simple” demographic risk-rating model 
has an important impact on the premium range. The potential gains of risk-rating 
are particularly substantial for the “complete SI benefi ts package”, where the risk-
rated premium range from 146 euros (minimum) to 1276 (maximum) euros and the 
community-rated premium is only 538 euros. That is the highest risk group pays 700 
euros extra per year. The benefi ts that primarily contribute to this result are pharma-
ceuticals and medical devices (see Table 4b). If insurers gradually add risk-adjusters 
in the calculation of SI premiums, the premium range increases for all benefi ts 
(packages),10 and thereby the potential reduction of solidarity becomes more serious. 
Particularly for the “complete SI benefi ts package”, where the maximum (minimum) 
premiums for the risk-rating Models 2-3-4 are respectively 2581 (138), 2302 (132) and 
3239 (127) euros, the implementation of additional risk factors substantially increases 
the potential gains of risk-rating. For instance, in case insurers risk-rate using the de-
mographic plus the DCGs and PCGs dummies (that is the model with all available risk 
factors), the highest risks pay 2701 euros per year more than under community-rating, 
while the lowest risks save 411 euros. Again, the benefi ts that primarily contribute to 
these results are medical devices and pharmaceuticals (see Table 4b & 4c).
Considering only medical devices, the premium range of the demographic plus 
DCGs model (16; 608 euros) doubles the premiums range resulting from the demo-
graphic model (17; 299 euros). Also the premium range resulting from the demograph-
ic plus PCGs model (12; 483) increases in comparison to that of the less sophisticated 
demographic model but the effect of DCGs appears to be greater. In case insurers 
risk-rate by using the complete set of risk factors (Model 4), the premium range fur-
ther widens (12; 723), that is the highest risk groups would have to pay about 640 
euros more than in case of community-rating (76 euros).
For pharmaceuticals the estimation results suggest that the potential gains of 
risk-rating may be even more substantial. The premium range for the demographic 
plus DCGs (51; 1690) and the demographic plus PCGs (40; 1560) models is double that 
of the demographic model (57; 813). The use of the complete set of risk-adjusters 
produces a further growth in the premium range (38; 2175), which means that the 
highest-risk groups would have to pay 1900 euros more than in case of community-
rating.
Compared to other benefi ts (packages), the potential gains of risk-rating for dental 
care and paramedic care are quite limited. The premium range resulting from the use 
of the demographic model is 108 euros for dental care and 158 euros for paramedic 
10. For all benefi ts (packages), the more insurers risk-rate the higher (lower) is the maximum (mini-
mum) premium paid by the highest (lowest) risk-groups. Moreover, the increase in the maximum 
premium produced by the use of additional risk-adjusters is much larger than the decrease in the 
minimum premium.
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care. Considering that the community-rated premium is 83 and 70 euros respectively, 
the increase in premium resulting from demographic risk-rating is at most 50 eu-
ros for dental care and 106 euros for paramedic care. Moreover, if insurers add risk-
adjusters in the calculation of SI-premiums, the variation in the premium range for 
dental care is minimal: from 108 euros if insurers use demographic risk-rating (Model 
1) to 116 euros if they use the complete set of risk-adjusters (Model 4). For paramedic 
care the potential gains of further risk-rating are slightly more substantial than for 
dental care but smaller than for other benefi ts. The premium range varies from 158 
euros if insurers use Model 1 to 299 euros if they adopt Model 4 (see Table 4b & 4c).
4.6.2. Will insurers risk-rate in practice?
In competitive and unregulated SI markets, where consumers are sensitive to price-
variations and transaction costs are relatively low, the insurers’ choice regarding 
whether and to what extent to risk-rate premiums, depends on the predictive power 
of the risk-adjusters. In particular, insurers may decide whether or not to (further) 
Table 4b. Community-rated premiums (CRP) vs Risk-rated premiums (RRP)
Risk-factors
Benefi ts
2002 SI BP Dental Care Paramedic Care Medical devices Pharmaceuticals Complete SI BP
CRP=75* CRP=83 CRP=70 CRP=76 CRP=309 CRP=538
Model 1
(Demographic)
Min RRP= 6
Max RRP= 125
SD = 30
Min RRP= 35
Max RRP= 143
SD = 29
Min RRP= 18
Max RRP= 176
SD = 41
Min RRP= 17
Max RRP= 299
SD = 84
Min RRP= 57
Max RRP= 813
SD = 238
Min RRP= 146
Max RRP= 1276
SD = 341
Model 2
(Demographic 
/ DCGs)
Min RRP= 6
Max RRP= 135
SD = 30
Min RRP= 29
Max RRP= 143
SD = 29
Min RRP= 18
Max RRP= 281
SD = 44
Min RRP= 16
Max RRP= 608
SD = 95
Min RRP= 51
Max RRP= 1690
SD = 273
Min RRP= 138
Max RRP=2581
SD = 392
Model 3
(Demographic 
/ PCGs)
Min RRP= 6
Max RRP= 130
SD = 30
Min RRP= 31
Max RRP= 143
SD = 29
Min RRP= 17
Max RRP= 231
SD = 45
Min RRP= 12
Max RRP= 483
SD = 104
Min RRP= 40
Max RRP= 1560
SD = 357
Min RRP= 132
Max RRP= 2302
SD = 484
Model 4
(Demographic 
/ DCGs / PCGs)
Min RRP= 6
Max RRP= 138
SD = 30
Min RRP= 27
Max RRP= 143
SD = 29
Min RRP= 13
Max RRP= 314
SD = 47
Min RRP= 12
Max RRP= 723
SD = 110
Min RRP= 38
Max RRP= 2175
SD = 369
Min RRP= 127
Max RRP= 3239
SD = 506
* Units are in euros per year.
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risk-rate premiums on the basis of the potential fi nancial gains produced by the in-
troduction of different (new) risk factors. Ceteris paribus, the profi tability of (further) 
risk-rating depends on the specifi c risk-adjusters’ contribution to the variation in the 
premium range and on the percentage of individuals (frequency) in each risk group 
produced by the introduction of (new) risk-adjusters.11 The more substantial the risk-
adjusters’ contribution is to the variation of the premium range and to the variation 
in the percentage of individuals’ identifi ed in each risk cell, the greater the insur-
ers’ propensity to risk-rate SI premiums is in practice. For instance, the rather small 
effect of different models on the variation in the premiums range relative to the 
“2002 SI benefi ts package”, which is mainly due to the limited benefi ts covered, may 
generate a small incentive for risk-rating. This is also refl ected by the widespread 
use of community-rated premiums in countries’ unregulated competitive SI markets 
where SI coverage is limited to few (luxury) benefi ts (eg. the Netherlands) (Schut et 
al., 2004). The prevalence of community-rated premiums in the Dutch SI market may 
be also justifi ed by the long tradition of social health insurers (sickness funds) domi-
nating the market and the low consumer mobility in the BI market (until 2005) com-
bined with a strong link between SI and BI (Laske-Aldershof and Schut, 2005; Laske-
Aldershof et al., 2004). Insurers’ propensity towards risk-rating may change due to 
the introduction of the new Health Insurance Act in January 2006. In particular, the 
Health Insurance Act abolished the distinction between sickness funds and private 
health insurers and transferred several benefi ts from BI to SI coverage. Therefore, in 
the coming years the presence of commercial-oriented insurers, the higher degree 
of competition in the market, the substantially increased mobility in the BI market 
(from 3 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2006), which is likely to increase the mobility 
in the SI market due to strong links between SI and BI carriers, and the increased 
broadness of the SI benefi ts package may induce insurers to risk-rate SI premiums.
In this section, we focus on the “complete SI benefi ts package” since it shows the 
largest premium range variations for the four models simulated. For this particular 
benefi ts package we present the variations in the percentages of individuals in each 
risk cell produced by the introduction of (additional) risk-adjusters. The purpose is 
to discern whether and to what extent insurers would have incentives to risk-rate 
in a competitive unregulated SI market, characterised by price-sensitive consumers 
and by low transaction costs (eg. risk-adjusters are available routinely at reasonable 
costs).
11. In order to provide a “prediction” of the profi tability of risk-rating, the difference between expect-
ed expenditures in each risk-cell and the community-rated premiums may be considered. Simulation 
techniques that take into account also the differences in price-sensitivity may be adopted to predict 
the number of individuals moving (ie. switchers). We thank a referee for bringing up this point.
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As shown in Table 4d, insurers risk-rating premiums according to a “simple” de-
mographic model may gain a substantial competitive advantage towards insurers 
adopting community-rated premiums (538 euros). In fact, the percentage of low-risk 
consumers attracted by the lower risk-rated premiums is around 55 percent,12 where-
as consumers with higher than average risk profi les (about 45 percent) may prefer 
the lower community-rated premiums. In the long run, the (potentially) substantial 
crowding-out of low-risks from community-rating insurers may seriously endanger 
their fi nancial sustainability. The high proportion of high-risks due to the ‘departure’ 
of low-risks reduces the implicit cross-subsidisation realised by community-rated pre-
miums (equivalence principle). Therefore, community-rating insurers may be forced 
‘sooner or later’ to risk-rate premiums in order to survive in the market. All in all, the 
substantial variations in the premium range and in the percentage of (new) low-
risk individuals attracted by the lower premiums increase the insurers incentives to 
shift from community-rating to risk-rating SI premiums according to age and gender 
dummies. Risk factors such as age and gender are easily available at reasonably low 
costs and forbidding the collection or the use of this type of information by insurers 
can be potentially very onerous for the regulator. Therefore, risk-rating premiums by 
means of age and gender dummies appear to be quite feasible.
Insurers may decide to further risk-rate premiums in order to attract new mem-
bers by adding to the demographical model risk-adjusters such as DCGs and/or 
PCGs (models 2, 3, 4). From Table 4d, we observe that by adding the DCGs dummy 
the percentage of (new) low-risk individuals (55 percent) does not vary from that 
of the demographic model. That is, insurers do not gain any competitive advantage 
towards insurers that risk-rate adopting only age and gender dummies. Whereas, the 
introduction of either the demographic plus PCGs model or the demographic plus 
DCGs and PCGs makes insurers’ premiums more attractive for an extra 5-10% low-
risk consumers. Whether the relatively marginal increase in the percentage of new 
(low-risk) potential costumers is considered suffi cient for adopting Models 3 and/
or 4 depends in practice also on the premium variation relative to community-rated 
premiums and the effects of risk-rating on the insurers’ reputation.
12. This represents the percentage of individuals that would pay less than 538 euros (community-
rated premium) if they switched to insurers adopting a demographic model to risk-rate premiums. In 
particular, more than the 15% (25%) of enrolees would have a substantial reduction of 338 (238) euros 
in their premium contribution.
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Table 4d. Percentages of individuals (Frequency) in each risk group for the 4 Models
Risk-rated 
Premiums
Model 1 
(Demographic)
Model 2 (Demographic 
/ DCGs)
Model 3 (Demographic 
/ PCGs)
Model 4 (Demographic 
/ DCGs / PCGs)
0-100 0 0 0 0
100-200 17% 17% 17% 22%
200-300 26% 26% 26% 21%
300-400 10% 10% 9% 9%
400-500 5% 5% 11% 11%
500-600 8% 8% 4% 12%
600-700 4% 10% 14% 7%
700-800 7% 4% 2% 0
800-900 10% 5% 0 6%
900-1000 0 0 6% 0
1000-1100 0 4% 0 0.1%
1100-1200 4% 7% 0 0.2%
1200-1300 9% 0 0 0.1%
1300-1400 0 0 0 0.3%
1400-1500 0 0.2% 0 0.6%
1500-1600 0 0.2% 0.4% 0.6%
1600-1700 0 0.3% 0.6% 1%
1700-1800 0 0.3% 0.6% 0.9%
1800-1900 0 0 0.4% 2%
1900-2000 0 0.4% 2% 2%
2000-2100 0 0.4% 2% 0
2100-2200 0 0.3% 2% 2%
2200-2300 0 0 0 0
2300-2400 0 0.2% 3% 0
2400-2500 0 0.7% 0 0
2500-2600 0 1% 0 0
2600-2700 0 0 0 0.1%
2700-2800 0 0 0 0.3%
2800-2900 0 0 0 0.1%
2900-3000 0 0 0 0.3%
3000-3100 0 0 0 0.4%
3100-3200 0 0 0 0
3200-3300 0 0 0 1%
>3300 0 0 0 0
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4.7. CONCLUSIONS
The limited level of risk-rating in most SI markets may be attributed to the absence 
of a strong price-competition, to insurers’ strategic choice of abstaining from risk-
rating to avoid government intervention, to consumers’ limited price-sensitivity and 
willingness to switch, and to insurers’ fear of a loss of reputation. In the short term, 
in countries where the size of total SI expenditures (compared to BI) and the varia-
tion in individual expenditures for SI benefi ts are small it may not be advantageous 
for insurers to risk-rate premiums. For instance, Dutch health insurers conceded to 
the government to provide SI policies at community-rated premiums and to abstain 
from underwriting for the fi rst 6 months of 2006. This type of commitments may 
strengthen insurers’ reputation and convince the regulator to (further) transfer ben-
efi ts from BI to SI, given the unchanged premium regime. Therefore, it is likely that 
refraining from risk-rating could induce governments to transfer benefi ts from BI to 
SI coverage. This in turn may result in an increase in the insurers’ potential gain of 
risk-rating. Policy makers, when transferring benefi ts from BI to SI, should be aware 
of the potential long-run implications for solidarity because a larger role of unregu-
lated competitive SI markets provides stronger incentives for insurers to risk-rate 
premiums. Moreover, the ongoing debate in several countries (eg. the Netherlands) 
on whether to apply premium rate restrictions in competitive SI markets seems to re-
fl ect the notion that if competing risk-bearing insurers are free to set their premiums, 
the premium for high-risks may end up to be so high as to jeopardise their access to 
supplementary health insurance coverage. A transfer of benefi ts from BI to SI and 
the transition from community-rated to risk-rated premiums inherent to competitive 
SI markets imply in the long run a potential reduction of risk-solidarity (in terms of 
access to insurance coverage), as shown by the variation of the premium range for 
the different benefi ts (packages). For some of the transferred benefi ts (eg. medical 
devices and drugs) the premium range of risk-rating may be considered too large and 
thereby not “socially acceptable”, since it implies a substantial reduction of solidar-
ity for certain risk/income groups. For other services (eg. dental care), the premium 
range is likely to be considered acceptable, given that the reduction of risk-solidarity 
is quite small. Governments when transferring benefi ts from BI (community-rated 
premiums) to SI (risk-rated premiums), have to carefully decide for which benefi ts 
(packages) and to what extent (in terms of “allowable” premium variation) solidarity 
is desired. For services such as medical devices and drugs for which the risk-rated 
premiums variations are substantial, policy-makers may decide not to transfer these 
benefi ts from BI (community-rated premiums) to SI (risk-rated premiums) markets. 
Although cross-subsidising benefi ts by keeping them in BI (community-rated pre-
miums) increases solidarity, it may also induce moral hazard (ie. subsidies-induced 
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overconsumption). So when transferring benefi ts from BI to SI, governments may 
face a trade-off between subsidies-induced moral hazard and the reduction of risk-
solidarity induced by risk-rating in SI markets. For instance, the (potential) high pre-
mium range due to risk-rating may be a reason for Society to consider which specifi c 
drugs or medical devices, if any, to transfer to SI coverage and whether to fi ne-tune 
BI-coverage with some form of co-insurance (eg. deductibles or co-payments), which 
is actually already the case in many countries. As discussed in chapter 2, the preferred 
alternative for the fi ne-tuning of BI-coverage is the implementation of the single-
option scheme with voluntary income-related deductibles.
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5.
Solidarity in competitive health insurance 
markets: analysing the relevant EC legal 
framework
summary  In this chapter we perform an economic analysis of different 
regulatory frameworks that aim at achieving solidarity in competitive markets 
for basic health insurance. Thereafter, we analyse the legal conformity of 
these intervention strategies with European Community (EC) law. We fi nd that 
risk-compensation schemes are the fi rst-best intervention strategy because 
they guarantee an “acceptable level of solidarity” without hindering free 
trade and competition and without reducing effi ciency. Second-best options 
are premium- and excess-loss- compensation schemes, which guarantee 
solidarity at the expense of some effi ciency. Premium rate restrictions and 
open enrolment should be avoided because they reduce effi ciency and are 
unnecessary, not proportional and undesirable to the pursuit of the general 
good. These conclusions are relevant for European Union (EU) countries that 
adopt premium rate restrictions and open enrolment in combination with 
a risk-compensation scheme, such as Ireland and the Netherlands. In these 
countries policy-makers should design the health insurance schemes in 
conformity with EC-law, eg. by replacing premium rate restrictions and open 
enrolment with premium- and/or excess-loss- compensation schemes.
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5.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the apparent incompatibility between the solidarity and 
equivalence principles was discussed. In particular, we argued that without govern-
ment regulatory intervention, (implicit) cross-subsidisation cannot be fi nancially 
sustainable in competitive health insurance markets.
In most European Union (EU) countries with a competitive health insurance mar-
ket, such as Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands, 
governments or employers have been taking actions to increase solidarity, resulting 
in a reduction of the level of competition. Since a restriction of competition may 
reduce effi ciency, an increasing number of countries are looking for ways to combine 
competition and solidarity.
In this chapter, we address the following questions:
• What is the best strategy that governments can adopt to guarantee an “accept-
able level of solidarity” in competitive basic health insurance markets from an 
economic perspective?
• Do the different intervention strategies conform to the European Community 
(EC) legal framework?
This chapter is organised as follows. First we present an economic analysis of four 
regulatory interventions aimed at guaranteeing solidarity in competitive basic 
health insurance markets. Then we describe a legal analysis of the EC legal frame-
work relevant for these markets. Finally we discuss the conclusions and the policy 
implications.
5.2. GUARANTEEING SOLIDARITY IN COMPETITIVE BASIC HEALTH INSURANCE 
MARKETS
Four strategies can be discerned to achieve solidarity in competitive basic health 
insurance markets:
(a) Legal restrictions on competition;
(b) Risk-compensation schemes;1
1. Consistently with the literature, in other chapters of this thesis we used the terms risk-adjust-
ment or risk-equalisation schemes, when referring to mechanisms introduced to equalise the dif-
ference in risk profi les among competing insurers via a system of risk-adjusted subsidies. In this 
chapter, we mainly adopt the term risk-compensation schemes to be consistent with Article 54 of the 
Insurance Directives (see section 5.3.3.).
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(c) Premium-compensation schemes;
(d) Excess-loss-compensation schemes.
These intervention strategies can be applied independently or in combination. In the 
following subsections, we consider each strategy independently in order to compare 
them with each other and identify which is the preferred strategy from an economic 
perspective.
5.2.1. Strategy (a): legal restrictions to free trade and competition
One strategy to achieve an “acceptable level of risk-solidarity” is to regulate compe-
tition by introducing premium rate restrictions and open enrolment often together.2
Premium rate restrictions can take several forms: community-rating per insurer, 
a ban on certain rating factors, or rate-banding (by class). In this chapter, we mainly 
refer to community-rating per insurer, which implies that an insurer quotes the same 
premium for everyone in its pool, independent of the individual’s risk characteristics. 
The rate restrictions are assumed to apply to specifi ed health insurance coverage. 
To prevent insurers from refusing to contract (or renew a contract) with high-risk 
individuals, governments may complement premium rate restrictions with an open 
enrolment requirement. In order to ensure that low-risk individuals also contribute 
to solidarity, the government can introduce a mandatory health insurance scheme.
Although these regulations aim at solidarity by realising a system of implicit cross-
subsidies, they are not effective in guaranteeing it. Premium rate restrictions and 
open enrolment imply predictable profi ts and losses for identifi able subgroups of 
consumers. Despite the open enrolment requirement insurers can use many subtle 
forms of risk-selection, which may have various adverse effects (van de Ven et al., 
2000). First, in the case of large predictable profi ts resulting from risk-selection, in-
surers may provide poor services to the chronically ill and choose not to contract with 
providers who have the best reputation for treating chronic illnesses. Therefore, risk-
selection may threaten good quality care for the chronically ill. Second, to the extent 
that some insurers are successful in attracting the low-risk persons, these selection 
activities result in market segmentation, such that good quality care for high-risk 
individuals is not cross-subsidised. All in all, risk-selection may threaten solidarity in 
terms of the coverage of good quality care for high-risk people.
Third, in case of large predictable profi ts resulting from selection, selection may 
be more profi table than improving effi ciency in health care production; particularly 
in the short run, when insurers have limited resources available to invest in cost-
reducing activities. Effi cient insurers may lose market shares to ineffi cient insurers 
2. A weaker form of open enrolment is “guaranteed renewal”, which implies that once insurers 
have accepted an enrolee they cannot cancel the policy.
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that prefer to invest in selection rather than in effi ciency, resulting in a welfare loss 
for Society as a whole. Therefore, risk-selection may threaten effi ciency.
In sum, premium rate restrictions and open enrolment, whose aim is guarantee-
ing solidarity, create incentives for selection that may threaten solidarity, effi ciency, 
quality of care and consumer satisfaction. Because of these adverse effects of risk-
selection, premium rate restrictions and open enrolment are undesirable. Illustrative 
empirical evidence supporting our conclusions about the effect of various interven-
tions in competitive health insurance markets can be found in Hall (2000) for the 
US, in Beck et al. (2003) for Switzerland and in Buchner et al. (2003) for Germany. In 
addition, in the pursuit of the general good, it is not advisable to forbid insurers to 
differentiate premiums according to risk factors for which solidarity is not desired 
such as providers’ ineffi ciency, oversupply, consumer propensity to consume, life-
style factors, etc. (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000).
5.2.2. Strategy (b): risk-compensation schemes
An alternative way to achieve risk-solidarity is through risk-compensation schemes. 
According to this strategy, insurers are completely free to apply risk-rated premiums 
and to refuse or accept high-risk consumers. Risk-compensation schemes correspond 
to a system of explicit cross-subsidies, such that the high-risk individuals receive a 
risk-adjusted premium subsidy from a solidarity fund, which is fi lled with manda-
tory solidarity contributions from the low-risk individuals. In order to determine the 
amount of the subsidy, several relevant risk groups are discerned. The subsidy for 
each risk group is based on the average expenses of all insurers within the relevant 
risk group. In addition, the subsidy is earmarked for the purchase of health insurance 
with a specifi ed benefi ts package and is not transferable. “Maximum-risk-solidarity”
is achieved when the risk factors used by the solidarity fund to calculate the risk-
adjusted subsidy correspond to the risk factors used by the insurers to calculate the 
premium. If the solidarity fund uses fewer risk factors, then the high-risk consumers 
are not compensated for the higher premium as far as these risk factors are con-
cerned. Moreover, insurers may also refuse applicants, given the absence of an open 
enrolment requirement. In practice a “perfect risk-equalisation” system does not (yet) 
exist. Therefore, the level of risk-solidarity achieved in the presence of an “imperfect 
risk-equalisation” system might not be acceptable for Society. For instance, if the risk-
compensation scheme is only based on age and gender (as it is in most countries), 
insurers that are specialised in Disease Management Programs for treating patients 
with diseases such as asthma, heart disease, diabetes or cancer, are confronted with 
predictable losses on their target groups ranging from 30 to 65 percent of the ac-
tual expenses for these patients (see Table 5). In order to increase solidarity there 
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Table 5. Predictable losses in case of premium rate restrictions (ie. community-rating per insurer) and 
open enrolment
SOURCE SUBGROUP % Of population Predictable Loss as % of Actual Expenses
MODEL
No RE A/G A/G A/G A/G
+DCG +PCG +DCG
+PCG
SUBGROUP BASED ON INFORMATION FROM PRIOR YEAR
(1) Poor perceived health  20.7% 54% 29% 23% . .
(1) >= 3 Chronic conditions 18.0% 55% 35% 28% . .
(1) Functional disabilities 9.9% 67% 33% 27% . .
(1) Visiting GP >= 4 times in 
2 months
4.2% 62% 43% 33% .  .
(1) Use of home nursing 
(prior year)
2.4% 70% 51% 46% . .
(1) Use of prescribed drugs 
>= 5 in 2 weeks
3.3% 73% 49% 40% . .
(2) Asthma 5.0% 49% 36% . . .
(2) Heart Disease 1.8% 76% 53% . . .
(2) Diabetes 1.7% 70% 44% . . .
(2) Cancer 1.2% 78% 64% . . .
(3) Highest expenses (prior 
year)
10% 75% 61% 40% 43% 30%
SUBGROUP BASED ON INFORMATION FROM 4 YEARS AGO
(4) Highest expenses 9.2% 57% 44% . . .
(4) Highest prescription drug 
expenditures
9.7% 67% 47% . . .
(4) Highest number of days 
of illness
5.2% . 51% . . .
(4) Change in relative health 
status
14.1% . 32% . . .
(4) >3 physician consultation 
(6 months)
20.5% . 34% . . .
(5) Highest expenses 9.5% 64% 47% 38% . .
SOURCES:
(1) Lamers, HSR, 1999, Table 2
(2) Van Barneveld et al., JHE, 2001, Table 5
(3) Van de Ven et al., HA, 2004, Exhibit 1
(4) Van Vliet & Van de Ven, SSM, 1992, Table 4 & 7
(5) Lamers & Van Vliet, MedCare, 1996, Table 8
RE = Risk-Equalisation; A/G = Age/Gender; DCG = Diagnostic Cost Group; PCG = Pharmaceutical Cost Group.
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are complementary measures for which two different situations can be discerned, 
depending on the cause of the imperfectness:3
i. Insurers have, for whatever reason, more risk factors available (for use in pre-
mium differentiation) than the ones used for calculating the risk-adjusted premium 
subsidies. In this case, complementary measures that achieve risk-solidarity are: 
premium-compensation schemes that give subsidies related to the “premium minus 
risk-adjusted subsidy” (premium-related subsidies); and/or excess-loss-compensation 
schemes that compensate insurers for all expenses in excess of some fi xed amount 
(see below: strategy (c) and (d)). They both reduce the range of the “premium minus 
risk-adjusted subsidy” and thereby increase risk-solidarity.
ii. Insurers know that there are high-risk and low-risk individuals within the ‘risk-
adjusted premium subsidy’s risk groups’, but they prefer to refuse high-risk clients 
rather than further differentiate their premiums. Reasons to do this would include 
the high transaction costs of further premium differentiation. In this case, premium 
rate restrictions (by defi nition) are unnecessary and an alternative to open enrolment 
may be an excess-loss-compensation scheme, which reduces the insurers’ incentives 
for risk-selection.
There are at least three modes to organise the subsidy payment fl ows (see Figure 5):
1. Direct-Consumer-Subsidy;
2. Indirect-Consumer-Subsidy;
3. Risk-Equalisation.
According to Mode (1), equalisation occurs among consumers. The low-risk consum-
ers pay a mandatory solidarity contribution to the solidarity fund and the high-risk 
consumers receive a risk-adjusted premium subsidy from the solidarity fund. An al-
ternative is that the subsidy goes to the insurer, and the consumer pays the premium 
minus the subsidy to the insurer (Mode (2)). Another alternative is that the consumer 
pays the “premium minus subsidy plus solidarity contribution” to the insurer, while 
the insurer and the solidarity fund clear the net difference of all the solidarity con-
tributions and subsidies of the relevant clients (Mode (3)). Although at fi rst glance 
these modalities may seem to be quite different, they primarily differ in the way that 
payment fl ows are organised. Since the solidarity contributions and the subsidies can 
be calculated in the same way. Therefore the effects on incentives are also equal.
3. Throughout this chapter, we consider the most realistic scenario of imperfect risk-equalisation.
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Figure 5. Three modes of a subsidy system
MSoC= mandatory solidarity contribution; S= subsidy (these could be risk-adjusted or premium-
related); P= risk-rated premium.
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5.2.3. Strategy (c): premium-compensation schemes
Premium-compensation schemes correspond to premium-related subsidies. Normal-
ly, these subsidies are granted directly to consumers (Mode (1)), eg. via tax-deductible 
premiums. Under this strategy insurers are completely free to ask risk-rated premi-
ums and to refuse or accept high-risk consumers. Premium-compensation schemes 
are effective in achieving solidarity to whatever extent Society wants. In case insur-
ers still selectively underwrite, given the absence of an open enrolment requirement, 
it may be necessary to introduce an excess-loss-compensation scheme.
In general, premium-related subsidies diminish the consumers’ incentives to shop 
around for the lowest premium and thereby insurers’ incentives for effi ciency. They 
would also stimulate consumers to buy more complete insurance, resulting in more 
moral hazard, than they would have done in case of no subsidy at the margin. In 
addition, premium-compensation schemes reduce the competitive advantage of the 
most effi cient insurers and thereby overall price-competition. This may lead to pre-
mium infl ation. In sum, premium-compensation schemes are effective in guarantee-
ing solidarity but only at the expense of some effi ciency.
5.2.4. Strategy (d): excess-loss-compensation schemes
Another solution to increase risk-solidarity is to introduce cost-compensation 
schemes, eg. excess-loss-compensation schemes (for several forms of ex-post cost-
compensation arrangements see Van Barneveld et al, 2001; Van Vliet, 2000; Van de 
Ven and Ellis, 2000). Under an excess-loss-compensation scheme insurers are com-
pensated by the solidarity fund for all expenditures above a certain threshold (eg. 
20,000 euros per year) for each individual insured. These compensations reduce the 
range of the risk-adjusted premiums. Since the solidarity fund is fi lled in by contribu-
tions from low-risk individuals, excess-loss-compensation schemes increase risk-sol-
idarity. If the threshold amount is not too high, excess-loss-compensation schemes 
may avoid selection activities such as the exclusion of pre-existing medical condi-
tions and the rejection of applicants. Because excess-loss-compensation schemes 
reduce the insurers’ fi nancial risks, solidarity is achieved at the expense of price-
competition. Moreover, these schemes may cause infl ation in insurance premiums, 
so Society has to weigh the solidarity-gains with the effi ciency-losses caused by its 
adoption. An extreme example of excess-loss-compensation schemes was provided 
by the Act on Access to Private Health Insurance (WTZ) in the Netherlands, which 
guaranteed full compensation of all losses above the maximum premium set by the 
government. In January 2006, WTZ was abolished because of the introduction of the 
new Health Insurance Act.
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5.2.5. The preferred intervention strategy
Although politicians may prefer premium rate restrictions and open enrolment be-
cause of their supposed direct effects on achieving the goal of solidarity, we conclude 
that risk-compensation schemes are preferable. In particular, perfect risk-compen-
sation schemes are the fi rst-best intervention strategy to achieve an acceptable 
level of solidarity in competitive health insurance markets without compromising 
effective price-competition and without endangering the fi nancial sustainability of 
the scheme. In presence of an imperfect risk-compensation scheme the level of risk-
solidarity might not be acceptable for Society.
In order to increase solidarity, excess-loss- and premium- compensation schemes 
may be implemented as complementary measures to the best available risk-compen-
sation scheme. Premium- and excess-loss- compensation schemes are both effective 
in achieving solidarity to whatever extent Society wants, but only at the expense of 
effi ciency (trade-off solidarity-effi ciency).
Premium rate restrictions and open enrolment are not advisable strategies per se
or as complements of imperfect risk-compensation scheme to achieve solidarity in 
competitive insurance markets because they create predictable losses (profi ts) for 
insurers on high-risk (low-risk) individuals. In the long run, this induces insurers to 
avoid individuals with predictable losses and to select profi table consumers, despite 
an open enrolment requirement. This selection can have adverse effects in terms of 
the quality of care for chronically ill individuals, solidarity for the good quality care 
for high-risk people and effi ciency in the production of care.
All in all, we suggest risk-compensation schemes as the intervention strategy to 
start from when regulating competitive health insurance markets that aim at guar-
anteeing solidarity.
5.3. THE EC LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELEVANT FOR COMPETITIVE HEALTH INSURANCE 
MARKETS
This section presents the EC legal framework relevant for competitive health insur-
ance markets, which focuses on the Competition rules and the Insurance Directives 
as part of the Free Movement of Services principles.
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5.3.1. Competition law: Are social health insurers ‘undertakings’?
The introduction of market forces in health care raises the question of whether EC 
Competition principles are applicable in traditional public law activities (in particu-
lar Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty). If applicable, Competition rules may forbid 
national measures and/or agreements between undertakings ‘which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition’ (Article 81), within the context of social 
health insurance. In order to assess whether Competition principles apply to social 
health insurers, eg. sickness funds, the concept of ‘undertaking’ is central. Based on 
the Court’s jurisprudence, an ‘undertaking’ encompasses every entity engaged in an 
economic activity, irrespective of the legal status of the entity and the way in which 
it is fi nanced.4 In Cases 159 & 160/91 Poucet and Pistre (1993) ECR I-637, para 17, the 
Court made clear that the concept did not encompass organisations with a social 
objective and charged with the management of certain compulsory social security 
schemes, based on the principle of solidarity. The Court enforced the centrality of 
the solidarity principle by ruling that a social security entity, offering an optional 
old-age scheme that operates on a capitalisation basis5 with limited elements of soli-
darity, was engaged in an economic activity (Case C-244/94 Fédération Francaise des 
Société d’Assurance, FFSA (1995) ECR I-4013, para 17-19). The principles established in 
the FFSA Case were confi rmed in three parallel judgments in which the pension fund 
providing supplementary old-age pensions to medical specialist was classifi ed as an 
undertaking.6 The Court emphasised the fact that the funds operated in accordance 
with the capitalisation principle, under which the amount of the individuals’ con-
tributions and benefi ts depended on the fi nancial results of the investments made. 
These rulings indicate that when elements of the capitalisation principle are added 
to solidarity-based health insurance schemes and premiums are set in relation to the 
degree of risk, the activity’s character (economic or social) of the scheme becomes 
less clear. In the Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002] ECR I-691, para 37, the Court concluded 
that there is solidarity between better and less well paid workers if there is no direct 
link between the contributions paid and the benefi ts granted.7 Compulsory member-
4. See, in particular, Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21; Cases 159 & 160/91 
Poucet and Pistre [1993] ECR I-637, para 17; and Case C-244/94 Fédération Francaise des Société 
d’Assurance (FFSA) [1995] ECR I-4013, para 17-19.
5. According to the Court this is the case when the entitlements depend solely on the amount of 
contributions paid by the recipients and the fi nancial results of the investments made by the manag-
ing organisation rather than on a redistributive basis where contributions solely depend on income.
6. Joined Cases C-115/97 to C-117/97, Albany, Drijvende Bokken and Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025 and in 
the joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov [2000] ECR I-6451.
7. C-218/00 para 42.
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ship in the plan is also required for solidarity to exist. Moreover, solidarity exists when 
social security activities are subject to supervision by the State and the nature and 
level of benefi ts and the amount of contributions are, in the last resort, fi xed by the 
State.8 Although statutory supervision is important, the solidarity element seems to 
be decisive in determining whether an insurer is an undertaking. An insurance entity 
that transfers risk between members regardless of the level of contribution fulfi ls an 
exclusive social function, and therefore does not carry out an economic activity (Case 
C-355/00 Freskot [2003] ECR 2003, I-5263, para 78-79).
In the jointed Cases C-263/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband
(2004), ECJ, para 53, the Court held that the solidarity principle was fulfi lled by an 
equalisation of costs and risks between the German sickness funds. Because of risk-
equalisation, sickness funds are not in competition with each other or with private 
institutions with respect to providing statutory pharmaceutical benefi ts. Even the 
latitude that the sickness funds have when setting premiums and their freedom to 
compete with each other to attract members, does not call the non-economic nature 
of their activity into question.9
5.3.2. Health insurers entrusted with a task of “general economic interest”
An important exception to EC Competition law is found in Article 86, section 2 EC, 
which provides an exclusion from the general Competition rules for certain under-
takings that perform a task of “general economic interest”. This exception represents 
an escape from the general Competition rules regarding certain undertakings, where 
the application of Competition law would ‘obstruct the performance’ of their as-
signed tasks. Since the Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner (2001), ECR I-5751, para 65, 
it is clear that this exception may also be applicable to the health care sector.10 In 
this Case, the Court ruled that the general economic interest task of transporting 
patients that was entrusted to these organisations by law could justify the existing 
restriction (or exclusion) of competition if necessary in order to make the activity 
economically feasible. All in all, the Court recognises that exceptions to Competition 
rules are allowed in those instances where these exceptions are necessary for the 
general economic interest. Therefore, for Article 86 (2) EC to apply, it has to be shown 
that the restrictive measures or even the exclusion of competition in health insur-
ance markets is necessary to ensure the performance of the particular tasks assigned 
8. Ibid, para 43.
9. AOK, para 56.
10. The European Commission presented a Green paper on services of general interest (COM 
(2003)270) in order to clarify the concept of services of general interest and the relevant Community 
legal regime.
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to sickness funds (Case C-320/91 Carbeau [1993] ECR 1993, I-2533, para 14). It should 
be clear that without such restrictive measures, sickness funds cannot perform their 
entrusted task under economically acceptable conditions or under conditions of fi -
nancial stability. In addition, Article 86 (2) is subject to the principle of proportional-
ity. If the restrictive measures go further than is necessary to perform the assigned 
tasks under the same conditions, the restrictive measures cannot be precluded as 
necessary and proportionate.
5.3.3. The Insurance Directives
The EC-Treaty provides that restrictions on the freedom to provide (insurance) ser-
vices across borders within the EU shall be prohibited (Article 49 EC-Treaty: ‘Services’ 
are ‘normally for remuneration’). This provision is supplemented by secondary legis-
lation (eg. Directives), including that covering insurance services.
The Insurance Directives11 introduced a single system for the authorisation and 
fi nancial supervision of insurance undertakings by the Member State where their 
head offi ce is located. Such authorisation issued by the home Member State enables 
insurance undertakings to carry out their insurance business anywhere in the EU. 
The Directives also required Member States to abolish controls on premium prices 
and prior notifi cation of policy conditions, and allowed individuals and businesses to 
buy insurance in another Member State. As such, the Insurance Directives intend to 
encourage and enhance competition in EU countries’ insurance markets.12 In several 
Member States, private health insurance serves as a partial or complete alternative 
to the health coverage provided by the social security system and falls within the 
scope of the Insurance Directives. Article 2(1) clearly excludes social health insurance 
schemes from the scope of the Directives.13 This is relevant not merely for social se-
curity organisations but also for the types of insurance and operations which they 
provide in that capacity. However, if insurance funds operate a social security scheme 
(ie. work-related accidents) at their own risk, then this scheme does not fall under 
Article 2’s exception. This is the consequence of the Case C-206/98 Belgium ECR 
[2000] I-3509, in which the Court concluded that where this insurance is offered by 
undertakings operating at their own risk, it falls within the scope of the Directives. 
This means that the applicability of the Directives is determined by whether or not 
11. Offi cially Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions related to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending 
Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (OJ 1992 No. L 228, 11/8/1992, p. 1).
12. Commission Interpretative Communication Freedom to Provide Services and the General Good 
in the Insurance sector. European Commission Brussels, 2/2/2000 C (1999) 5046:1.
13. Article 2(1): ‘This Directive shall apply to the types of insurance and undertakings referred to in 
Article 1 of Directive 73/239/EEC’.
Ch
ap
te
r 
5
102
the insurance is offered at the organisation’s own risk and the scheme in question 
pursues an economic activity.14 If the Directives apply, governments are essentially 
not allowed to control the prices and conditions of insurance products. However, 
there are several exceptions to this rule, such as the Article 54 exception.15 According 
to that provision, the introduction of legal restrictions can be justifi ed by reason of 
general good,16 in case private health insurance schemes “wholly or partially” replace 
the social security system. These measures may include: open enrolment, rating on 
a uniform basis and lifetime cover; offering standard policies in line with social se-
curity schemes in combination with participating in loss compensation schemes.17
In the context of a competitive health insurance market, the general good can be 
defi ned as the guarantee of an “acceptable level of risk-solidarity”. As suggested by 
the European Commission,18 private health insurance schemes could be in line with 
Article 54 only if the Court considers the disputed measures (eg. premium rating and 
open enrolment) as objectively necessary and proportionate to the general good. The 
necessity and proportionality criterion is crucial when assessing the legal sustain-
ability of different strategies, as it will appear hereafter.
14. On the interpretation of own risk element see (Drijber and de Groot, 2002) or (van de Gronden, 
2003).
15. Article 54(1): “Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, a Member State in which contracts 
covering the risks in class 2 of point A of the Annex to Directive 73/239/EEC may serve as a partial or 
complete alternative to health cover provided by the statutory social security system may require 
that those contracts comply with the specifi c legal provisions adopted by that Member State to pro-
tect the general good in that class of insurance, and that the general and special conditions of that 
insurance be communicated to the competent authorities of that Member State before use”.
16. The concept of the general good is based on both the Treaty (Article 28 EC) and the Court’s Case 
law. The Court requires that a national provision must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
they must be justifi ed by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for 
securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain it. Case 55/94 Gebhard ECH I-4165. In its interpretative communication, 
the Commission has applied these principles to the insurance sector. Commission Interpretative 
Communication. Freedom to Provide Services and the General Good in the Insurance Sector. C (1999) 
5046 Brussels, 2.2.2000, pp. 22 and 27-28.
17. According to the 24th recital in the Directive’s preamble.
18. See the famous “Bolkestein-letter”, Brussels 25 November 2003. CAB/PvB/D (03) 0848, page 2; 
the Landsadvocaat, p.16; Steyger, 2002; and Van de Gronden, J.W., 2003.
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5.4. CONFORMITY OF DIFFERENT INTERVENTION STRATEGIES WITH THE EC LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK
In this section, we assess whether the four intervention strategies previously an-
alysed conform with EC legal principles, or if not, can be justifi ed in terms of the 
general good principle in order to achieve solidarity in competitive health insurance 
markets. The general good exception is primarily based on European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) Case-law concerning the Free Movement of Services, but has also been accept-
ed in the Competition law setting (Mortelmans, 2001).19 Under the Court-developed 
exemptions, any measure that hinders free movement and competition is justifi ed as 
long as it is both objectively necessary and proportionate to the achievement of the 
general good (Case C-120/78, Cassis du Dijon doctrine (1979) ECR 649).
5.4.1. Are legal restrictions of free trade and competition in conformity with 
EC-law?
Premium rate restrictions in combination with open enrolment are inadequate tools 
to guarantee risk-solidarity in competitive basic health insurance markets. Therefore, 
the Court’s general good exception may not provide a justifi able hindrance to free 
trade and competition, since these measures are not effective in realising the objec-
tive and because less invasive alternatives are available. All in all, legal restrictions 
to competition fail both the necessity and the proportionality tests, as part of the 
general good exception.
According to Article 54 of the Insurance Directives, legal restrictions (such as pre-
mium rate restriction and open enrolment) in combination with a loss compensation 
scheme can be justifi ed as a barrier to free trade and competition. Nevertheless, such 
a combination, as applied in the Dutch private WTZ health insurance scheme, may 
not be suitable from an economic perspective since it leaves the insurers without 
any fi nancial risk, and therefore without any incentive for effi ciency and without any 
price-competition.
5.4.2. Are risk-compensation schemes in conformity with EC-law?
Risk-compensation schemes do not hinder competition or free trade since insurers 
are free to set their premium conditions and select low-risk individuals. At the least, 
this holds true for Modes (1) and (2). Since there is no hindrance to competition or 
free movement, assessment of the general good exception is not necessary. However, 
this is different with Mode (3), where insurers are forced to participate in the com-
19. See also the Communication made pursuant to Article 19 (3) of Council Regulation No 17, OJ 1999, 
C-363/2, N (10).
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pensation scheme. One may question whether this measure constitutes a hindrance 
to the Free Movement of Services or Competition rules, or falls under the scope of 
State Aid when private insurers are forced to participate in a risk-compensation 
scheme. Participation in such a scheme can be justifi ed for reasons of general good 
(ie. the ‘solidarity principle’). Nonetheless, Mode (3) has to fulfi l the necessity and 
proportionality test. Although necessary in order to compensate bad risks (‘solidarity 
objective’), Mode (3) does not fulfi l the proportionality test, because it has a more 
invasive impact than Modes (1) and (2) due to the forced participation in the compen-
sation scheme.
If one assumes that sickness funds for providing social health insurance are not 
(considered) undertakings in terms of Competition law,20 the State Aid argument 
will be relevant only to private insurance undertakings operating the social health 
insurance scheme. Particularly, when insurers participate in a compensation scheme 
supervised by law, the rules on State Aid are relevant (Article 87(1) EC). This is relevant 
for Modes (2) and (3) of the risk-compensation scheme. Mode (1) falls outside the 
scope of this Article, since consumers instead of insurers receive the compensation; 
consequently, State Aid is not applicable in this case. However even in the case of 
Modes (2) and (3), the compensation does not necessarily constitute State Aid, since 
it may be viewed as a compensation for bad risks, which exceeds the additional costs 
the insurers bear in operating their public obligation. This can be derived from the 
Case C-280/00 Altmark 24 July 2003, para. 95. Therefore, State Aid rules are not ap-
plicable.
To conclude, while Modes (1) and (2) of the risk-compensation scheme do not hin-
der free trade and competition, Mode (3) does.
5.4.3. Are premium- and excess-loss- compensation schemes in conformity with 
EC-law?
Premium- and excess-loss- compensation schemes are partially effective in achiev-
ing solidarity at the expense of price-competition. Consequently, these strategies 
may constitute a hindrance to free trade and competition. Moreover, excess-loss- and 
premium- compensation schemes are less proportionate than risk-compensation 
schemes (Mode (1) and (2)), since the latter constitute a more effective alternative to 
achieve solidarity without hindering free trade and competition. Therefore, excess-
loss- and premium- compensation schemes are per se unjustifi able from an EC legal 
perspective. However, they are justifi able as effective complementary alternatives to 
the best available risk-compensation scheme because there are no other less inva-
sive and more effective options.
20. See also, the “Bolkestein-letter”, ibid, p. 3.
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5.5. CONCLUSIONS
Both from an economic and legal perspective, risk-compensation schemes represent, 
in principle, the fi rst-best intervention strategy to achieve an “acceptable level of 
risk-solidarity” in EU Member States’ competitive basic health insurance markets. In 
principle, they are effective in guaranteeing solidarity, particularly if complemented 
with premium- and/or excess-loss- compensation schemes (see below). In addition, 
risk-compensation schemes do not hinder free trade and competition and do not 
reduce effi ciency (at least, Modes (1) and (2)).
Premium- and excess-loss- compensation schemes are partially effective in 
achieving solidarity. Because they reduce price-competition and thereby are less 
proportionate than risk-compensation schemes (Mode (1) and (2)), they are per se 
unjustifi able from an EC legal perspective. However, as a complement to the best 
available risk-compensation scheme, they are justifi able, because there are no other 
less invasive and more effective complementary alternatives available. In particular, 
premium rate restrictions and open enrolment are equally invasive, since they reduce 
price-competition and effi ciency, but in the long run they create incentives for risk-
selection and thereby threaten the quality of care for high-risk individuals.
In sum, risk-compensation schemes (Mode (1) and (2)) are the fi rst-best strategy 
and should be the regulatory starting point when Society’s goal is to achieve solidar-
ity in competitive basic health insurance markets. If Society considers the level of 
solidarity achieved by the most sophisticated risk-equalisation system as insuffi cient, 
it should combine risk-compensation schemes with second-best strategies such as 
premium- and excess-loss- compensation schemes. Such combinations constitute a 
justifi able hindrance to free trade and competition.
5.6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EU COUNTRIES
Several EU Member States aim to combine competition and solidarity. However, the 
strategies they apply to achieve solidarity in competitive markets for basic health 
insurance may confl ict with EC legal principles on free trade and competition. In this 
respect, it is crucial to know whether the insurance scheme in place is exempted 
from the Insurance Directives by Article 2 (social security exception). Therefore, the 
scheme should fulfi l the ‘social security’ defi nition, which is related to elements such 
as social objective, income- and risk- solidarity, compulsory contributions, state su-
pervision and legal status. Although these elements are crucial, the absence of one 
or more elements does not necessarily mean that the exception is not applicable. 
Apart from being exempted from the Directive, it is also important to remain outside 
Ch
ap
te
r 
5
106
the scope of the Directive. When the solidarity element in social insurance schemes 
becomes blurred, there is still the danger that the Directive might apply. Nonethe-
less, a dominant solidarity-based scheme with compulsory solidarity contributions 
instead of a capitalisation-based scheme is a pivotal element of social security. When 
operated by a private undertaking, the insurance activity should not be operated at 
the insurer’s own risk and should not perform an economic activity; otherwise, the 
Directives are applicable.
Assuming that there is a convergence among the criteria of both Free Movement 
of Services (including the Insurance Directives) and Competition rules, the ‘economic 
activity’ criterion is decisive for defi ning a scheme as ‘social security’. This assumption 
has been based on several Court rulings on convergence, such as Dassonville Case 
8/74, 1974 ECR 837; Leclerc Case 229/83, 1985 ECR 1, and Banchero Case 387/93, 1995 
ECR I-4666. The relevance to Member States can be described as follows. In the AOK
Case, the Court ruled that German sickness funds do not perform an economic activ-
ity when determining maximum amounts for pharmaceuticals. Therefore, they are 
assumed to fulfi l the social security exception of the Directives. A similar conclusion 
with respect to the current Belgian and Czech sickness funds might not be unlikely, 
since they operate in a more or less similar way when providing social health insur-
ance. However, the Dutch situation might be different if the Court would consider 
the Dutch private insurers as undertakings, (as the Dutch Competition Authority 
NMa currently does (NMa, 2000)), or consider the insurance risk they bear as “own 
risk” (as decided in the “Belgium Case”). In that case, EC Competition law and the In-
surance Directives would be applicable. In Ireland, the voluntary scheme for supple-
mentary health insurance is managed by competing private insurance undertakings 
which provide fi nancial coverage for basic health care services’ costs at their own 
risk, which means that the Directives are applicable.
It has been argued before that if Article 2’s exception is not applicable; an insur-
ance scheme can be still exempted from the Directives by Article 54 for reasons of 
general good. In order to achieve solidarity in competitive markets for basic health 
insurance, Member States may adopt intervention strategies that are justifi able un-
der the general good provision of Article 54. Assuming that countries wish to adopt 
legal restrictions, they are left (from an EC legal perspective) with the unique alter-
native of combining premium rate restrictions and open enrolment with an excess-
loss-compensation scheme that fully compensates the insurers for all losses above 
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the maximum premium. However, from an economic perspective, this option is not 
attractive.
One may question the consequences for intervention strategies that Member 
States have chosen within competitive insurance markets and whether they are 
economically suitable and “Europe-proof”. In January 2006, the Dutch government 
introduced a mandatory basic health insurance scheme for the all population man-
aged by private insurers operating at their own risk, which combines premium rate 
restrictions and open enrolment with a risk-compensation scheme (Mode (2)) and 
premium-compensation schemes (“zorgtoeslag”, for low-income individuals and 
tax-deductions for the chronically ill). Based on our analysis, this proposed scheme 
is not justifi able under Article 54’s general good exception requirements, because 
these proposed legal restrictions to free trade and competition do not fulfi l the ne-
cessity and the proportionality tests. In the Irish case, the voluntary health insurance 
scheme combines premium rate restrictions, open enrolment and a standardised 
benefi t package with a risk-compensation scheme. This combination was found to 
be unnecessary and disproportionate, since the alternative of combining risk-com-
pensation schemes with a premium- and/or an excess-loss- compensation scheme is 
both more effective and less invasive to competition. Therefore, the current premium 
rate restrictions and open enrolment adopted in Ireland is not in conformity with 
Article 54’s general good exception criteria. This conclusion for Ireland is based on 
the consideration that premium rate restrictions and open enrolment are tools for 
guaranteeing solidarity and not the general good itself. Although EU Member States 
do have some discretionary authority to defi ne the “general good”, it is inappropriate 
to defi ne a “tool that is ineffective in guaranteeing solidarity” as the general good, as 
the Irish government does.21
In sum, the premium rate restrictions and open enrolment that are currently ap-
plied in Ireland and the Netherlands (implemented since January 2006) do not satisfy 
the necessary legal conditions in terms of the Insurance Directives. Therefore, we ad-
vise policy makers in these countries to consider the following alternatives, which in 
our view reconcile the equivalence and the solidarity principles in competitive health 
insurance markets in an “Europe-proof way”: 1) replace the premium rate restrictions 
and open enrolment with premium- and/or excess-loss- compensation schemes; or 
2) change the health insurance schemes’ institutional character in such a way that it 
falls outside the scope of the EC Competition law and the Insurance Directives.
21. Currently in Ireland’s open enrolment, community-rating and lifetime cover are considered as 
expressions of the principle of solidarity not as tools for its fulfi lment (White Paper, Department 
of Health and Children 1999, page. 21; European Commission, State Aid N46/2003 – Ireland, ‘Risk 
equalization scheme in the Irish health insurance market’).
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6
Supplementary health insurance as a 
tool for risk-selection in mandatory basic 
health insurance markets: a fi ve-country 
comparison
summary  As the share of supplementary health insurance (SI) in health care 
fi nance is likely to grow, SI may become an increasingly attractive tool for risk-
selection in basic health insurance (BI). In this chapter, we develop a conceptual 
framework to assess the probability that insurers use SI for favourable risk-
selection in BI. We apply our framework to fi ve countries in which risk-selection 
via SI is feasible: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
For each country we review the available evidence of SI being used as selection 
device. We fi nd that the probability that SI is and will be used for risk-selection 
substantially varies across countries. Finally, we discuss several strategies for 
policy makers to reduce the chance that SI will be used for risk-selection in 
BI-markets.
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6.1. INTRODUCTION
In chapter 4 we found that a transfer of benefi ts from mandatory basic health in-
surance (BI) to supplementary health insurance (SI) may reduce the affordability of 
health insurance coverage for the transferred benefi ts, since SI-premiums may be 
risk-rated and health insurers may not be willing to accept all applicants (in par-
ticular high-risk individuals). In addition, the expansion of SI may also reduce access 
to basic health services, since it may increase the opportunities for risk-selection in 
basic health insurance (BI) markets (van de Ven et al., 2003). For unfavourable risk 
groups, risk-selection may imply less choice because of limited switching opportuni-
ties and higher premiums due to lower cross-subsidies from favourable risk groups.
In this chapter, we examine the conditions where SI is likely to be used as a tool for 
risk-selection in BI-markets. In particular, we develop a conceptual framework that 
identifi es the preconditions for the use of SI as a tool for risk-selection in BI-markets, 
and the determinants of the probability that SI is used for this scope. Then, we inves-
tigate to what extent risk-selection via SI is likely to occur in fi ve countries where the 
preconditions are met: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
For each of these countries, we review the available evidence of the use of SI as a 
risk-selection device and we assess whether SI is likely to be used as a tool for risk-
selection. Finally, we discuss the main policy implications of our fi ndings.
6.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we develop a conceptual framework to assess the probability that SI is 
or will be used for risk-selection in BI. First, we identify two necessary preconditions 
and then the crucial determinants for the use of SI as a selection device in BI.
6.2.1. Preconditions for risk-selection via supplementary health insurance
The fi rst precondition is that insurers have to have incentives to perform risk-selec-
tion in BI. This implies that health insurers must bear fi nancial risk for the provision 
of BI and some risk types must be more attractive than others. Traditionally, BI was 
provided by non-competing administrative-carriers that were fully compensated for 
the medical costs of their enrolees (Cutler, 2002). However, during the nineties these 
BI-carriers in several countries were exposed to competition and fi nancial risk. In 
order to preserve universal fi nancial access, these changes were typically accompa-
nied by premium rate restrictions, open enrolment and risk-adjusted compensation 
payments. As far as the risk-adjusted compensation payments are not suffi cient to 
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compensate for predictable losses on high-risk individuals, health insurers in these 
countries face incentives to select risks (van de Ven et al., 2003).
The second precondition for the use of SI as a selection device in BI is the presence 
of a link between the purchasing decisions for the two types of insurance. This link 
must exist in order for health insurers to be able to use SI to infl uence the consumers’ 
decision to buy BI. For instance, if consumers are legally obliged - or have a strong 
preference - to obtain SI from the same carrier that provides BI, selective underwrit-
ing by insurers of applicants for SI may undermine open enrolment requirements in 
BI.
6.2.2. Determinants of risk-selection via supplementary health insurance
If both preconditions are present, the probability that SI is used for risk-selection in 
BI critically depends on the strength of the incentives for risk-selection in BI and the 
strength of the links between SI and BI.
We distinguish the following determinants of the strength of the incentives for 
risk-selection in BI. The fi rst crucial determinant is the quality of the risk-equalisation 
scheme. The more accurately insurers are compensated for each risk type, the weaker 
the incentives for risk-selection are. A second determinant is the level of fi nancial risk 
for the health insurer. The more the insurer is at risk for the fi nancial results of selling 
BI, the stronger the incentives for risk-selection. A third determining factor for the in-
centives faced by insurers is the level of price-competition. Strong price-competition 
will force insurers to exploit the available opportunities for risk-selection. By contrast, 
weak competition leaves room for cross-subsidisation, which may reduce incentives 
for risk-selection, particularly if BI is carried out by non-profi t insurers pursuing social 
goals (Douven and Schut, 2006).
Next, we discern the following determinants of the strength of the links between 
SI and BI. First, the strength depends on the type of link. In practice three types can 
be observed: (1) regulatory or formal links, (2) insurer-established links or tying provi-
sions, and (3) consumer-preferred links.
The strongest link is constituted by a legal requirement that SI and BI have to 
be sold as a joint product by the same health insurer. Next, insurers may be able to 
enforce joint purchase by means of tie-in sale provisions in SI-policies. For instance, 
SI-contracts may include provisions that the contract will be terminated or a sur-
charge will be required if the subscriber switches to another BI-carrier. Since these 
tie-in provisions are not legally required they are likely to constitute a weaker link 
than a formally enforced one. If the government forbids tie-in provisions or even 
requires that BI and SI must be sold by different legal entities, insurers may still be 
able to establish a link between the two. For instance, insurers could establish such 
a link by joining the same holding company and using the same brand name for SI 
Supplementary health insurance as a tool for risk-selection in mandatory basic health insurance 113
and BI products. Finally, even in the absence of any formally or insurer-established 
link, consumers may have strong preferences for a joint purchase of SI and BI. One-
stop shopping may be attractive because it lowers search and transaction costs and 
because it may facilitate the coordination of basic and supplementary benefi ts.
A second determinant of the strength of the link between SI and BI is the extent 
to which health insurers are free to set the terms of the contract, the enrolment 
rules and the types of benefi ts covered by SI. Health insurers can effectively use SI for 
risk-selection in BI by means of selective underwriting, by premium discounts and by 
benefi ts design targeted at favourable risk groups (with respect to BI).
Selective underwriting can be based on health history questionnaires to SI-appli-
cants. By including questions that are particularly relevant to assess the applicant’s 
risk for BI, insurers can subsequently decide to deny SI-coverage or calculate a high 
surcharge to compensate for the expected loss on BI. If allowed, insurers may also 
decide not to renew the SI-contract of enrolees who are unfavourable risks in BI (se-
lective disenrolment).
The design of specifi c SI-packages is another strategy that insurers may adopt to 
differentiate between low-risks and high-risks (eg. early cancer diagnosis is more 
likely to be demanded by healthy individuals whereas cancer therapy by sick people). 
In the same way, insurers may advertise SI to certain (profi table) risk categories, eg. 
by using specifi c distribution channels (internet, fi tness clubs etc.), offering high re-
bates for deductibles, informing unprofi table enrolees about their right to change 
insurer and providing bonuses to agents who are successful in getting rid of the 
most expensive cases by shunting them off to competitors.
Insurers may also attract favourable risks by offering SI-premiums below actuari-
ally fair levels. By using health history questionnaires, insurers can determine which 
applicants are likely to be profi table in BI and they may use these expected prof-
its to offer these applicants a premium discount. Cross-subsidising SI-contracts by 
profi ts on BI-contracts may be more attractive than lowering the community-rated 
BI-premium, particularly for new entrants who do not have to recover the losses of 
unfavourable risk groups in the BI-market (Kifman, 2005).
Finally, the strength of the link between SI and BI is also determined by the impor-
tance of SI for consumers. If SI comprises only a small fraction of individuals’ health 
care expenses or if only a small proportion of the population purchases SI, then the 
link between both types of insurance is likely to be weak. Hence, both the share of 
SI in total health care expenditure and the share of the population covered by SI are 
likely to be positively related to the probability that SI will be used for risk-selection 
in BI.
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6.3. SUPPLEMENTARY HEALTH INSURANCE AS A TOOL FOR RISK-SELECTION IN 
MANDATORY BASIC HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS IN FIVE COUNTRIES
In this section, we investigate to what extent SI is likely to be used as a tool for risk-
selection in the BI-market in fi ve countries: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland. These countries were selected because each country fulfi ls 
Table 6a. Main features of SI in the 5 countries*
Belgium Germany Israel
VSI
The Netherlands
VSI
Switzerland
VSIMSI VSI MSI VSI
Expenditure 
ratio SI/BI 
(%)
2% < 5% 2% < 5% 6% 23%
Share of BI-
insured buying 
SI (%)
95% n.a. 95% 11% 66% 92% 71%
Market share 
of largest 4 
SI-insurers at 
national level 
(%)
19% - - 45% 91% 52% 40%
Regulation 
of premium, 
coverage and 
enrollment
No 
exclusion 
by age/
health 
status
No 
exclusion 
by age/
health 
status
Coverage 
restrictions, 
open 
enrolment
None Open 
enrolment,
age-related 
premiums
None None
Share of 
group-
contracts
No group-
contracts
No 
group-
contracts
Negligible Negligible No group-
contracts
Negligible 11.3% Negligible
Premium 
setting
Risk-
rated
Risk-
rated
Income-
related
Risk-rated Age-related 
to be 
approved 
by the 
government
Community-
rated (some 
insurers use few 
age classes)
Risk-rated
Premium 
variation
Small Small Substantial Substantial Small Substantial Substantial
Product 
differentiation
Moderate Moderate Large Large Small Large Large
* Most fi gures relate to 2002 or 2003. Sources: Beck et al. (2003), Beck (2004, 2006), Berghman & 
Meerbergen (2005), Brammli-Greenberg & Gross (2003), Bruijn et al. (2005, 2006), Buchner & Wasem 
(2003), Christian Mutualities (2003), Colombo (2001), Controledienst (2004), Douven & Schut (2006), 
Laske-Aldershof et al. (2004), Nuscheler & Knaus (2005), NZa i.o. (2006), Prinsze et al. (2005), Schokkaert 
& Van de Voorde (2003), Schut et al. (2004), Shmueli et al. (2003), Tamm et al. (2006), Wasem et al.
(2004).
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the preconditions for risk-selection via SI: insurers face incentives for risk-selection 
in BI and there are links between the decisions to purchase BI and SI. For each of the 
fi ve countries we assess whether SI is likely to be used as a tool for risk-selection 
in BI by examining to which extent the determinants of the conceptual framework 
are relevant in these countries. In addition, we review the available evidence of the 
actual use of SI as a risk-selection device. Table 6a summarises the main features of 
SI in each of the fi ve countries.
6.3.1. Belgium
6.3.1.1. Main features of SI
In Belgium, three types of SI can be distinguished, two of which can be used as a tool 
for risk-selection in the BI-market. First, almost all local BI-providers offer mandatory 
supplementary coverage (MSI). It is stipulated in the statutes of these local insurers 
that SI is mandatory for all their members. Moreover, according to the law all insured 
are legally obliged to enrol with the same local insurer for both BI and MSI. Second, 
BI-providers offer voluntary supplementary coverage (VSI) on top of BI and MSI (pri-
marily extra hospital services). Again, insured who want to buy VSI are obliged to en-
rol with the same BI/MSI provider. From 1994 until 2002, SI-expenditures as a share 
of BI-expenditures remained constant at 2 percent (Table 6a), indicating that SI and 
BI expenditures grew at the same rate. Currently, MSI covers costs related mainly to 
hospitalisation, health care abroad, transportation of the sick, logopaedics, ortho-
dontics, alternative medicine and home care. VSI expands the coverage of hospital 
costs. The benefi ts package is regulated by the law, which obliges every BI-provider 
to offer at least one item in the MSI. In reality, all insurers offer dozens of additional 
benefi ts ranging from health promotion to all kinds of advantages such as birth pre-
miums, cheap holidays for children and pre-marriage savings. The level of concentra-
tion of the SI-market is low, the market share of the four largest insurers being only 
about 19.4 percent. Premium rate restrictions (eg. community-rated premiums) are 
absent in both SI-markets. In case of fi nancial problems, the Control Offi ce can oblige 
them to take some measures. There is no formal open enrolment in the MSI-market. 
Nevertheless, insurers do not deny access in practice. VSI-providers can only exclude 
new enrolees because of their age or health status. SI-contracts can be terminated 
yearly subject to three months’ notice by the insured.
6.3.1.2. Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalisation scheme in Belgium is based on demographic and socio-econom-
ic information. There are also some morbidity-related risk-adjusters, but they are not 
based on diagnostic information, meaning that BI-providers can easily identify highly 
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profi table risk groups (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2003). Despite the rather poor 
risk-equalisation scheme, incentives for risk-selection are substantially mitigated by 
the limited fi nancial risk for BI-providers (7.5 percent of gains and losses). In addition, 
the out-of-pocket BI-premium is almost negligible, so price-competition is hardly 
feasible. Finally, in absence of competition, BI-carriers have no strong drive to select 
risks, since they are non-profi t entities pursuing social goals.
Due to the limited fi nancial risk and the absence of price-competition, BI-providers 
have relatively weak incentives for risk-selection (Table 6b).
6.3.1.3. Usefulness of SI as selection device
The law stipulates that the insured must obtain BI and MSI from different entities of 
the same insurer. These entities must be fi nancially independent and cannot cross-
subsidise each other. In practice, however, it is diffi cult to attribute marketing and 
administrative costs to the different entities, since the same insurer offers SI and 
BI. Typically, BI and SI are marketed as joint products. For insurers, the strong formal 
links make SI a potentially important tool to attract customers.
For Belgian insurers the most straightforward strategies to select favourable risks 
in SI-markets are product and premium differentiation. Premiums are differentiated 
according to risk categories, mainly age, family composition and employee/self-
employed status. The benefi ts package is regulated but the freedom to differentiate 
is suffi ciently large to attract specifi c risk groups. Under the Belgian law comparative 
or misleading advertising is forbidden. In addition, the law forbids that benefi ts are 
granted with the purpose of inciting switching. In practice, these regulatory restric-
tions on selective marketing and benefi ts design are not very effective (see below).
Finally, selective underwriting, particularly in the forms of waiting times and ex-
clusion of pre-existing medical conditions, is allowed and used in the VSI-market.
Despite the fact that SI offers insurers a potentially effective tool for risk-selection, 
the usefulness of SI for this purpose is restricted due to the limited role of SI in total 
health care fi nancing. This together with the weak incentives for risk-selection makes 
it unlikely that SI is a frequently used tool for risk-selection in BI.
6.3.1.4. Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Nevertheless, there are indications that SI is increasingly used for favourable risk-
selection. Although evidence is largely anecdotal, selective advertising has increased 
during the last years. Certain insurers selectively promote new insurance products 
related to sports (such as a reduction of registration fee for the sports club or dis-
counts for children participating in a sports camp). In the leading Belgian newspa-
per “De Standaard“ (September 28, 2005), three CEOs of large insurers’ associations 
wrote an article entitled “War amongst insurers”. In particular, they accused other 
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BI-carriers’ sales representatives of attracting healthy enrolees by offering them 
advantageous SI-contracts. Since 2000, the number of items included in the SI has 
steadily increased, with substantial differences between the different funds. Accord-
ing to the three CEOs this risk-selection undermines access, and they appealed to the 
government to make these selection activities impossible.
Evidence from a survey among VSI-members of the Christian insurers showed that 
specifi c benefi ts are particularly attractive to specifi c risk groups (Christian Mutuali-
ties, 2003). Not only enrolment in VSI substantially differed between various age and 
socio-economic groups, but an analysis of the survey data also revealed a positive 
relation between characteristics such as education, income and marital status and 
the probability of having hospital insurance.
6.3.2. Germany
6.3.2.1. Main features of SI
Two types of supplementary insurance can be distinguished in Germany: MSI and 
VSI.
MSI is exclusively offered by (most) BI-providers. On top of the standardized man-
datory basic benefi ts package (MBI), German insurers are allowed to offer extra ben-
efi ts, up to a maximum of 5 percent of total expenses covered (Buchner and Wasem, 
2003). MSI-benefi ts include services such as spa treatments and hospice treatment. 
Supplementary benefi ts are determined in the by-laws of the individual insurer and 
are mandatory for all subscribers of that insurer (no opting-out). Open enrolment for 
BI also applies to MSI. Moreover, insurers must charge a single contribution rate for 
both basic and supplementary benefi ts. However, in contrast to BI, expenses for MSI 
are not included in the risk-equalisation scheme.
German citizens can also buy supplementary insurance from competing for-profi t 
carriers on a voluntary basis (Wasem et al., 2004). VSI mainly covers costs regard-
ing upgraded hospital accommodation, dental care, alternative medicine, glasses 
and co-payments. The VSI-market is unregulated: no premium rate restrictions (eg. 
community-rated premiums), no open enrolment requirements and no standardized 
benefi ts. VSI-providers are allowed to calculate risk-rated premiums and to exclude 
pre-existing conditions from coverage. Usually, applicants 55 years or older receive no 
contract at all. BI-carriers are not allowed to offer VSI. VSI comprises only 2 percent of 
total health care expenditure and 11 percent of the German population. The market 
share of the four largest VSI-insurers is about 45 percent (Table 6a).
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6.3.2.2. Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalisation scheme in Germany does not effectively neutralise incentives 
for risk-selection (Buchner and Wasem, 2003). This and the high level of fi nancial 
risk for health insurers, accountable for 97 percent of gains and losses, create strong 
incentives for risk-selection. In addition, the high level of competition due to the 
presence of about 250 BI-carriers, and the absence of entry barriers further reinforce 
the incentives for risk-selection (Table 6b). For instance, new BI-carriers (eg. Betrie-
bskrankenkassen, BKKs) grew rapidly after entering the market because they were 
successful in attracting favourable risks by offering low contribution rates (Tamm et 
al., 2006).
6.3.2.3. Usefulness of SI as a selection device
BI and MSI are tightly linked, since they are offered and marketed as joint products by 
a single provider at a single price. If subscribers want to opt out, they can only switch 
to another BI-provider that offers a different package of supplementary benefi ts. The 
strong link between MSI and BI makes MSI a potentially useful tool to attract favour-
able risks. Despite this, the usefulness of MSI for risk-selection in BI is restricted by 
the open enrolment requirement, the absence of a separate premium and the limited 
scope of the supplementary benefi ts that can be included. In fact, the only way that 
MSI can be used for risk-selection is by the design of the benefi ts package.
Until 2004 VSI and BI were completely separated by law. Then, the government 
decided to allow BI-providers to act as agents for VSI-providers. Most BI-providers 
now cooperate with one VSI-provider and offer premium discounts to their subscrib-
ers. Moreover, as part of this cooperation, some VSI-providers waive their right to 
reject applicants. However, none of them has waived its right to calculate risk-related 
premiums. If subscribers switch to another BI-provider, in most cases they lose their 
VSI-discount. Opportunities for BI-providers to use this link as a tool for risk-selection 
are rather limited, since BI and VSI providers are also not allowed to cross-subsidise 
each other and must be fi nancially independent from each other.
6.3.2.4. Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that BI-carriers use the composition of MSI-
benefi ts to attract low-risks. A comparison of supplementary benefi ts for the three 
main types of BI-providers shows substantial differences (Nuscheler and Knaus, 2005). 
Whereas most of the traditional regional BI-carriers (AOKs) offer benefi ts that are at-
tractive to the high-risks – such as chiro therapy (91 percent), cancer therapy (64 per-
cent), homeopathic medicine (70 percent) – only a small minority of the fast growing 
and lower-priced BKK-funds offer these benefi ts (14 percent offers cancer therapy, 26 
percent homeopathic medicine and 33 percent chiro therapy). By contrast, BKKs more 
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often than AOKs offer benefi ts that are attractive to favourable risk groups, such as 
health checkups (25 vs. 9 percent) and cancer screening (25 vs. 0 percent).
Given the weak and only recently established link between BI and VSI providers, 
risk-selection via VSI does not seem to be an issue yet. However, many of VSI-contracts 
offer rebates that may be lost if enrolees switch BI-carrier. Andersen and Grabka 
(2006) conclude that attractive SI-packages had an impact on switching. However, 
the risk profi les of switchers are unknown.
MSI and VSI may become a more important tool for risk-selection in the near fu-
ture if the basic benefi t package is further reduced. However, in contrast to the trend 
of a gradual expansion of the role of SI in health care fi nancing, the 2006 German 
health care reform plan includes a transfer of a number MSI-benefi ts (palliative care 
and some spa treatments) and some VSI-benefi ts (acupuncture) to the basic health 
insurance package.
6.3.3. Israel
6.3.3.1. Main features of SI
In Israel, SI can be bought voluntarily and on an individual basis from the same insurer 
providing BI, a commercial insurer, or both. During the period 1995-2002, the share in 
the population buying SI from a BI-provider rapidly increased from 35 to 66 percent, 
while the share buying SI from a commercial insurer increased from 16 to 24 percent 
(the share buying both types of SI grew from 5 to 20 percent). Since only SI provided 
by BI-carriers can be used as a tool for risk-selection in BI, we focus our analysis on 
this type of SI. Currently, SI covers costs of some surgical interventions in Israel and 
abroad, dental care, preventive screening, alternative medicine, co-payments in BI 
(especially for drugs), and IVF. In the period 1999-2002, SI-expenditures as a share of 
BI-expenditures grew from 3.3 percent to 5.3 percent (Table 6a).
In Israel the four largest BI/SI providers together hold 91 percent of the SI-market 
share. There is an open enrolment requirement and insurers may charge age-related 
premiums for SI-coverage after government approval. Law does not determine the 
composition of benefi ts package and the contractual conditions. Nevertheless, the 
extent of product differentiation is still moderate (Brammli-Greenberg and Gross, 
2003).
6.3.3.2. Incentives for risk-selection
The quality of the risk-equalisation scheme in Israel is quite poor (only age-related 
subsidies), therefore BI-providers can easily identify risk groups that are highly 
unprofi table, such as chronically ill people (Shmueli et al., 2003). Since BI-suppliers 
are fully at risk and are not allowed to charge a premium for BI, the incentives for 
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risk-selection are strong. These incentives are mitigated, however, by the weakly 
competitive structure of the BI-market. Traditionally the BI-market is dominated by 
a few non-profi t insurers, while legal entry barriers effectively prohibit any potential 
competition. Switching rates are low (about 1 percent per year) (Laske-Aldershof et 
al., 2004).
6.3.3.3. Usefulness of SI as a selection device
BI-providers are allowed to offer SI only to their own enrolees. Alternatively, BI-
insured may choose to buy SI-coverage from commercial insurers, but they cannot 
obtain SI from another BI-provider. BI-providers exercise the double function of SI 
and BI suppliers in a regulated context. The law requires that BI/SI providers keep a 
separate fi nancial administration for SI and BI. Cross-subsidisation between BI and SI 
is forbidden and providers are not allowed to sell other types of insurance.
Despite the strong link between BI and SI, the usefulness of SI as a selection device 
is restricted by open enrolment and by the limited freedom for insurers to differenti-
ate premiums. The limited role of SI in health care fi nancing and the low switching 
rates also reduce the usefulness of SI as a selection device.
6.3.3.4. Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Currently, there is no evidence of insurers using SI for risk-selection in BI. Although 
the share of SI in total health care fi nancing is still small (5 percent), it steadily in-
creased during the last decade. If this trend continues, SI is likely to become a more 
useful tool for risk-selection, particularly if the risk-equalisation scheme will not be 
improved.
6.3.4. The Netherlands
6.3.4.1. Main features of SI
In the Netherlands, SI is exclusively voluntary. More than 90 percent of BI-insured 
buy SI. SI can be bought on an individual basis or via group contracts (Table 6b). Cur-
rently, SI covers almost all dental care for adults, alternative medicine, maternal home 
care, physical therapy, psychotherapy, anticonceptives and IVF. In the last decade, the 
number of services excluded from the basic benefi ts package and covered by SI has 
steadily increased. The same applies to SI-expenditures as a share of BI-expenditures, 
which grew from 2 percent in 1994 to 6.5 percent in 2003 (Table 6a).
The Dutch SI-market is not regulated by the government. There is no open enrol-
ment requirement and there are no restrictions on premium rate setting and ben-
efi ts package. Although risk-rating is allowed, insurers still charge predominantly 
community-rated premiums (Schut et al., 2004). The most likely explanation for this 
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is that SI is traditionally offered as a by-product of BI. Since almost all insured buy 
SI and BI from the same insurer and switching rates were low until 2006, there was 
hardly any competitive pressure to differentiate SI-premiums (Laske-Aldershof et al., 
2004; Douven and Schut, 2006).
6.3.4.2. Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalisation scheme in the Netherlands is the most sophisticated among 
the fi ve countries. Nevertheless, BI-providers can still easily identify risk groups that 
are highly unprofi table relative to the community-rated premium that BI-providers 
have to charge (Prinsze et al., 2005). Since BI-carriers are accountable for about 50 
percent of gains and losses, insurers can substantially benefi t from risk-selection. 
Prior to 2006, incentives for risk-selection were mitigated by the weak competition 
among non-profi t BI-providers due to the limited propensity of consumers to switch 
to another insurer (Laske-Aldershof et al., 2004; Douven and Schut, 2006). Since the 
1st of January 2006, the Dutch health insurance system has been profoundly reformed 
by the introduction of a new BI-scheme. The former distinction between social health 
insurance (MBI) for low/middle income groups and private health insurance (VBI) for 
high-income groups has been abolished. Under the new BI-scheme all enrolees can 
switch plans at annual open enrolment periods (two months). BI-premiums have to 
be community-rated and a risk-equalisation scheme applies as before. Dutch citizens 
had to choose a new contract for BI and SI. Anticipating that many customers would 
consider switching, insurers engaged in a price war (Douven and Schut 2006). In-
deed, the switching rate increased dramatically, from about 3 to 18 percent (NZa i.o., 
2006). Although switching rates in 2006 are likely to have been high because of the 
radical change in choice setting, price-competition is expected to remain strong in 
the future. Strong price-competition substantially increases the incentives for risk-
selection in the new BI-scheme.
6.3.4.3. Usefulness of SI as a selection device
Since the introduction of the New Health Insurance Act in January 2006, there is no 
legal separation between SI and BI providers in the Netherlands. Before 2006 both 
types of insurance were offered by different juridical entities. Cross-subsidisation 
between BI and SI providers was forbidden and both providers had to be fi nancially 
independent. Despite the separation of providers, SI and BI were always sold as a 
joint product under the same brand name (Schut et al., 2004). SI and BI providers 
typically belonged to the same holding company, making marketing and administra-
tive costs diffi cult to ascribe to the different entities. Prior to 2006, most SI-contracts 
had a clause that the contract would be automatically terminated once the insured 
would switch to another BI-provider. Although termination clauses are forbidden 
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under the new BI-scheme, this prohibition does not effectively preclude tie-in sales. 
For instance, several insurers made clear that they would charge higher SI-premiums 
to enrolees choosing other BI-providers and some insurers offer SI only to applicants 
that obtain BI from the same company. In practice, almost all consumers still buy SI 
and BI from the same company (NZa i.o., 2006).
Since SI-providers are free to set premiums, determine the benefi ts package and 
apply medical underwriting; SI can be effectively used for risk-selection in BI. If con-
sumer mobility remains high after 2006, this would make SI a particularly powerful 
tool to discriminate between different risk groups.
Other straightforward strategies would be to use health questionnaires to identify 
favourable and unfavourable risk groups that apply for SI. Such strategies, however, 
are effective only if a substantial proportion of the insured is willing to switch (Schut 
and Hassink, 2002).
Given the links between BI and SI and the absence of legal restrictions on under-
writing, product differentiation and premium setting, SI is a moderately useful tool 
for risk-selection.
6.3.4.4. Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Before 2006, both the incentives for risk-selection and the usefulness of SI as a se-
lection device were limited. Survey results indicate that less than 1 percent of the 
applicants were refused, despite the fact that insurers used health questionnaires 
for SI-applicants (Bruijn et al., 2005; Laske-Aldershof and Schut, 2005).
Since 2006, price-competition and consumer mobility increased, which made SI 
a powerful selection device. However, to accommodate the transfer to the new BI-
scheme, all insurers promised to accept all applicants for SI without medical under-
writing. Recent investigations show that in 2006 only a few insurers used health 
questionnaires for SI-applicants and, except for extensive dental coverage, no ap-
plicants were refused (Bruijn and Schut, 2006; NZa i.o., 2006). Since the promise to 
accept all SI-applicants only holds for 2006 and 2007, the probability that SI will be 
used as selection device is likely to increase in the future. A possible counteracting 
factor may be the damaging effect of such behaviour on an insurer’s reputation. For 
several years already, the national patient federation (NPCF), the Ministry of Health 
and the Dutch Health Authority (NZa) monitor the underwriting practices of SI-
providers and publish the results of their investigations (NZa i.o, 2006; Bruijn et al., 
2005-6; Laske-Aldershof and Schut, 2005).
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6.3.5. Switzerland
6.3.5.1. Main features of SI
In Switzerland, SI is exclusively voluntary and covers dental care, sick-leave payments, 
alternative medicine, upgraded hospital accommodation, access to all physicians 
and hospitals all over the country, cross-border care, and transportation costs for 
accidents in the mountains. Prior to the health care reform of 1996, SI accounted 
for almost 30 percent of total health care expenditures. Due to the introduction of 
a comprehensive BI-scheme, however, the share of SI in health care fi nancing de-
creased to about 20 percent (Table 6a). Nevertheless, the popularity of SI has grown, 
with the share of BI-insured holding SI-coverage increasing from 62 percent in 1997 
to 71 percent in 2003.
Government intervention in the SI-market is limited. There are no open enrolment 
requirements, standardised benefi ts and premium rate restrictions. Three types of 
SI-carriers can be distinguished: independent SI-providers, daughter companies of 
BI-carriers, and integrated BI/SI providers. Consumers are free to choose among 
these three SI-carriers. The regulatory regimes that apply to daughter companies 
and integrated providers are quite different. Integrated insurers are restricted to the 
exclusive provision of health coverage by law, while daughter companies may offer 
all kinds of insurance coverage besides health insurance. Combined with the more 
liberal supervisory regime, this explains the growing popularity of daughter compa-
nies at the expense of integrated ones.
6.3.5.2. Incentives for risk-selection
The risk-equalisation scheme in Switzerland is based only on age, gender and region, 
implying that BI-providers can easily identify risk groups that are highly (un)profi t-
able. Moreover, BI-carriers are fully at risk and there is no reinsurance or state aid 
in case of losses. Therefore, insurers have to charge suffi ciently high premiums to 
survive. Since insurers face substantial competition, the incentives for risk-selection 
are strong (Table 6c).
6.3.5.3. Usefulness of SI as a selection device
Formally, basic and supplementary benefi ts are strictly separated. It is legally forbid-
den to link rebates in SI to BI, ie. SI-carriers are not allowed to cover the medical 
expenses that fall under voluntary deductibles in BI. In terms of accounting require-
ments, SI-providers are obliged to keep their fi nancial administration separated from 
BI-providers. Cross-subsidisation between BI and SI providers and tie-in sale provi-
sions in SI-contracts are also forbidden.
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Despite the legal separation between BI and SI carriers, most SI-carriers are 
daughter companies of or integrated with BI-carriers, which makes it diffi cult to es-
tablish whether marketing and administration costs refer either to BI or SI carriers. 
Moreover, despite the fact that tying-in is forbidden, when people switch BI-provider 
they usually terminate their contract with the related SI-carrier. This likely refl ects a 
consumer preference for a joint purchase of BI and SI. Since BI and SI benefi ts overlap 
to some extent, consumers may not want to fi gure out which plan is responsible to 
cover the costs of care once they fall ill. Moreover, insurers try to prevent consumers 
from a separate purchase of BI and SI “by all kind of tricks, for instance by taking 
away the premium discount for families or by surcharges on the premium or for extra 
administrative expenses” (“Beobachter Kompakt”, 2006). Beck (2004) also found that 
having SI signifi cantly reduces the probability to switch.
Hence, despite the separation between BI and SI, most consumers purchase both 
products from the same company. Given the important role of SI in health care fi nanc-
ing and the possibility of selective underwriting, selective advertising, and product 
and premium differentiation, the joint purchase of SI and BI makes SI a potentially 
useful tool for risk-selection in the BI-market (Table 6b).
6.3.5.4. Evidence of risk-selection via SI
Beck (2006) shows that the impact of risk-selection on premiums increased from 
1997 to 2006 by a factor of 12 and can explain a substantial part of the variation in 
premiums. Although empirical research is hampered by the fact that risk-selection 
is a hidden activity by insurers, there is substantial evidence suggesting that risk-
selection via SI in the BI-market is becoming more and more important (Beck, 2004; 
Colombo, 2001). Each year several insurers launch new SI-products that are particu-
larly attractive to healthy customers. In addition, SI-premiums are increasingly risk-
rated, new SI-products for upgraded hospital accommodation targeted at specifi c 
age groups (eg. SI-policies were launched under the label “Hospital 20” and “Hospital 
30”). These new SI-products are attractive for young people as long as they pass the 
mandatory health check.
6.4. CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIVE-COUNTRY COMPARISON
In this chapter we developed a conceptual framework to assess the probability that 
insurers use supplementary insurance as a tool for risk-selection in basic insurance 
markets. We identifi ed two preconditions for using SI as a selection device: (1) the 
presence of incentives for risk-selection in BI, and (2) the presence of links between SI 
and BI. Next, we identifi ed which factors determine the strength of the incentives for 
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risk-selection in BI and the usefulness of SI as a tool for risk-selection. We applied our 
framework to fi ve countries in which the preconditions are met, and conclude that 
the probability that SI is or will be used for risk-selection substantially varies across 
countries.
The main fi ndings of our fi ve country comparison are summarised in Tables 6b, 6c 
and 6d.
Table 6b concludes that incentives for risk-selection in BI-markets are particularly 
strong in Switzerland and Germany, moderate in Israel and the Netherlands (since 
2006) and relatively weak in Belgium.
Table 6c concludes that the usefulness of SI as a tool for risk-selection in BI is highest 
in Switzerland, followed by the Netherlands, Belgium and Israel. In contrast, SI is not 
a particularly useful selection device in Germany.
Table 6d combines the fi ndings of Table 6b and 6c to assess the probability that SI 
is or will be used for risk-selection in each of the fi ve countries. In Switzerland, SI is 
most likely to be used for risk-selection in BI. Although insurers typically try to hide 
risk-selection activities, there is substantial evidence that SI is increasingly used for 
risk-selection in Swiss BI-market. In the Netherlands the probability that SI will be 
used for risk-selection in BI has been substantially increased since the introduction of 
the new BI-scheme in 2006. During the fi rst two years of the reform, health insurers 
agreed to accept all applicants for SI without selection. For subsequent years this 
agreement will no longer hold, however, and the intensifi ed competition may prompt 
insurers to use SI as an effective strategy for risk-selection. Despite the strong incen-
tives for risk-selection in Germany, SI is not a very useful tool for risk-selection. Nev-
ertheless, there is some evidence of BI-carriers using SI-benefi ts as a way to attract 
favourable risk groups or to deter unfavourable ones. As compared to Germany, Bel-
gium presents the opposite case, where SI could be effectively used for risk-selection 
in BI but the incentives to do so are weak. Despite these limited incentives, SI also 
appears to be increasingly used in Belgium to attract favourable risk groups. In Israel, 
insurers are faced with moderate incentives for risk-selection. Although SI and BI are 
closely linked, the room to use SI for risk-selection is limited by regulation. At present, 
there is no evidence that SI is used in Israel for risk-selection in BI.
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Table 6b. Strength of incentives for risk-selection in BI
Belgium Germany Israel The 
Netherlands
Switzerland
Quality of the risk-
equalisation scheme
Moderate Moderate Low High Low
Financial risk for insurers Low
7.5%
High
97%
High
>90%
Moderate
54%
High
100%
Competition among 
insurers
Weak Strong Weak Weak (until 
2006)
Strong (since 
2006)
Strong
Incentives for risk-
selection
Weak Strong Moderate Moderate Strong
Table 6c. Usefulness of SI for risk-selection in BI
Belgium Germany Israel The 
Netherlands
Switzerland
MSI VSI
Type of link Strong Strong Weak Strong Moderate (until 
2006) / Strong 
(since 2006)
Moderate
Freedom to use SI as 
tool for risk-selection
High Low High Low High High
Importance of SI Moderate Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Usefulness of SI for 
risk-selection in BI
Moderate/
High
Low Very 
low
Moderate Moderate/
High
High
Table 6d. Probability and evidence of risk-selection in BI via SI
Belgium Germany Israel The Netherlands Switzerland
MSI VSI
Incentives for risk-
selection
Weak Strong Strong Moderate Moderate Strong
Usefulness of SI for risk-
selection in BI
Moderate/High Low Very 
low
Moderate Moderate/High High
Probability of risk-
selection in BI via SI
Low Moderate Low Moderate Moderate/High High
Evidence of different 
strategies adopted to 
use SI as a tool for 
risk-selection
Yes Yes No No Limited Yes 
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6.5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
For policymakers, expanding supplementary health insurance may be an attractive 
policy option to alleviate the mounting pressure to contain public spending. For 
insurers, however, the expansion of SI may offer opportunities for risk-selection in 
BI-markets. Policymakers may want to avoid this spillover effect, since risk-selection 
is likely to reduce both access (due to lower cross-subsidies) and choice (due to lower 
switching opportunities) for specifi c risk groups.
Policymakers can pursue two main strategies to reduce the probability that SI 
is or will be used for risk-selection in BI-markets. The fi rst strategy is to reduce the 
incentives for risk-selection in BI. The most effective way to accomplish this is by 
improving the risk-equalisation scheme. Particularly in Germany, Israel and Swit-
zerland, where the quality of the current risk-equalisation scheme is quite poor, the 
risk-equalisation formula needs to be improved to neutralise the strong incentives 
for selection. Alternative ways to reduce the incentives for risk-selection are to limit 
insurers’ fi nancial risk (as in Belgium), and to restrict competition among insurers (as 
in Israel). Both alternatives have the important drawback, however, that they also 
reduce the incentives for effi ciency.
The second strategy is to reduce the usefulness of SI as a selection device. The 
most effective way to do this would be to enforce a strict separation of SI and BI pro-
viders (as was the case in the VSI-market in Germany prior to 2004). However, a strict 
separation would raise consumers’ search costs and inhibit an effective coordination 
of services covered by BI and SI. A less radical measure would be to forbid tie-in sales 
provisions in SI-contracts; although the Swiss experience shows that such a measure 
can be easily circumvented. The usefulness of SI as a selection device can also be 
limited by imposing regulatory restrictions to SI-providers such as open enrolment, 
standardised benefi ts and premium rate restrictions (as in Israel). A disadvantage 
of these regulations may be that they hamper an effi cient functioning of the SI-
market. For instance, premium rate restrictions and standardised benefi ts may result 
in adverse selection and could expose insurers to a premium death spiral (Cutler and 
Reber, 1998). Moreover, for EU countries like Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
regulating SI may not be a feasible option, since it is likely to be in confl ict with the 
prevailing EU regulation (as argued in chapter 5). An alternative strategy to counter-
act the use of SI as a tool for risk-selection is to make this hidden strategy transpar-
ent. In the Netherlands, for instance, the national patient federation (NPCF) and the 
Dutch Health Authority (NZa) periodically monitor insurers’ behaviour. By investigat-
ing and exposing the use of health questionnaires for applicants of SI, the use of 
tying-in strategies and the underwriting practices, the fear of a loss of reputation 
may prevent insurers from using SI for risk-selection purposes. Hence, bringing the 
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‘reputation mechanism’ into play might be an effective complement to the fi rst-best 
strategy of improving the quality of the risk-equalisation scheme.
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7.
Conclusions and discussion
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7.1. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the role of supplementary health insurance in 
different countries’ health care fi nancing has received considerable attention from 
policy-makers and analysts. In an increasing number of OECD countries, health care 
reforms have been proposed in the direction of increasing the role of supplementary 
health insurance markets in the fi nancing of health care. The major reasons behind 
the increasing reliance on supplementary health insurance markets are the alleged 
ineffi ciencies of collectively fi nanced schemes, and the increasing constraints upon 
collective spending caused by the rising health care expenditures. The simplest 
government strategy to face the worldwide growth in health care expenditures, in 
the presence of constrained public resources, is to increase the share of individuals’ 
contributions to health care fi nancing by an increasing reliance on supplementary 
health care fi nancing schemes.
In this thesis, the focus is on the design of basic and supplementary health care 
fi nancing schemes and on the implications of an increasing reliance on supplemen-
tary health care fi nancing schemes on effi ciency and affordability of basic health care 
services. For this purpose, we envisaged two elements to characterize health care 
fi nancing schemes: 1) the implementation of a system of mandatory cross-subsidies 
that guarantees the fi nancial access to care for vulnerable groups (ie. low-income 
or high-risk people); and 2) the enforcement of a legal obligation for individuals to 
purchase coverage for a predefi ned set of services. The presence of a system of cross-
subsidies is crucial to distinguish basic from supplementary services. The enforce-
ment of a legal obligation to purchase coverage is essential to discern mandatory 
from voluntary coverage. Based on a distinction between basic and supplementary 
services and between mandatory and voluntary coverage, a classifi cation of different 
countries’ health care fi nancing schemes was proposed with the purpose of answer-
ing the central question of this thesis:
• What are the consequences of an increasing share of supplementary health insur-
ance for the effi ciency and affordability of basic health care services?
The present study is relevant since supplementary health insurance is viewed as an 
alternative to collective fi nancing that effectively enhances effi ciency and increases 
consumer choice. In particular, competition in supplementary health insurance 
markets is considered as a vehicle to achieve these goals. However, an increasing 
reliance on competitive and unregulated markets for supplementary insurance may 
also reduce access to health insurance for high-risk groups. This happens because 
competition induces insurers to differentiate premiums according to individuals’ risk 
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profi les (risk-rating) or exclude some risks from coverage (risk-selection). These strat-
egies may result in high premiums and partial or even absent coverage for high-risk 
groups. Consequently, the potential social welfare gain from risk protection cannot 
be fully realized. Depending on the way supplementary health insurance markets 
are intertwined with basic health care fi nancing schemes, an increasing reliance on 
supplementary health insurance may also affect the fi nancial access to affordable 
basic health care services and the effi ciency of basic health care fi nancing schemes.
The study is organised as follows. First, we present a theoretical analysis for the 
design of health care fi nancing arrangements and its application to different OECD 
countries. Then, we perform empirical and institutional investigations of the implica-
tions of an increasing share of supplementary health care fi nancing on the effi ciency 
and affordability of basic health care services.
7.2. THE DESIGN OF BASIC AND SUPPLEMENTARY HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
SCHEMES
The proposed typology of health care fi nancing schemes, which classifi es health 
care fi nancing schemes along the dimensions of basic/supplementary (services) and 
mandatory/voluntary (coverage), is based on the distinction between mandatory 
cross-subsidies and mandatory coverage. Therefore, it becomes fundamental to an-
swer the following research question:
• What can be the economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of 
mandatory cross-subsidies and to implement a legal mandate to purchase cover-
age for a set of predefi ned services?
The conclusion of our analysis is that the main economic arguments for govern-
ments to enforce a system of mandatory cross-subsidies that guarantees the fi nan-
cial access to predefi ned basic services to high-risk or low-income individuals are 
the presence of externalities in health services consumption and the lack of private 
insurance against the fi nancial risk of becoming a high-risk in the future. In particu-
lar, the larger are the externalities in the demand for health care services and the less 
feasible is insurance against the risk of becoming a high-risk in the future, the more 
a system of cross-subsidies is justifi able on economic grounds. A system of cross-sub-
sidies may induce moral hazard and lead to an increase in total medical care costs. 
Ceteris paribus, this may be an argument for governments not to cross-subsidize the 
fi nancial access to services with a high price-elasticity of demand.
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From our analysis, we identifi ed three main economic arguments for govern-
ments to enforce mandatory coverage: free riding, lack of foresight, and the transac-
tion costs of organising otherwise a system of mandatory cross-subsidies. In many 
OECD countries, the introduction of mandatory coverage is intended to enhance 
the fi nancial accessibility to health care services for low-income and high-risk in-
dividuals. Nevertheless, mandatory coverage is not per se necessary to achieve the 
goal of affordability, given that the implementation of a system of mandatory cross-
subsidies is a suffi cient measure to guarantee the fi nancial access to basic services 
for low-income and high-risk individuals. The extent to which a mandatory coverage 
provision is necessary for the prevention of free riding and myopic behaviour is not 
equal for different income groups and for different types of services and health risks. 
In particular, the higher the income the less necessary is a legal obligation to obtain 
coverage for a broad set of services (eg. including the coverage for non-catastrophic 
risks or of services with low average expected costs). Moreover, a universal mandate 
to pay for a uniform and broad set of services may not be proportionate because 
it may unnecessarily reduce the responsiveness to consumers’ preferences, induce 
moral hazard and increase health care costs, and thereby lead to a welfare loss for 
society. Consistent with the free riding and the lack of foresight arguments man-
datory coverage could be fi ne-tuned according to the individuals’ available income. 
Although the fi ne-tuning of mandatory coverage may limit the extent of moral 
hazard compared to universal mandatory coverage, it may involve transaction costs. 
Therefore, when introducing universal mandatory coverage for a uniform package 
of services, governments face a trade-off between moral hazard, on the one hand, 
and the transaction costs of fi ne-tuning and of organising otherwise a system of 
cross-subsidies. The following two strategies were proposed to smooth this trade-
off: a two-option scheme and a single-option scheme with voluntary income-related 
deductibles. These strategies are both suitable alternatives to universal mandatory 
coverage. For the following reasons the single-option scheme with income-related 
deductibles is preferable: the distinction between two options may be problematic 
in terms of the identifi cation of the criteria to differentiate the services between the 
two packages; the transaction costs of fi ne-tuning are higher and the possibilities for 
fi ne-tuning are smaller for the two-option scheme than for the single-option scheme 
with income-related deductibles.
Based on our theoretical analysis, we examined the economic rationales of the 
health care fi nancing schemes of several OECD countries (eg. Australia, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States). 
In particular, we addressed the following question:
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• Is the design of health care fi nancing schemes in the selected countries in confor-
mity with the economic rationales for organising a system of mandatory cross-
subsidies, and for imposing mandatory coverage?
The tendency in most of the selected countries is to have universal mandatory cover-
age for a uniform and broad set of services. Only Germany and Ireland have introduced 
the two-option scheme. In Germany, the high-option scheme (ie. for low-income 
people) appears to be too broad, because it applies to 90 percent of the population 
and it provides coverage for services such as spa, ambulatory care etc. for which the 
arguments for mandatory coverage are weak and incentives for moral hazard par-
ticularly strong. For these services the government may consider to lower the income 
threshold or to introduce income-related copayments/deductibles. Albeit there is no 
two-option scheme in France, high fi xed-copayments apply to the coverage of most 
basic services. Nevertheless, the fact that in France individuals may purchase vol-
untary subsidised health insurance for the coverage of copayments may offset the 
effectiveness of this tool to limit moral hazard and thereby health care expenditures. 
In Ireland the mandatory coverage provision for ambulatory care and prescription 
drugs applies to only 30 percent of the population. The low price-elasticity and high 
costs of prescription drugs provides economic arguments for extending the manda-
tory coverage provision for expensive drugs to the majority of the population.
Although the single-option scheme with voluntary income-related deductibles is 
the preferred alternative to universal coverage from an economic perspective, it is 
partly implemented only in few countries. In Switzerland, a single-option scheme 
with traditional deductibles (fi xed amounts) is implemented for all services consid-
ered as basic. In the Netherlands there are two distinct single-option schemes. One 
provides coverage for long-term care services and is combined with income-related 
copayments (ie. AWBZ). The other provides coverage for other basic services and 
resembles the Swiss single-option scheme with voluntary fi xed-deductibles. Fixed 
deductibles do not address appropriately the problems of free riding and myopic 
behaviour given that they may be too high for low-income people and too low for 
high-income people. For the same reason they are less effective than income-related 
deductibles in tackling moral hazard.
Some inferences were made also about the effectiveness of the systems of man-
datory cross-subsidies in relation to the services subsidised in different countries. 
In conformity with the economic arguments for mandatory cross-subsidies, in most 
countries everyone may benefi t from cross-subsidies for the coverage or the access 
to long-term care. Australia and Belgium are rather exceptional. In Australia a com-
bination of explicit (eg. risk-equalisation) and implicit (eg. community-rating) cross-
subsidies exists only for individuals purchasing voluntary health insurance. In the 
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past decades, the peculiar combination of a poor quality risk-equalisation scheme (ie. 
two age-bands) with community-rating per insurer has induced an adverse selection 
spiral and has created incentives for risk-selection in the Australian voluntary health 
insurance market.
In Belgium the coverage of home care is mandatory for everyone but not cross-
subsidised. Substituting an explicit system of mandatory cross-subsidies with an 
implicit one (ie. universal mandatory coverage) might be effective in the short run, 
but it is not a stable solution because in the long run insurers have incentives for 
risk-selection. An effective long-term solution might be to introduce explicit risk-
adjusted subsidies for home care in Belgium.
7.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFICIENCY AND AFFORDABILITY
Based on the proposed classifi cation, the thesis focuses on the consequences on af-
fordability and effi ciency of a shift from basic towards supplementary health insur-
ance schemes. First, we answer the following research questions:
• Why and to what extent do insurers risk-rate premiums in supplementary health 
insurance markets?
• What is the potential for risk-rating caused by transferring services from basic to 
supplementary health insurance?
In competitive markets for voluntary supplementary health insurance, insurers are 
more likely to risk-rate premiums:
- The greater the freedom in setting premiums (ie. absence of premium rate re-
strictions) and the degree of competition in the voluntary supplementary health 
insurance market.
- The more consumers are sensitive to price-variations and willing to switch.
- The lower the transaction costs involved in the risk-rating process.
- The greater the availability, the stability and the profi tability of risk-adjusters 
that effectively represent good predictors of future individuals’ health care ex-
penditures.
- The lower the loss of reputation produced by risk-rating.
In most countries, supplementary health insurance markets are far less regulated 
than basic health insurance markets or tax-funded schemes. Apart from few excep-
tions (such as Belgium and Germany), the purchase of supplementary health insur-
ance is usually voluntary. Cross-subsidisation between low and high risk/income 
groups and legal restrictions on the premiums setting (eg. community-rating) are 
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practically absent. Nevertheless, risk-rating is limited. This can be explained by the 
absence of strong price-competition, the consumers’ low price-sensitivity or propen-
sity to switch due to the linkage with basic insurance, insurers’ social reputation and 
as a strategy to avoid government intervention. In the long run, however, the ex-
pansion of competitive markets for voluntary supplementary health insurance may 
increase price-competition, which may induce insurers to risk-rate premiums.
An empirical analysis was developed to investigate the potential for risk-rating 
due to the transfer of benefi ts from basic to supplementary coverage in the long run. 
For this analysis, we considered competitive and unregulated markets for voluntary 
supplementary health insurance, where consumers are sensitive to price-variations, 
transaction costs are minimal and risk-adjusters available at a reasonable cost. A 
dataset issued by one of the largest insurers in the Netherlands was used to simulate 
different scenarios in which several benefi ts, eg. dental care, paramedic care, pre-
scription drugs and medical devices, were transferred from basic to supplementary 
insurance coverage. We chose these benefi ts because most OECD countries consider 
them as supplementary services, ie. the access to (the coverage of) these services is 
not cross-subsidised. The results of the study indicate that a shift away from basic to 
supplementary health insurance is likely to lead to a substantial premium variation 
for most benefi ts. We found that risk-rating primarily affects the maximum premium. 
For services such as dental care, the potential gains of risk-rating for insurers are likely 
to be acceptable for society given that the difference between the community-rated 
premium and the risk-rated premiums is quite small in absolute terms and does not 
change if insurers use sophisticated risk-rating models. Particularly for prescription 
drugs and medical devices, the potential gains of risk-rating for insurers are already 
substantial if insurers use a simple demographic model and increase if insurers use 
additional risk-factors (eg. Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs) and Pharmaceuticals Cost 
Groups (PCGs). For these benefi ts the potential consequences of risk-rating in terms 
of access to affordable insurance coverage may be considered not “socially accept-
able”, since they result in high premiums for certain risk/income groups. Besides, this 
may also result in a welfare loss to society if individuals’ (altruistic) preferences can-
not be met.
Therefore, when transferring benefi ts from basic (community-rated premiums) to 
supplementary (risk-rated premiums) health insurance schemes a careful consider-
ation of the consequences on effi ciency and affordability of this transfer is required. 
For services for which the risk-rated premium variations are substantial, policy mak-
ers may decide not to transfer these benefi ts from basic (ie. subsidised) to supple-
mentary (ie. non-subsidised) health insurance schemes.
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Furthermore, governments have to consider whether the different intervention strat-
egies available are effective in achieving an affordable access to health care in basic 
health insurance schemes. Therefore, the following questions were addressed:
• What is the best strategy that governments can adopt to achieve an “acceptable 
level of solidarity” in competitive health insurance markets from an economic per-
spective?
• Do the different intervention strategies conform to the European Community (EC) 
legal framework?
Without external intervention competitive health insurance markets tend to risk-rat-
ed premiums or may induce insurers to select favourable risks. By observing different 
countries, we identifi ed several intervention strategies that governments may adopt 
to achieve affordable insurance premiums in competitive basic health insurance mar-
kets. The most common strategies, which can be adopted alone or in combination, 
are the following four: premium rate restrictions (eg. community-rating) and open 
enrolment, risk-equalisation schemes, premium-compensation schemes and excess-
loss-compensation schemes. From an economic perspective, the preferred strategy is 
to introduce a system of risk-equalisation.A system of risk-equalisation corresponds 
to a scheme of explicit cross-subsidies, such that the high-risks receive a risk-adjusted 
premium subsidy from a solidarity fund, which is fi lled with (mandatory) solidarity 
contributions from the low-risks. To the extent that the risk-equalisation scheme is 
not capable to suffi ciently compensate health insurers for predictable losses, the 
other three strategies may additionally be required to achieve an affordable ac-
cess to health insurance coverage. Without an adequate risk-equalisation scheme, 
premium rate restrictions and open enrolment are not effective in guaranteeing an 
“acceptable level of risk-solidarity”, because they create incentives for selection that 
may threaten the quality of care for high-risk people, effi ciency and consumer satis-
faction. Premium- and excess-loss- compensation schemes are effective in achieving 
risk- and income- solidarity to whatever extent society wants. On the other hand, 
they reduce the competitive advantage of the most effi cient insurers and thereby 
overall price-competition. Moreover, these strategies increase the consumers’ incen-
tives to overinsure (ie. moral hazard) and diminish the consumers’ incentives to shop 
around for the lowest premium, and thereby insurers’ incentive for effi ciency. There-
fore society has to weigh the solidarity-gains with the effi ciency-losses caused by the 
introduction of premium- and excess-loss-compensation schemes.
For European Union (EU) countries, any potential restriction of free trade and com-
petition of national policies has to be compatible with supranational regulations (ie. 
EC-law). Therefore, the different intervention strategies proposed to guarantee the 
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access to affordable health insurance have to be in conformity with EC competition 
rules and with the Insurance Directives. In order to assess the conformity with EC-
law, the necessity and proportionality tests were applied to verify whether the four 
alleged intervention strategies satisfi ed them. We found that also from an EC legal 
perspective, risk-equalisation schemes represent the fi rst-best intervention strategy 
to achieve an “acceptable level of risk-solidarity” in EU Member States’ competitive 
markets for basic health insurance. As explained, perfect risk-equalisation schemes 
guarantee risk-solidarity without hindering free trade or competition and do not re-
duce effi ciency. Therefore, risk-equalisation schemes are necessary and proportionate 
measures to realize the goal of affordability. Premium rate restrictions and open en-
rolment may be considered as “justifi able hindrances” to free trade and competition 
under the EC legal framework only if combined with an excess-loss-compensation 
scheme (Article 54 of the Insurance Directives). Premium- and excess-loss- compen-
sation schemes were found less proportionate than risk-equalisation schemes, and 
therefore per se unjustifi able hindrances of free trade and competition from an EC 
legal perspective. But in case the level of risk-solidarity achieved by an “imperfect 
risk-equalisation system” is not considered as “socially acceptable”, in terms of the 
“allowable” premium variation, the regulator may adopt premium- and excess-loss- 
compensation schemes as complementary to the best available risk-equalisation 
scheme. Such combinations constitute a justifi able hindrance to free trade and com-
petition from an EC-law perspective.
Finally the extent to which supplementary health insurance can be used as a tool for 
risk-selection in competitive markets for basic health insurance was analysed for the 
following fi ve countries: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
The following research questions were addressed:
• What are the conditions under which supplementary health insurance can be used 
as a selection device in competitive markets for mandatory basic health insur-
ance?
• To what extent are these conditions fulfi lled in the competitive mandatory basic 
health insurance markets of the fi ve countries considered?
Under certain conditions basic health insurance carriers are likely to use supplemen-
tary health insurance as a selection device in competitive markets for basic health 
insurance. Risk-selection in basic health insurance markets may reduce access to 
affordable health insurance due to a reduction of cross-subsidies from low- to high- 
risk groups, may reduce quality of care for unprofi table risk groups and may reduce 
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effi ciency, since the resources invested in risk-selection produce no welfare gain for 
society.
We identifi ed and examined two necessary preconditions and several determi-
nants to assess the chance that basic insurance carriers adopt supplementary health 
insurance as a selection tool. The fi rst precondition is that insurers have to have in-
centives for risk-selection in basic health insurance markets, which depends on the 
quality of the risk-equalisation scheme, on whether insurers bear the fi nancial risk 
for their insurance activities, and on the level of competition. The second precondi-
tion is the presence of a link between supplementary and basic health insurance 
providers or products. The ‘strength’ of the links between supplementary and basic 
health insurance depends on the following three determinants:
1. The type of link between basic and supplementary insurances;
2. The freedom insurers have in setting the terms of the insurance contracts, the 
enrolment rules and the types of benefi ts covered; and
3. The importance of supplementary health insurance in terms of total health care 
fi nancing and of the percentage of individuals purchasing it.
After having identifi ed and examined these conditions, we investigated to what 
extent they are fulfi lled in fi ve countries where the preconditions are met and risk-
selection in basic health insurance markets is a potential problem: Belgium, Germany, 
Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Given the quality of the risk-equalisation for-
mula, the extent of competition and the insurers’ fi nancial risk in the fi ve countries’ 
basic health insurance markets, incentives for risk-selection are particularly strong 
in Germany and Switzerland, moderately pronounced in the Netherlands and Israel, 
and relatively weak in Belgium. In all countries, except for voluntary supplementary 
health insurance in Germany, basic and supplementary health insurance are linked 
either formally or informally (or both). This implies that supplementary health insur-
ance is a potential selection tool in basic health insurance markets. In Switzerland, 
the availability of various strategies to use supplementary health insurance as a se-
lection device combined with the strong incentives for risk-selection makes supple-
mentary health insurance a very powerful tool to select favourable risks in the basic 
health insurance markets. This is confi rmed by the available evidence regarding the 
use of supplementary insurance as a selection tool. In Germany, there is also some 
evidence that mandatory supplementary health insurance is used as selection de-
vice. However, since the importance of mandatory supplementary health insurance 
is limited and diminishing, its usefulness as a selection device is limited. In the Neth-
erlands, the sophisticated risk-equalisation scheme limits but does not eliminate 
the incentives for risk-selection in the basic health insurance market. Furthermore, 
the existence of informal links and unrestricted opportunities to risk-select in the 
supplementary insurance market make supplementary health insurance an attrac-
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tive tool for risk-selection, especially after the 2006 reform, which allows new com-
mercial insurers to enter the basic health insurance market. Despite the incentives 
for risk-selection in the Israelis’ basic health insurance market and the strong formal 
links between basic and supplementary insurers, the probability that supplementary 
health insurance is used as a selection device is substantially reduced by legal restric-
tions. Finally, in Belgium supplementary health insurance is a useful selection device. 
On the other hand, due to the weak incentives for risk-selection, the probability that 
supplementary insurance is adopted as a selection device is quite low. Nevertheless, 
there is growing anecdotal evidence showing that an increasing number of basic 
insurers use supplementary health insurance as a tool to select favourable risks in 
basic health insurance markets.
7.4. EPILOGUE
The central question addressed in this thesis is the following:
• What are the consequences of an increasing share of supplementary health insur-
ance for the effi ciency and affordability of basic health care services?
Based on our theoretical and empirical fi ndings, the answer to the central question 
can be summarized as follows. Supplementary health insurance can play a useful 
role in containing public health care fi nancing, and in improving the effi ciency of 
resource allocation in health services and health insurance markets. But the effects 
of an increasing reliance on supplementary health insurance strongly depend on 
the complex interaction between basic and supplementary health care fi nancing 
schemes.
In the long run, a transfer of benefi ts from basic to supplementary health care 
fi nancing schemes reduces the affordability of health insurance coverage. The ab-
sence of government regulation (eg. community-rating) and of cross-subsidies in 
most countries’ competitive markets for supplementary health insurance can induce 
insurers to risk-rate premiums. As indicated by the variation of the premium range 
for the different benefi ts, the potential for risk-rating in supplementary health in-
surance markets is particularly large for services such as drugs and medical devices 
and small for dental care and paramedic care. For drugs the premium may range 
from a minimum of about 40 euros to a maximum of about 2200 euros per year, 
and for medical devices from a minimum of 12 euros to a maximum of 723 euros 
per year. For dental care the premium may range from 27 euros (minimum) to 143 
euros (maximum) per year, and for paramedic care from 13 euros (minimum) to 314 
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euros (maximum) per year. Both for affordability and effi ciency reasons policymak-
ers when expanding supplementary health insurance by transferring benefi ts from 
basic health care fi nancing schemes should consciously decide for which benefi ts 
(packages) and to what extent (in terms of “allowable” premium variation) cross-
subsidisation is desired. The (potential) high premium range due to risk-rating for 
drugs and medical devices may be a reason for governments to consider which spe-
cifi c drugs or medical devices, if any, to transfer from basic to supplementary health 
care fi nancing schemes and whether to fi ne-tune the coverage of basic services with 
some form of co-insurance (eg. deductibles or co-payments).
The expansion of supplementary health care fi nancing schemes has repercussions 
also on the effi ciency and affordability of basic health care fi nancing schemes. In Bis-
markian countries (eg. Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland) 
the close intertwining between the competitive markets for basic and supplementa-
ry health insurance offers the opportunities to use supplementary health insurance 
as a selection device in competitive markets for basic health insurance. Without ad-
equate government intervention, risk-selection is likely to reduce both access (due to 
lower cross-subsidies) and choice (due to lower switching opportunities) for specifi c 
risk groups. From an economic perspective, the most effective strategy to reduce the 
probability that supplementary health insurance is or will be used for risk-selection 
in basic health insurance markets is to improve the risk-equalisation scheme. Other 
strategies such as limiting the insurers’ fi nancial risk, restricting competition among 
insurers, enforcing a strict separation between supplementary and basic health 
insurance providers, forbidding tie-in sales provisions in supplementary insurance 
contracts, may result in an ineffi cient functioning of both basic and supplementary 
health care fi nancing schemes. For EU countries the adoption and improvement of 
the risk-equalisation scheme is the fi rst-best intervention strategy also from a legal 
perspective. In particular, the introduction of legal restrictions of competition such 
as community-rating and open enrolment may not be in conformity with EC-law un-
less it is in combination with a full loss compensation scheme.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
DE VORMGEVING VAN BASIS- EN AANVULLENDE ZORGVERZEKERINGEN: 
IMPLICATIES VOOR DOELMATIGHEID EN BETAALBAARHEID
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de vormgeving van basis- en aanvullende zorgverzekerin-
gen. Het belangrijkste doel van deze studie is te onderzoeken wat de gevolgen zijn 
van een toenemend aandeel van aanvullende verzekeringen in de fi nanciering van 
gezondheidszorg voor de doelmatigheid en betaalbaarheid van zorg.
De belangrijkste onderzoeksresultaten worden hieronder opgesomd.
Hoofdstuk twee bespreekt de economische motieven die een rol spelen bij de vorm-
geving van het fi nancieringsysteem. Hierbij wordt expliciet een onderscheid gemaakt 
tussen de motieven voor verplichte kruissubsidies en de motieven voor een verzeker-
ingsplicht. De belangrijkste motieven voor verplichte kruissubsidies zijn de externe 
effecten van zorggebruik en de kans voor een individu om in de toekomst een hoog 
risico te worden. Een argument tégen verplichte kruissubsidies voor zorgverzekerin-
gen is dat dit kan leiden tot een toename van het moreel risico (dat wil zeggen: het 
‘gebruikmaken of verschaffen van meer of duurdere medische diensten, veroorzaakt 
door het feit dat de verzekering de kosten vergoedt’). De motieven voor een verplich-
te verzekeringsdekking zijn gerelateerd aan de mogelijkheden tot liftersgedrag bij 
afwezigheid van een verzekeringsplicht, de neiging van individuen om toekomstige 
risico’s te laag in te schatten, en de hoge transactiekosten die zijn verbonden aan 
het op een andere manier organiseren van kruissubsidies. Geconcludeerd wordt dat 
verplichte kruissubsidies voldoende zijn voor het realiseren van een betaalbare zorg-
premie voor kwetsbare groepen. Een voor iedereen verplichte verzekering met een 
uniform pakket is hiervoor in beginsel niet nodig. Indien de fi nanciële toegankelijk-
heid via verplichte kruissubsidies is gegarandeerd, kan voor hogere inkomensgroepen 
de omvang van het verplichte verzekeringspakket worden verkleind en/of de hoogte 
van het eigen risico voor de basisverzekering worden verhoogd. Het voordeel hiervan 
is een vermindering van moreel risico.
In hoofdstuk drie wordt het theoretisch kader uit hoofdstuk twee toegepast op de 
volgende landen: Australië, België, Frankrijk, Duitsland, Ierland, Israel, Nederland, 
Zwitserland en de Verenigde Staten. Landen als Australië, België, Frankrijk, Nederland 
en Israel kennen een voor iedereen verplichte verzekering met een uitgebreid, uni-
form pakket. Zoals beargumenteerd in hoofdstuk 2, is deze maatregel niet noodzake-
lijk en niet proportioneel voor het bereiken van een betaalbare gezondheidszorg 
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voor kwetsbare groepen. Teneinde het moreel risico niet onnodig te vergroten zou de 
overheid als alternatief een beperkt pakket voor hoge inkomens en een uitgebreid 
pakket voor lage inkomens kunnen hanteren of een uniform pakket met een inko-
mensafhankelijk eigen risico dat laag is voor lage inkomens en hoog is voor hoge 
inkomens. Hoewel een uniform pakket met een inkomensafhankelijk eigen risico 
vanuit economisch perspectief de voorkeur verdient, is het in geen van de genoemde 
landen terug te vinden. Alleen Nederland en Zwitserland komen in de buurt van dit 
systeem gegeven het feit dat zij voor de curatieve zorg een uniform pakket hebben 
met traditionele (d.w.z. niet inkomensafhankelijke) eigen risico’s. Daarnaast is in 
Nederland de langdurige zorg opgenomen in een verplichte verzekering met een 
uniform pakket en inkomensafhankelijke eigen bijdragen. Een verplichte verzeker-
ing met een beperkt pakket voor hoge inkomens en een uitgebreid pakket voor lage 
inkomens vinden we in Duitsland en Ierland.
De markt van aanvullende verzekeringen kenmerkt zich door sterke concurrentie 
tussen verzekeraars. Dit kan leiden tot meer doelmatigheid en een toename van 
keuzemogelijkheden voor de consument. Sterke concurrentie kan verzekeraars ook 
aanzetten tot premiedifferentiatie en risicoselectie. Deze strategieën leiden tot ho-
gere premies en minder verzekeringsdekking voor verzekerden met een hoog risico. 
Hoofdstuk vier beschouwt mogelijke vormen van premiedifferentiatie die kunnen 
optreden bij een eventuele overheveling van zorg uit de basisverzekering naar de 
aanvullende verzekering. Voor verschillende zorgvormen wordt gesimuleerd hoe 
groot de premiebandbreedte bij premiedifferentiatie zou kunnen zijn. Deze simulatie 
laat zien dat de premiebandbreedte groot is voor medicijnen en hulpmiddelen en 
klein is voor tandheelkundige hulp en paramedische zorg. Voor medicijnen kan de 
premie variëren van 40 euro tot 2200 euro per jaar, voor hulpmiddelen van 12 euro 
tot 723 euro per jaar; voor tandheelkundige hulp van 27 euro tot 143 euro per jaar en 
voor paramedische hulp van 13 euro tot 314 euro per jaar. Gegeven zulke potentiële 
premieverschillen dienen beleidsmakers bij een eventuele overheveling van zorg van 
de basisverzekering naar aanvullende verzekeringen een bewuste keuze te maken 
voor welke zorgvormen kruissubsidiëring wenselijk is en in welke mate.
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt een economische analyse uitgevoerd van verschillende regul-
eringsmechanismen voor het bereiken van solidariteit op een concurrerende zorgver-
zekeringsmarkt. Vervolgens wordt getoetst of deze mechanismen in overeenstem-
ming zijn met het EG-recht. De belangrijkste bevinding van deze analyse is dat een 
systeem van risicoafhankelijke premiesubsidies vanuit economische overwegingen 
de beste manier is om solidariteit te realiseren en niet in strijd is met het EG-recht. 
Dit systeem kan leiden tot een acceptabel solidariteitsniveau zonder belemmer-
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ing van het vrije verkeer en concurrentie, en doet geen afbreuk aan doelmatigheid. 
Second-best alternatieven voor het bereiken van solidariteit zijn premieafhankelijke 
subsidies en het achteraf compenseren van hoge kosten (hetgeen tot lagere premies 
zal leiden voor de verzekerden met een hoog risico). Deze alternatieven gaan echter 
ten koste van de doelmatigheid. Een ander alternatief is premieregulering en een 
acceptatieplicht voor verzekeraars. Deze maatregelen geven verzekeraars prikkels 
tot risicoselectie en kunnen zodoende leiden tot verminderde toegankelijkheid tot 
goede zorg van chronisch zieken en tot verminderde doelmatigheid. Voorts zijn 
genoemde maatregelen in strijd met het EG-recht omdat zij niet noodzakelijk en 
niet proportioneel zijn. Dit is een relevante uitkomst voor de EU landen die premie-
regulering en acceptatieplicht hanteren naast een systeem van risicoafhankelijke 
premiesubsidies, zoals bijvoorbeeld Ierland en Nederland. Teneinde hun regulering 
in overeenstemming brengen met het EG-recht zouden deze landen de premiereg-
ulering en acceptatieplicht kunnen vervangen door premieafhankelijke subsidies (of 
zorgtoeslagen) of het achteraf compenseren van hoge kosten.
Naarmate aanvullende verzekeringen belangrijker worden in de fi nanciering van 
gezondheidszorg, worden zij een aantrekkelijker instrument voor risicoselectie 
in de basisverzekering. Hoofdstuk zes bespreekt een conceptueel model voor het 
vaststellen van de kans dat verzekeraars aanvullende verzekeringen gebruiken voor 
gunstige-risicoselectie in de basisverzekering. Dit model wordt vervolgens toegepast 
op vijf landen waarin risicoselectie via de aanvullende verzekering mogelijk is: Bel-
gië, Duitsland, Israel, Nederland en Zwitserland. Daaruit blijkt dat de risico’s op het 
gebruik van aanvullende verzekeringen als selectie-instrument in de basisverzeker-
ing het grootst zijn in Zwitserland en het kleinst in België. In Nederland is het risico 
toegenomen door invoering van de Zorgverzekeringswet in 2006. Ten slotte worden 
verschillende strategieën besproken die beleidsmakers kunnen gebruiken om de kans 
op risicoselectie via de aanvullende verzekeringen te verkleinen. Vanuit economisch 
perspectief is het verbeteren van de risicoverevening de meest effectieve strategie. 
Andere strategieën zoals het beperken van het fi nanciële risico van verzekeraars, 
het beperken van concurrentie tussen verzekeraars, het afdwingen van een strikte 
scheiding tussen basisverzekering en aanvullende verzekering en het verbieden van 
koppelverkoop kunnen leiden tot doelmatigheidsverliezen.
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